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THE ROLE OF INHIBITORY CONTROL IN THE COOPERATIVE PLAY 
OF HIGH-FUNCTIONING CHILDREN WITH AUTISM  
 
Summary 
This thesis contributes to the executive dysfunction account of autism by 
demonstrating that impairments in inhibitory control, an aspect of executive 
functioning, are partially responsible for deficits in the cooperative play of high-
functioning children with autism (HFA).  
As past research on whether inhibitory control is impaired in autism has been 
inconclusive, a meta-analysis of 42 empirical studies (57 effect sizes, total n = 2,256) 
was conducted, which provided clear evidence for impaired inhibition in HFA 
children. It was also found that the degree of impairment shown does not vary across 
measures of inhibition, which has important methodological implications for future 
research. 
Two experimental studies were carried out to directly test the link between 
inhibition and three components of cooperation: reciprocity, accepting the play 
partner’s input, and fairness. In study one, HFA children in primary school and age-
matched typically-developing (TD) peers were tested on engaging in joint attention, 
theory of mind (ToM), measures of inhibition, and a cooperative drawing task. The 
groups did not differ on first-order ToM and joint attention, but HFA participants 
demonstrated poorer inhibitory control and less cooperative behaviour. Importantly, 
the degree of impairment in inhibitory control predicted reciprocity and accepting the 
play partner’s input in HFA children.  
The second experimental study investigated whether poor inhibitory control 
can explain the well-established discrepancy between moral reasoning and actual 
sharing behaviour. A sample of HFA and TD children of primary school age 
completed a moral reasoning interview, inhibitory control tasks, and a Dictator 
Game. The results showed that while HFA children demonstrated age-typical levels 
of moral reasoning and sharing, inhibitory control emerged as the most important 
iii 
 
predictor of sharing behaviour, lending support to the hypothesis that the ability to 
suppress one’s own desires is a prerequisite of acting considerately.  
The last study comprises a qualitative investigation of TD children’s 
experience of engaging in cooperative play with their sibling who has a diagnosis of 
HFA. Six children between the ages of 5 and 11 were interviewed, and their reports 
analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Five themes 
emerged: poor emotion regulation, restricted interests, and no acceptance of the 
playmate’s contributions reduced the hedonistic value of joint play for the 
participants, but these were mitigated by appreciation for the HFA sibling’s 
creativity and adjustment to the HFA sibling’s behavioural atypicalities. These 
results can inform the development of support programmes for TD siblings and 
social skills training for HFA children. 
Overall, the results of the studies included in this thesis provide evidence that 
deficits in inhibitory control moderate the relationship between relatively intact 
social knowledge and impaired social competence in HFA children. This refinement 
of the executive dysfunction account is a useful building block for an improved 
multiple-deficit model of the autism phenotype.  
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Introduction 
1. Autism: a brief overview 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a pervasive developmental disorder characterised 
by deficits in social communication and social interaction, and by restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or activities (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  
According to the definition adopted in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-V), the term encompasses not only classic autism, but also 
the related disorders previously referred to as Asperger syndrome (AS) and pervasive 
developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), respectively.  
Autism is typically diagnosed in childhood, often with a comorbid diagnosis of 
intellectual disability (Chakrabarti & Fombonne, 2001), obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD, Russell et al., 2013), attention-deficit / hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD, Reiersen & Todd, 2008), or other medical and neurological problems.  
Over the past 20 years, there has been a marked increase in the number of ASD 
diagnoses (Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). Current estimates suggest that around 1 in 100 
children are affected. ASD is more common among males: a commonly referenced 
consensus ratio is 4:1 (Werling & Geschwind, 2013).  
 
1.1. Prevalence  
A recent epidemiological study conducted on a British sample estimated the 
prevalence of ASDs at 116 in 10,000 or 1 in 86 (Baird et al., 2006), very close to the 
US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention figure of 113 in 10,000 or 1 in 88 
(Baio, 2012), but estimates of the prevalence of autism vary broadly across studies 
conducted in various parts of the world, ranging from 60 to 260 in 10,000, or 
between 1 in 166 to 1 in 38 (Fombonne, 2009; Gillberg, 1984; Kawamura, 
Takahashi, & Ishii, 2008; Kim et al., 2011). In a meta-analysis of 37 prevalence 
studies, Williams et al. (2006) found that prevalence estimates were significantly 
affected by the diagnostic criteria used, the age of the children screened, and 
geographic location. There is consensus among experts, both researchers and 
practitioners, however, that the prevalence of ASDs has increased greatly over the 
past few decades (Kawamura et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2011; Walsh, Elsabbagh, 
Bolton, & Singh, 2011), apparently as a result of greater public awareness, the 
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broadening of diagnostic criteria for ASDs, lower age at diagnosis, and diagnostic 
substitution (Fombonne, 2008). For example, a US-based study reported a threefold 
increase in the number of ASD diagnoses given between 1997 and 2008 (Boyle et 
al., 2011).  
Nonetheless, the actual number of people with autism may be higher still: in a 
Korean epidemiological study (Kim et al., 2011), two thirds of the children identified 
as having an ASD were undiagnosed. Similarly, Baron-Cohen et al. (2009) estimated 
the ratio of known to unknown cases at 3 to 2 (i.e. 60 per cent undiagnosed) amongst 
British children of primary school age. This means that as many as 700,000 people 
may be affected by ASD in the UK.  
 
1.2. Aetiology 
Although autism was first described over 70 years ago (Kanner, 1943), its aetiology 
is still unclear. Attempts to link susceptibility to autism to environmental factors, 
such as detached and unemotional (“refrigerator”) parenting (Bettelheim, 1967; 
Eisenberg & Kanner, 1956) or, more recently, to exposure to the MMR vaccine 
(Wakefield et al., 1998) or thimerosal (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
1999) have been unsuccessful. A meta-analysis that examined over fifty prenatal risk 
factors concluded that no single factor was implicated in the aetiology of autism, 
although there was some evidence that complications in pregnancy (resulting, for 
example, from advanced parental age or prenatal medication use by the mother) were 
associated with increased risk of the disorder (Gardener, Spiegelman, & Buka, 2009).  
The search for biological markers (e.g. abnormalities in brain morphology and 
function) has proven similarly elusive for a number of reasons. Firstly, autism has a 
multidimensional and complex phenotype with substantial overlap with other 
disorders (Walsh et al., 2011), which makes it difficult to map biological markers 
onto clinically defined categories. Also, because autism is a developmental disorder, 
its clinical, cognitive, and behavioural manifestations change as the individual ages, 
suggesting an interplay between various risk factors, and making the identification of 
the (typically unchanging) implicated biological markers a difficult task (Elsabbagh 
& Johnson, 2010).  
The early onset of the symptoms, the fact that autism tends to run in families 
(Rutter, 2000), and the results of twin studies (Bailey et al., 1995; Hallmayer et al., 
2011) suggest that autism has a moderate to strong genetic component. The 
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identification of an “autism gene”, however, seems an ever more unattainable goal, 
because although a large number of promising susceptibility loci that have been 
identified, each only accounts for a small amount (between 1 and 2 per cent) of 
variance (Weiss et al., 2008), leading researchers to believe that the behavioural and 
cognitive heterogeneity of autism is mirrored at the genetic level (Unwin, Maybery, 
Wray, & Whitehouse, 2013).  
As a result of these difficulties, autism is still defined and diagnosed solely on 
the basis of behavioural criteria.  
 
1.3. Issues of diagnosis 
1.3.1. Gender bias in diagnosing autism  
Autism is a male-dominated diagnosis, and has been since its conception: eight of the 
eleven children described by Kanner (1943), and all four children described by 
Asperger (1944) were boys. It has even been conceptualised as a manifestation of an 
“extreme male brain” (Baron-Cohen, 2002). The extent of this gender bias varies 
across prevalence studies, with estimates ranging between 1.33:1 to 15.7:1 
(Fombonne, 2009), and is affected by whether a comorbid diagnosis of intellectual 
disability is given. In the “low-functioning” cases, the genders are more equally 
represented, but there is a very strong male bias in “high-functioning” autism. In his 
review of prevalence studies, Fombonne (1999) reported median sex ratios of 1.7:1 
when moderate to severe intellectual disability was present, and 6:1 when it was not. 
The fact that comorbid intellectual disability increases the likelihood of an autism 
diagnosis in females may suggest that girls’ generally faster social development leads 
to the diagnostic substitution of autism with another disorder (or no diagnosis) in 
“high-functioning” cases (Werling & Geschwind, 2013).  
 
1.3.2. The “spectrum” of autism 
As noted above, the diagnostic criteria for autism have been revised in the latest 
edition of the DSM, and AS and PDD-NOS have now been merged into ASD. 
Formerly, a diagnosis of AS was given when impairments in social interaction and 
communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests were not 
accompanied by a clinically significant delay in cognitive development (including 
language use). PDD-NOS was used for cases of “atypical autism”, i.e. when late age 
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of onset, atypical or subthreshold symptomatology, or a combination of these factors 
meant that the presentation did not fully meet the criteria for an autism diagnosis.  
This revision of the diagnostic categories reflects that the former clinical 
subgroups have not been successfully mapped to specific aetiologies, or to distinct 
cognitive and behavioural profiles (Walsh et al., 2011), and represents the latest 
change in the ever developing perception of autism, both public and professional. 
Originally conceptualised as a categorical disorder that manifests itself in a well-
defined set of impairments and affects only a small number of people, autism later 
became an umbrella term for a diverse group of conditions that affect individuals 
differently, and to different extents, with the emergence of the concept of an autistic 
“spectrum” in the 1980s (Wing, 1996). While a substantial proportion of people 
affected by autism have a comorbid intellectual disability and no language, those on 
the “high-functioning” end of the spectrum can sometimes lead independent lives 
despite sharing the core diagnostic features of impaired social interaction and 
restricted interests (Farley et al., 2009) although this is, sadly, not the typical 
outcome (see e.g. Howlin et al., 2014; Seltzer et al., 2004).  
Extending the idea of a spectrum even further, there is increasing consensus 
today that a diagnosis of ASD represents a quantitative, rather than qualitative, 
difference, i.e. that there is a smooth continuum between autism and the general 
population (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Mirroring this process, the public perception of a 
person with autism is shifting away from Raymond Babbitt (the Rain Man character) 
and towards Sheldon Cooper (a socially awkward but highly intelligent physicist in 
US sitcom The Big Bang Theory). ASD is portrayed in the media as the “geek 
syndrome” (Silberman, 2001), i.e. an extreme manifestation of the restricted interests 
and difficulties in social interaction that characterise certain subgroups of the non-
clinical population.  
An important implication of this shift in the definition of autism is the growing 
appreciation of phenotypic heterogeneity, which poses substantial challenges to 
formulating a comprehensive theory of autism. This has prompted a number of 
researchers to abandon the search for a single genetic, neurological, or psychological 
explanation for the diverse symptoms that characterise autism (e.g. Happé, Ronald, 
& Plomin, 2006). They opt instead to focus on multiple-deficit accounts, hoping that 
these would be better able to capture the diversity of the phenotype and the overlap 
between autism and other disorders, as well as with the general population.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Psychological accounts of autism – a changing landscape  
The theoretical framework of autism is in a state of transition. The psychological 
accounts that shaped our understanding of the disorder for several decades have 
proven unable to provide a comprehensive explanation for its diverse behavioural 
manifestations, and in the wake of a landmark article by Happé, Ronald and Plomin 
(2006), an increasing number of researchers now argue that further progress requires 
a paradigm shift: namely a recasting of autism as a ‘fractionable’ set of impairments, 
each with its own distinct aetiology (see also Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Happé & 
Ronald, 2008).  
There is, of course, considerable disagreement among researchers over not just 
the details of this ‘fractionable triad’ account, but also about whether its fundamental 
assumption, i.e. that no single-deficit model can prove satisfactory, is correct (e.g. 
Hobson, 2014; Rutter, 2014). Chevallier et al. (2012), for example, have recently put 
forward their social motivation theory, which posits that the origin of autistic 
symptoms lies not in a combination of cognitive impairments, but rather in an 
extremely reduced drive for social acceptance. Hobson (1993, 2007), on the other 
hand, argues that the multiple and diverse deficits that characterise autism are linked 
by a ‘final common pathway’ (Hobson, 2014, p. 10) that can be comprehensively 
described in terms of his intersubjectivity theory.  
The restructuring of diagnostic categories in the latest edition of the DSM also 
reflects a change in how ASD is construed: Asperger syndrome and PDD-NOS are 
no longer included, in what can be interpreted as an acknowledgement that this way 
of dividing up autism ‘had not worked’ (Rutter, 2014, p. 55). On the other hand, the 
introduction of a new diagnostic category, social (pragmatic) communication 
disorder, seems to suggest that the social and non-social impairments are 
increasingly perceived as separable.  
 
2.1.1. Single-deficit accounts of autism  
Because of the lack of a biomarker for autism, it is defined as a constellation of 
impairments, namely difficulties in social interaction (including social 
communication and language use), and repetitive behaviours and narrow interests. 
Although the association between these symptoms is not immediately obvious, and it 
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has long been known that their relative severity varies across individuals (Wing & 
Wing, 1971), early epidemiological data showed that their co-occurrence is well 
above chance levels, giving the impression of a monolithic disorder. In a study of 
35,000 children from London, Wing and Gould (1979) found that all those who 
experienced substantial social difficulties also displayed repetitive stereotyped 
behaviour, and nearly all of them had abnormal language development and 
impairments in symbolic play. As a result, autism has been perceived as a coherent 
(albeit heterogeneous) syndrome, and it was assumed that all of its behavioural 
manifestations stem from the same genetic, neural, and cognitive atypicalities 
(Brunsdon & Happé, 2014).  
Substantial research efforts have been expended in attempting to identify the 
single underlying cognitive or social deficit responsible for the whole of autistic 
symptomatology, which has been variously posited to lie in fundamental problems in 
language development (Rutter, 1968), sensory and perceptual abnormalities (Ornitz 
& Ritvo, 1968), abnormal affective responses to social interactions (Mundy & 
Sigman, 1989), or an imbalance between systemising and empathising (Baron-
Cohen, 2009), among others. The three most influential single-deficit theories have 
been the theory of mind account (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), which 
posits that individuals with autism are ‘mind-blind’, i.e. have deficits in 
understanding and attributing mental states to themselves and to others (for a review, 
see Tager-Flusberg, 2007); the weak central coherence account (e.g. Frith & Happé, 
1994), which claims that the behavioural symptoms of autism are manifestations of a 
difficulty in integrating contextual information, accompanied by an overemphasis on 
details (for a review, see Happé & Booth, 2008); and the executive dysfunction 
account (e.g. Hughes & Russell, 1993), which proposes that domain-general deficits 
in planning, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility underlie the autism phenotype (for a 
review, see Hill, 2004). Two of these single-deficit theories, namely the theory of 
mind and the executive dysfunction accounts, are particularly germane to the 
questions of theory addressed in this thesis, and are therefore discussed in more 
detail here.  
The theory of mind explanation of autism was the first major cognitive 
account, which posits that all autistic symptomatology stems from an inability to 
infer one’s own and others’ mental states, which leads to difficulties in interpreting 
others’ behaviour, a prerequisite of being an effective social agent. In a landmark 
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study, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) found that 80 per cent of their participants with 
autism were unable to complete a false-belief task, even though their mental age was 
over the 4-year-old level, which is when success on this task is achieved in typical 
development. Since then, countless studies have demonstrated that individuals with 
autism have difficulties in attributing knowledge to others (e.g. Leslie & Frith, 1988), 
understand deception (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1992),  intention (e.g. Philips et al., 1998), 
and complex emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993), all of which are essential for 
relating to and communicating with others effectively. Although there is 
overwhelming evidence that theory of mind is impaired in autism, the claim that this 
is the single reason underlying all behavioural manifestations of the disorder has 
been challenged robustly by more recent evidence.  
Even in Baron-Cohen et al.’s original 1985 study, one in five children passed 
the false-belief task, demonstrating that impaired mentalising is not universal in 
autism. In subsequent studies, the success rate varied from 15 per cent (Reed & 
Peterson, 1990) to 55 per cent (Prior et al., 1990). In her review, Happé (1995) found 
that children with autism can indeed pass tests of false-belief, provided they have 
reached a mental age of 12 years, which is considerably higher than in typical 
development, but certainly not uncommon. On the basis of these results, she argued 
(Happé et al., 1996) that success on false-belief tasks in autism does not indicate an 
intact theory of mind mechanism, but rather is the result of recruiting alternative 
cognitive resources. This claim is supported by brain imaging studies (e.g. Castelli et 
al., 2002), which found that high-functioning adults with autism, who succeeded on 
theory of mind tasks, showed less activation in the brain areas typically associated 
with completing these tasks.  
Another challenge to the theory of mind account comes from the fact that 
impairments in this ability are not unique to autism: similar difficulties have been 
found in children with moderate learning disability (Yirmiya et al., 1996), oral 
deafness (Peterson & Siegal, 1999), congenital blindness (Green et al., 2004), and 
specific language impairment (Miller, 2001), calling into question whether a specific 
impairment in theory of mind is sufficient to explain all behavioural manifestations 
of autism.  
Finally, evidence for a direct relationship between the severity of autistic 
symptoms and theory of mind difficulties is mixed. A number of studies (e.g. 
Pellicano et al., 2006, Travis et al., 2001) found no significant association, although a 
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longitudinal study (Tager-Flusberg, 2003) reported that early theory of mind (at age 
4) emerged as a significant predictor of social functioning and severity of socio-
communicative symptoms a year later. Despite its intuitive appeal and concordance 
with anecdotal reports in terms of social difficulties, the theory of mind account 
ultimately failed to explain the non-social aspects of autistic behaviour, such as 
repetitive behaviours and restricted interests. 
The executive dysfunction account is, in some ways, a counterpart to the theory 
of mind account, in that it grew out of the observation that non-social aspects of 
autistic symptomatology, such as the tendency for inflexible, repetitive behaviours, is 
shared by patients with damage to the frontal lobe, which is responsible for higher-
order cognitive functions that support flexible, goal-oriented behaviour (Damasio & 
Maurer, 1978). Individuals with autism perform poorly on tests of cognitive 
flexibility and planning (e.g. Prior & Hoffmann, 1990), and Ozonoff et al. (1991) 
showed that executive function, rather than theory of mind performance, could best 
distinguish between individuals with and without autism.  
Impairments in executive function seem to be common in autism: 13 of the 14 
studies included in Pennington and Ozonoff’s 1996 review identified some form of 
executive dysfuction in this population. The prevalence reported in individual 
studies, however, varies widely, between near-universal at 96 per cent (Ozonoff et 
al., 1991) to barely more than half at 57 per cent (Liss et al., 2001), depending on the 
aspect of executive function measured, the experimental task of choice, and the cut-
off point for ‘impairment’ (Pellicano, 2011).  
Another major challenge to this theory comes from the ‘discriminant validity 
problem’, i.e. the fact that impairments in executive function are, of course, far from 
being unique to autism. They are well documented in ADHD, Tourette’s syndrome, 
and conduct disorder, among others. More recent studies have focussed on 
identifying an autism-specific profile of executive impairments, and there is strong 
evidence for deficits in cognitive flexibility and planning (Geurts et al., 2004; 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), but the picture is more mixed as regards working memory 
(Bennetto et al., 1996; Griffith et al., 1999) and inhibitory control (Christ et al., 2007; 
Russell et al., 1996).  
If executive dysfunction is indeed the cause of autistic symptoms, it should be 
demonstrable at a very early age. Griffith et al. (1999), however, found no evidence 
for impairments in inhibition, set-shifting, and working memory at age 4 and at one-
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year follow-up. This and similar findings (Dawson et al., 2002; Stahl & Pry, 2002) 
suggest that executive difficulties emerge later, and are actually a consequence of 
atypical development that originates from other social and/or cognitive impairments.   
Finally, a theory of autism that posits executive function as the sole (or 
primary) cause of the symptomatology associated with the disorder must be able to 
account for social as well as non-social atypicalities of behaviour (Bennetto et al., 
1996; Pennington et al., 1997). Evidence for such a link is limited. While some 
studies found an association between various aspects of executive functioning and 
social competence (e.g. McEvoy et al., 1993; Ozonoff et al., 2004), others did not 
(e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Liss et al., 2001). The complexity of both areas of 
functioning (i.e. executive and social) and the multitude of measures used to assess 
performance in them make cross-study comparisons difficult, and so which, if any 
aspects of executive function affect which aspects of social competence, is still 
unclear. 
Although the vast number of studies inspired by these theories (whether aiming 
to confirm or refute their central claims) have been invaluable in mapping out the 
cognitive and behavioural profile of autism, empirical findings have conclusively 
shown that none can provide a comprehensive account of autism on its own 
(Pellicano, 2011). For example, the theory of mind hypothesis struggles to explain 
non-social impairments (i.e. restricted and repetitive interests and behaviours) and 
sensory abnormalities (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). While weak central coherence can 
account for these particular deficits, performance on measures of central coherence 
seems to be unrelated to the overall severity of autistic symptoms (Pellicano, 
Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006a). The main weakness of the executive 
dysfunction account, in turn, is that it is poorly specified: the specific pattern of 
executive impairments that are proposed to lead to the autism phenotype is unclear 
(Williams & Bowler, 2014), and the results of experiments attempting to link various 
executive functions to social competence are highly varied (Pellicano, 2011).  
These facts, along with evidence for genetic heterogeneity in the components 
of the autistic triad (Ronald, Happé, Bolton, et al., 2006), as well for low correlations 
between the degree of social impairments, communication impairments, and 
restricted and repetitive interests and behaviours (Ronald, Happé, Price, Baron-
Cohen, & Plomin, 2006) have prompted some researchers to “abandon the attempt to 
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find a single cognitive explanation [for autism], in favor of good accounts for each 
distinct aspect of the triad” (Happé et al., 2006, p. 1219).  
 
2.1.2. The fractionable autism triad 
According to the interpretation championed by Happé and collaborators (Happé & 
Ronald, 2008; Happé et al., 2006), deficits in social interaction and in 
communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests, i.e. the 
traditionally conceived ‘triad of impairments’ (Wing & Gould, 1979), constitute 
orthogonal axes of a multivariate space (Pellicano, 2011) that can be used to describe 
the severity of difficulties in each area faced by individuals with autism (and, indeed, 
by the typically-developing population). They further claim that cognitive 
impairments map neatly onto behavioural symptoms, i.e. that poor theory of mind is 
associated with social difficulties; poor executive function, with non-social 
symptomatology; while weak central coherence explains the uneven cognitive profile 
and preponderance of savant skills that are characteristic of autism (Brunsdon & 
Happé, 2014).  
The benefit of such a clearly specified theory is that it leads to easily testable 
hypotheses. The fractionable triad account makes three important predictions: that 
the triad of impairments will be separable at the behavioural level; similarly, that 
performance on various cognitive measures (i.e. theory of mind, executive function, 
and central coherence) will show separation; and that the degree of impairment in 
these three component cognitive mechanisms will be uniquely associated with a 
particular ‘axis’ of autistic symptomatology. Evidence for these three predictions is 
reviewed below.  
Evidence from the Twins Early Development Study seems to support the 
proposition that the triad of impairments is behaviourally and genetically separable. 
Ronald et al. (2006) found that 10 per cent of children in the general population 
presented with an impairment (i.e. scored in the bottom 5 per cent) in one domain, 
without concurrent deficits in the other two domains. Also, there were only low to 
modest correlations between difficulties on the three axes (Ronald, Happé, Price, et 
al., 2006). Interestingly, similarly weak relationships were found between 
behavioural difficulties in a subset of this sample (189 children) who had a diagnosis 
of ASD, and were therefore, by definition, impaired on all three components of the 
triad (Dworzynski, Happé, Bolton, & Ronald, 2009). Coupled with the results of 
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genetic studies showing relatively independent heritability for the individual autistic 
traits (e.g. Robinson et al., 2012), this lends credibility to the fractionable triad 
hypothesis.  
Evidence for the second prediction, i.e. that performance on tests of theory of 
mind, executive function, and central coherence will be largely unrelated to each 
other, is substantially weaker. Some studies suggest that central coherence is 
dissociable from theory of mind (Happé, 1994, 1997), and others find that although a 
relationship exists between performance on these measures, it no longer reaches 
significance once the effect of age and cognitive ability are taken into account 
(Burnette et al., 2005; Pellicano et al., 2006a). Jarrold et al. (2000), on the other 
hand, found a significant positive association between theory of mind and central 
coherence, both in typical development, and in autism. The separation between 
central coherence and executive function seems to be clearer. In their study cited 
above, Pellicano et al. (2006a) found that the association between central coherence 
and executive function measures was fully mediated by age and cognitive ability, and 
Booth et al. (2007) found no relationship between relationship between performance 
on a planning task and weak central coherence in autism or in ADHD. Central 
coherence therefore appears to be dissociable from both theory of mind and 
executive functioning, but there is substantial evidence for a strong link between the 
latter two. Significant correlations between theory of mind (measured using false-
belief tasks) and various (but not all) tests of executive function have been reported 
in numerous studies (Bigham, 2010; Colvert, Custance, & Swettenham, 2002; Joseph 
& Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; Pellicano, 2013; J. 
Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991a; Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 
2002). Taken together, these results lend only partial support to the fractionable triad 
account (although see below for a discussion of potential methodological confounds). 
Empirical support for the existence of unique relationships between primary 
cognitive deficits and certain aspects of the autism phenotype (i.e. the third 
prediction made by Happé and her collaborators) is mixed. Theory of mind has been 
linked to various aspects of social competence, such as keeping secrets and telling 
lies (Frith, Happé, & Frances, 1994) or acting fairly (Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, 
Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010). The pattern is far from universal, however: some 
studies have found no association between the severity of social symptoms and 
theory of mind (Loth, Happé, & Gómez, 2010). Longitudinal investigations also 
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show a mixed picture: in a large-scale study, theory of mind predicted better social 
functioning, as assessed by the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales (Tager-
Flusberg, 2003), while Bennett et al. (2013) reported that theory of mind in late 
childhood was associated with communication skills but, unexpectedly, not with 
social skills, in adolescence. Many studies found associations between executive 
dysfunction and the non-social symptoms, but not the social symptoms of autism 
(e.g. Mosconi et al., 2009; Pellicano, 2013; Yerys et al., 2009), but a substantial 
number reported that executive function was linked to better social functioning 
(Berger, Aerts, Spaendonck, Cools, & Teunisse, 2003; Gilotty, Kenworthy, Sirian, 
Black, & Wagner, 2002; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Pellicano, 2013), 
contrary to the prediction of the fractionable triad account. Weak central coherence is 
put forward as an explanation for restricted interests, insistence on sameness, sensory 
abnormalities, and islets of ability (Happé & Vital, 2009), but empirical evidence for 
this is likewise equivocal. For example, Chen et al. (2009) found that a detail-
focused processing style was associated with repetitive behaviours, but not with 
sensory abnormalities in children with autism. While some researchers were able to 
link central coherence and non-social symptom severity (Loth, Carlos Gómez, & 
Happé, 2008), others found no evidence for this relationship (Pellicano, 2013).  
Overall, the fractionable triad hypothesis is appealing because it addresses the 
issue of extreme heterogeneity in behavioural manifestations that is a hallmark of 
autism, and attempts to merge the most influential theories of the disorder so that 
they become complementary, rather than competing accounts, thus benefiting from 
the wealth of experimental results accumulated over the past decades. Empirical 
evidence for the account, however, is as yet far from overwhelming. That 
behavioural symptoms are potentially separable, if not unconnected, seems clear, and 
has in fact been recognised for several decades (Wing & Wing, 1971), although 
perhaps not to the same degree as Happé and her collaborators are now claiming. The 
parsing of cognitive impairments and linking them to specific groups of autistic 
symptoms, however, have proven a lot more challenging, which should not be 
surprising if we consider the profound limitations inherent in measuring cognitive 
impairments, and the surprisingly little attention that the developmental changes in 
both cognitive abilities and autistic symptoms have enjoyed from researchers until 
recently. These issues are briefly summarised below.  
 
13 
 
2.1.3. Unresolved issues  
It should be clear from the above that the fractionable triad account of autism is far 
from universally accepted. Hobson (2014), for example, argues that the undeniably 
diverse behavioural manifestations of autism all share a common origin, namely an 
impairment in intersubjective engagement (Hobson, 1993, 2007). Chevallier et al. 
(2012), on the other hand, focus their explanation on the role of reduced social 
motivation in the evolutionary, neurological, and behavioural levels. As this thesis 
adopts a cognitive theoretical approach, the critical evaluation of these alternative 
accounts of autism is beyond the scope of this chapter, but two important questions 
that arose from the critique of cognitive models of autism are discussed above: our 
surprisingly poor understanding of the relationship between cognitive test 
performance and real-life behaviour (Rutter, 2014); and the potential convergence or 
divergence of autistic traits during development.  
First of all, some of the ambiguity in the pattern of empirical findings is 
presumably due to the inherent insensitivity of the measures used to assess cognitive 
abilities or autistic symptoms. It is, of course, recognised that few, if any, cognitive 
tests are ‘process-pure’, therefore it can never be self-evident whether a statistically 
significant relationship between performance on two measures arises because of a 
meaningful link between the cognitive abilities of interest or shared task 
requirements. While controlling for the effect of obvious candidate confounds, such 
as verbal ability and mental age, can go some way towards clarifying the pattern of 
results, the possibility of as yet unrecognised shared mechanisms is very difficult to 
rule out.  
To illustrate this point, consider the case of individuals with autism who can 
pass false-belief tests. Because these tests were considered sensitive and reliable 
measures of theory of mind, the fact that some individuals with autism completed 
them successfully seemed to suggest that theory of mind deficits are not, in fact, 
universal in autism. Some researchers, however, argued that in these cases, the task 
was solved through alternative, compensatory mechanisms (e.g. Happé, 1995), rather 
than through engaging the theory of mind mechanism. This claim was later 
confirmed through neuroimaging (Frith & Frith, 2003) and eye-tracking (Senju, 
Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009) studies, and thus a previously unrecognised 
confounding variable was identified.  
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A more extreme example in the same vein is the inferring implicit information 
(or Triple I) impairment hypothesis recently proposed by White (2013), which 
suggests that apparent executive impairments in autism are, in fact, due to an 
underlying difficulty with mentalising, which prevents participants from completing 
the tests to the best of their abilities because they cannot fully infer the 
experimenter’s expectations (and, therefore, the requirements of the task). If correct, 
this hypothesis would essentially mean that all past studies that employed executive 
function measures without ensuring that impaired theory of mind did not interfere 
with successful task performance are fundamentally and fatally flawed.  
It is worth asking the question whether cognitive mechanisms are even 
theoretically dissociable. For example, in order to successfully complete the Sally-
Ann task, a well-established measure of false-belief understanding, the participant 
must first engage their executive function, and inhibit the prepotent response of 
pointing to the container in which they know the ball to be. An impairment in 
mentalising or in inhibition would be behaviourally indistinguishable. Conversely, it 
is difficult to imagine an experimental task that measures only, say, inhibitory 
control, and does not require relatively unimpaired working memory (to remember 
the instructions) or mentalising (to understand the experimenter’s expectations), 
among a multitude of other capacities.  
The other, equally important, and equally often overlooked issue is that of 
interactions between cognitive capacities as they mature throughout development. In 
a longitudinal study of cognitive impairments in autism, Pellicano (2010a, 2010b) 
showed that while performance on tests of central coherence, theory of mind, and 
executive function loaded onto separate factors in a sample of children with autism 
between the ages of 4 and 7, the latter two were no longer distinct three years later. 
In terms of primacy, she found that causal links were one-directional: executive 
function and central coherence were significant and independent predictors of 
development in theory of mind, but improvements in neither executive function nor 
central coherence were predicted by performance in the other two cognitive domains. 
This pattern of results highlights the possibility of developmental convergence (see 
also Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2012; Pellicano, 2013), i.e. traits that are initially 
relatively independent may become increasingly interlinked and inseparable over 
development. 
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2.2. The theoretical approach of this thesis 
For the purposes of this thesis, the importance of the broader theoretical framework 
lies in the fact that it implicitly shapes not only the interpretation of empirical results 
but also the formulation of research questions and the design of experiments. The 
primary focus of the studies presented here, however, is not theoretical. Throughout 
this investigation of the effect of impaired inhibitory control on social functioning, 
theory of mind is measured and controlled for as a potential confound, but single-
deficit cognitive accounts of autism are not directly contrasted with each other in the 
explanation of the results. Instead, inhibitory control is construed as a potential 
bottleneck, i.e. a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite of success in diverse social 
interactions. In order to avoid some common pitfalls described above, the interaction 
between theory of mind and executive function is considered, and issues of 
measurement are directly addressed, wherever possible.  
 
3. The importance of cooperative play for social development  
Both cooperation and play are fuzzy terms: easy to understand intuitively, but 
difficult to definitively delineate. For the purposes of the following, play is 
understood as an activity that is (i) pleasurable and enjoyable; (ii) pursued for its own 
sake, i.e. without an externally imposed objective; and which (iii) involves active 
engagement from the participant(s). This is in line with generally accepted 
definitions (for a review, see Sherratt & Peter, 2002). Cooperation, on the other hand, 
is defined according to Bratman’s (1992) criteria of (i) mutual responsiveness to each 
other’s intentions and actions; (ii) commitment to the joint activity; and (iii) mutual 
support of each other’s efforts as needed. Cooperative play is thus defined to mean 
playing together, and to be synonymous with social or joint play. 
It is one of the few undisputed psychological findings that cooperative play is 
essential for social development in childhood. It provides an opportunity to acquire 
and practise vital social skills (Sherratt, 1999), experiment with various roles (Restall 
& Magill-Evans, 1994) and, through interacting with others, to establish shared 
meanings and obtain an understanding of prevalent cultural norms (Wolfberg, 2009). 
The skills and experiences obtained in cooperative play help children develop a 
capacity for building friendships (Parker & Gottman, 1989) and attain cognitive, 
social, and cultural competence (Arthur, Bochner, & Butterfield, 1999). There is 
evidence that the infant’s understanding of the world has its origins in personal 
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interactions (e.g. Hobson, 2004), and Dunn (1991) suggested that children learn to 
engage with their environment through early playful interactions. Vygotsky (1978) 
saw play as “a major source of development ”, which contained “all developmental 
tendencies in a condensed form” (p. 102). 
Children with autism, however, regardless of level of functioning, have well-
documented and profound deficits in cooperative play (Jordan, 2003) as well as in 
other forms of play, such as pretend and shared pretend play, which are linked to 
social engagement (Hobson et al., 2013), and therefore potentially miss out on a 
range of developmental benefits. They may also suffer significant social 
disadvantages because, as Boucher (1999) points out, cooperative play is the 
currency of childhood, and failure to engage in mutually satisfying cooperative play 
is the main cause of social isolation in childhood.  
Symbolic (pretend) play has downstream developmental benefits (Kasari, 
Chang, & Patterson, 2013), but it develops late, and often not at all, in children with 
autism (Jarrold, Boucher, and Smith 1996). When prompted, children with autism are 
capable of engaging in the same level of pretend play as their typically-developing 
peers (e.g. Charman and Baron-Cohen 1997), but their behaviour is not as ‘playful’, 
i.e. spontaneous and creative. Hobson et al. (2012) rated the symbolic play 
behaviours of children with autism qualitatively, and found that while the 
‘mechanics’ of play were present, the children appeared less emotionally invested in 
the activity. As a result, teaching pretend play through verbal or physical prompts 
and adult modelling has been only moderately effective (e.g. Barton & Wolery, 
2008).  
Unlike symbolic play, which can be a solitary activity, shared (cooperative) 
play requires mutual engagement and the ability to share goals, attention, and 
intentions (Kimhi & Bauminger-Zviely, 2012). As such, it is also profoundly 
impaired in autism (Hill 2004; Pellicano, 2007). Although the aetiology of this 
impairment has not yet been fully established, there is evidence for links with 
abnormalities in joint attention (Kasari, Sigman, Mundy, & Yirmiya, 1990), imitation 
(Brown & Whiten, 2000), executive function (Atlas, 1990), and sensory processing 
(Miller-Kuhaneck & Britner, 2013). In this thesis, cooperation is defined as 
synonymous with ‘shared play’, following Bratman’s (1992) definition of a shared 
cooperative activity as a behaviour characterised by mutual responsiveness in the 
pursuit of a common goal with mutual support as required throughout. In the case of 
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play, mutual responsiveness manifests as readiness to incorporate the play partner’s 
contributions into the activity; the common goal is primarily mutual enjoyment of the 
interaction, but may also involve the attainment of external objectives, e.g. 
completing a puzzle or other challenge. Mutual support is provided by the play 
partners when needed, and this aspect of shared (cooperative) play is closely linked 
to mutual responsiveness. Clearly, cooperative play encompasses a set of different 
behaviours, such as reciprocity and accepting the play partner’s input, which are 
multifaceted and complex in themselves, and rest on diverse socio-cognitive 
capacities.  
The implications of this fact are twofold. On the one hand, it is unlikely that a 
single social or cognitive ability responsible for the whole range of deficits in 
cooperative play in autism will ever be identified. Nor can the teaching of discrete 
“play skills” be wholly successful, as cooperative play is essentially context-
dependent (Strain & Schwartz, 2001). On the other hand, however, because of the 
complex set of interdependencies in the skills and abilities that are prerequisites of 
successful cooperative play, it is possible that enhancing even a single social or 
cognitive ability, either through specific training or ‘online’ support during the 
interaction, would measurably improve the children’s capacity for cooperative play.  
The severity of particular socio-cognitive impairments varies considerably 
across children with HFA, and so there are, presumably, individual differences in the 
mechanisms that lead to the breakdown of cooperative play. It is possible, for 
example, that while one child with HFA struggles to sustain cooperative play 
interactions because of atypical sensory processes, another finds them difficult 
because of deficits in joint attention. Importantly, the behavioural manifestations of 
these impairments may be indistinguishable to an observer of the interaction. These 
considerations highlight the importance of approaching HFA children’s difficulties in 
cooperative play from a multiple-deficit perspective.  
 
4. Thesis overview 
4.1. Background and motivation 
Cooperative play with a peer has numerous and long-lasting benefits for children’s 
socio-cognitive development (Jordan, 2003), including the opportunity to acquire and 
practise social skills, and forge early friendships. Children with autism may miss out 
on these benefits because of their well-documented impairments in social 
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communication and interaction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Previous 
research has linked deficits in the cooperative play of children with autism to poor 
imitation and joint attention (Colombi et al., 2009), and social and communication 
impairments in general have long been explained in terms of difficulties in 
mentalising (Frith, 2001). 
This research project was motivated by the puzzling anecdotal evidence from 
caregiver and teacher reports that ‘high-functioning’ children with autism (HFA, i.e. 
those without a concurrent learning disability) often seem to have a good grasp of the 
‘rules’ of social interaction, but nevertheless struggle to put their relatively intact 
social knowledge to use during real-life interactions, including cooperative play. 
Clearly, mentalising is necessary, but not sufficient for effective cooperative play, 
and the role of other cognitive mechanisms should also be investigated.  
 
4.2. Aims and hypotheses  
The primary goal of this thesis was to evaluate a novel account of impaired 
cooperative play (see Figure 1), in which behavioural rigidity, arising from deficits in 
executive functions, prevents children with HFA from fully utilising their relatively 
intact social knowledge.  
‘Executive functions’ is as umbrella term for a group of cognitive processes 
linked to the prefrontal cortex (Kane & Engle, 2002) that are essential for the 
planning and execution of complex behaviour. Although executive deficits are well-
documented in autism (Hill, 2004), they have been investigated primarily in 
connection with non-social impairments, such as restricted interests and repetitive 
behaviours. This thesis explores the contribution of inhibitory control, a domain of 
executive functioning, to competence in an important aspect of social behaviour, 
namely cooperative play.  
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Figure 1. Hypothesised model of executive function as a moderator between social knowledge and 
behaviour 
 
4.3. Outline of studies  
This thesis consists of four research articles: a meta-analysis, two experimental 
studies, and a qualitative investigation. Article 1 describes a systematic review and 
meta-analysis of 42 studies that compared inhibitory control between children with 
HFA and a TD control group. The results provide strong evidence for an inhibitory 
impairment across all commonly used experimental measures.  
The link between inhibitory control and three prerequisites of mutually 
satisfying cooperative play: reciprocity, accepting the play partner’s input, and 
fairness, was investigated in two experimental studies (Articles 2 and 3). These 
studies involved children with HFA between the ages of 5 and 11 and age-matched 
TD comparison groups.  
In the first experimental study, the participants were tested on theory of mind, 
joint attention, inhibition, and a measure of cooperative play: the Interactive Drawing 
Test. While children with HFA performed at age-typical levels on theory of mind 
and joint attention, they showed impaired inhibition, and were less likely than TD 
children to engage in reciprocal drawing and to accept the play partner’s input. The 
severity of the deficit in cooperative play was significantly linked to inhibitory 
control.  
In the second experimental study, theory of mind, moral reasoning, inhibition, 
and sharing behaviour in the Dictator Game were assessed. There was no significant 
group difference on theory of mind, moral reasoning, and sharing, but children with 
HFA showed a deficit in inhibitory control. Multiple regression was carried out to 
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identify the predictors of less self-centred (‘fairer’) decisions in the Dictator Game. 
Inhibitory control was the only variable significantly associated with fairness.  
The last study constitutes a qualitative investigation of TD children’s 
experience of cooperative play with their HFA sibling. Six TD children between the 
ages of 5 and 11 were interviewed, and their reports analysed using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA). Five superordinate themes emerged from the 
participants’ accounts about factors that affect the quality of playing with the HFA 
sibling: poor emotion regulation, a narrow range of interests, reluctance to accept the 
play partner’s input, admiration for the creativity of the child with HFA, and 
adjustment to the HFA sibling’s atypical behaviour.  
The four papers are not presented in chronological order; the thesis is 
structured thematically, and the articles build on the findings of the previous paper. 
First, the aim of the systematic review and meta-analysis was to ascertain whether 
inhibitory control is impaired in high-functioning children with autism. This is a 
fundamental assumption of the model of social difficulties that is explored in the 
thesis. If no such impairment exists, it obviously cannot moderate the relationship 
between social knowledge and social behaviour. As a significant impairment was 
identified in this paper, the second and third articles investigate whether this 
impairment makes a unique contribution to social impairments. These two studies 
also contribute to the broader research literature through investigating cooperative 
play and the understanding and practice of fairness in sharing situations, respectively, 
which have received relatively little attention in children with autism. The results of 
these two studies provided strong evidence for inhibitory control being an enabler of 
effective cooperative play and fairness in experimental tasks. Although every effort 
had been made to ensure that the tasks used are ecologically valid and, therefore, the 
findings can be generalised to real-life cooperative interactions with peers, the 
limitations of the measures was recognised, and the fourth study therefore adopted a 
qualitative approach in order to explore the actual lived experiences of the most 
frequent playmates of children with autism: their typically developing siblings. This 
paper constitutes the first qualitative exploration of typically developing children’s 
experience of playing with their autistic sibling, but it also contributes to the 
overarching theme of the thesis directly: two of the themes that emerged in the 
participant reports in connection with factors that limit the hedonistic value of joint 
play were related to executive functions. This corroborates the findings of the two 
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experimental studies, and lends further support to the model being evaluated.Overall, 
these four studies lend credence to our hypothesis that inhibitory control is a 
prerequisite of cooperative play and, more broadly, that deficits in executive 
functions can lead to a breakdown in social interaction, even when the ability to 
mentalise is unimpaired.  
The implications of this work are discussed, along with two important 
questions for future research: regarding the link between inhibition and emotion 
regulation, and the extent to which inhibition and theory of mind are separable, both 
theoretically and experimentally.  
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Article 1: Inhibitory control in high-functioning children 
with autism: A meta-analysis and problems of measurement 
Abstract 
Inhibitory control is an aspect of executive function that has been linked to 
impulsivity and social functioning. While anecdotal evidence suggests that children 
with autism are impaired in this domain, experimental results are equivocal. 
Tentative explanations for the contradictory findings have focused on purported 
differences between the experimental measures commonly used to assess inhibition, 
suggesting that children with autism may be impaired in some aspects of inhibition 
(e.g. prepotent responses) but not in others (e.g. interference). In a meta-analysis of 
42 studies, with a total of 57 effect sizes and 2,256 participants, we found clear 
evidence for impaired inhibition in high-functioning children with autism (HFA), and 
no evidence for differential performance across measures. These results are discussed 
in terms of their implications for improving the methodology of measuring inhibition 
experimentally. 
 
Introduction 
Inhibitory control (IC) is considered part of a set of cognitive mechanisms, along 
with working memory, set shifting, and planning (Stuss & Knight, 2013), 
collectively referred to as executive function, whose purpose is to support planned 
action by filtering out irrelevant information, suppressing task-inappropriate actions, 
and adapting to changing task requirements in order to ensure success. Well-
developed inhibitory control has been linked to a broad range of areas including 
emotion regulation (Carlson & Wang, 2007; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008), 
academic success (Liew, McTigue, Barrois, & Hughes, 2008; Valiente, Lemery-
Chalfant, Swanson, & Reiser, 2008), moral cognition (Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 
1997), and the ability to engage in cooperative play (Borbely & Yuill, 2014), among 
others.  
Deficits in executive function, and in inhibitory control in particular, are 
common in several developmental disorders, e.g. attention-deficit / hyperactivity 
disorder (Schachar, Mota, Logan, Tannock, & Klim, 2000) and Tourette’s syndrome 
(Channon, Pratt, & Robertson, 2003), but evidence for impairments in this domain in 
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autism is equivocal, despite the fact that the executive function account has become 
one of the most influential single-deficit models of autism, purporting to account for 
non-social impairments, such as repetitive actions and narrow interests, in its weak 
form (Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; Turner, 1997), and also for deficits in 
social interaction in its strong form (Griffith, Pennington, Wehner, & Rogers, 1999; 
Hill & Bird, 2006; McEvoy et al., 1993). As early as in 1972, Frith showed 
behavioural inflexibility in individuals with autism. Later, Damasio and Maurer 
(1978) demonstrated behavioural similarities in tests of executive function between 
individuals with autism and those with acquired damage to the prefrontal cortex, 
which is the primary brain area associated with executive function (Stuss & Knight, 
2013). Since then, a large number of studies have been conducted on executive 
function in autism (for reviews, see Hill, 2004; Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & 
Wallace, 2008; O’Hearn, Asato, Ordaz, & Luna, 2010; Pellicano, 2011; Pennington 
& Ozonoff, 1996; Russo et al., 2007), yet the picture that has emerged over the 
decades is still unclear. Despite a wealth of promising results, the executive function 
model of autism has been challenged on multiple accounts: its specificity, 
universality, and predictive power have all been questioned (Pellicano, 2011). 
Narrative reviews of the executive function account of autism have generally 
concluded that some domains were indeed impaired in this disorder, e.g. set-shifting 
(Ozonoff et al., 1991; Shu, Tien, & Chen, 2001; Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson, & 
Bartolucci, 1990) and planning (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Pellicano, 2007), but that 
evidence in other domains, e.g. inhibitory control, was mixed: individuals with 
autism were outperformed by a typically-developing control group in some studies 
(Hughes & Russell, 1993; Russell et al., 1991a) but not in others (Ozonoff & Jensen, 
1999; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997; Russell, Jarrold, & Hood, 1999).  
In situations like this, pooling the available quantitative information through a 
systematic review has a number of important benefits (Cartwright-Hatton, Roberts, 
Chitsabesan, Fothergill, & Harrington, 2004). The increase in statistical power 
allows for more precise estimation of effect sizes, which is of particular importance 
in a field like autism research, where studies typically involve relatively small 
numbers of participants and are, therefore, underpowered. A better understanding of 
the pattern of findings, in turn, helps clarify the extent and nature of impairments, 
and is essential for evaluating current theories and mapping out directions of future 
research (Mulrow, 1994). Also, systematic reviews have great utility in assessing 
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commonly used experimental paradigms and identifying methodological pitfalls, 
which is essential in a field like the study of inhibitory control, which is characterised 
by a huge diversity of measures and tasks (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008).  
 
Issues of measurement 
Any successful investigation of the extent to which inhibitory control is impaired in 
autism has to first overcome a number of methodological obstacles. Firstly, tests of 
executive function are not ‘process-pure’, meaning that they involve more than a 
single cognitive mechanism: for example, it is notoriously difficult to design an 
experimental task that requires set-shifting, but not working memory.  
Secondly, although some standardised tests of executive functions do exist, 
there is also a plethora of commonly used tasks (for a summary, see Garon et al., 
2008) the procedural details of which (e.g. stimulus type, modality, inter-stimulus 
interval, number of trials, etc.) are routinely modified by researchers, sometimes 
perhaps without due consideration of the potential implications of these changes. 
This makes the comparison of results across studies difficult. As Garon, Bryson and 
Smith (2008, p. 40) poignantly state: “Ironically, one of the challenges in 
understanding the development of response inhibition is the multitude of response 
inhibition tasks.” This heterogeneity of experimental tasks means that variations of 
task characteristics are always readily available explanations for any inconsistencies 
in results.  
Indeed, fundamental differences between the measures of inhibitory control 
have been hypothesised to explain the equivocality of findings. There is no 
agreement amongst researchers, however, on which underlying characteristics set 
apart tests of inhibitory control on which individuals with autism show deficits from 
those on which they do not. 
Bíró and Russell (2001), for example, suggested that it is the arbitrary nature of 
the rules of a task that leads to impaired performance, and they went further to 
postulate that the same pattern applies to measures used in other subdomains of 
executive function, as well, such as the Tower of Hanoi (a measure of planning) and 
the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (a measure of set-shifting). Hill (2004), on the other 
hand, hypothesised that the tasks on which children with ASD show impaired 
performance are distinguished by the requirement of suppressing a prepotent 
response. In the Windows task (Russell et al., 1991a) for example, two open boxes 
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are presented, one of which contains a desirable object (a sweet). In order to obtain 
the sweet, the child must suppress the salient response of reaching for it and must 
instead point at the empty box. Children with autism consistently showed impaired 
performance on this task (e.g. Russell, Hala, & Hill, 2003). Russo et al. (2007) 
interpreted this pattern of findings in terms of a distinction between direct and 
indirect measures of inhibition. They posited that impaired performance on the 
Windows and other tasks is due to the fact that these are indirect measures, i.e. in 
addition to inhibitory control, they also require mental flexibility and disengagement, 
that is, they impose a larger cognitive load than pure measures of inhibition, and 
require the simultaneous use of diverse skills from the participants. O’Hearn et al. 
(2010) in turn, drew a contrast between tasks where an automatic response needs to 
be suppressed, such as the anti-saccade task, which consistently shows impairments 
in autism (e.g. Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007), and paradigms 
like the Stroop task, where interference from irrelevant stimuli needs to be 
suppressed. They point to the possibility of developing alternative strategies for 
solving this latter group of tasks. In the Stroop task, for instance, where participants 
are required to name the colours that words are written in rather than the 
(incongruous) colour that they represent, it is possible to blur one’s vision to 
minimise the interference of the verbal information, which, O’Hearn and colleagues 
suggest, might account for the unimpaired performance displayed by autistic but 
cognitively able participants. Although the use of such strategies could indeed distort 
test results, it is questionable whether children with autism would be motivated and 
able to do so. There is no empirical evidence that this population of experimental 
participants systematically employ such strategies to improve their performance on 
measures on inhibitory control.    
So far, none of these hypotheses have been tested directly in an empirical 
study, although a recent meta-analysis (Geurts, van den Bergh, & Ruzzano, 2014) 
which compared studies on prepotent response inhibition and interference 
suppression tasks in autism found no evidence for differential performance across the 
two domains. In order to evaluate each of the above theories, a systematic review 
would be of great use, not only because of the increased potential to survey the 
landscape of findings from a “tower of statistical power” (Gelber & Goldhirsch, 
1991, p. 467) but also because it introduces controls for sampling error, which 
individual studies more easily fall victim to. This is an important consideration 
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because frequent Type II errors are an inevitable consequence of the low power that 
characterises many psychological studies, and the resulting uneven pattern of 
findings can easily lead to “barren controversy” (Oakes, 1986): as the number of 
studies in the field grows, so does the apparent degree of disagreement between 
researchers.  
 
This review: inhibitory control in high-functioning children with autism (HFA) 
The focus of this meta-analysis is narrow: we only included studies on children 
(defined as under the age of 18) who were ‘high-functioning’ (defined as having an 
IQ of no lower than one standard deviation below the age-matched typically-
developing population). Our reasons for restricting the population of interest in these 
two ways are briefly outlined below.  
We chose to investigate only studies involving children for two reasons. On the 
one hand, the scarcity of research on adults with autism precludes the drawing of 
meaningful conclusions from a meta-analysis. On the other hand, inhibitory control 
develops dramatically from early childhood into adolescence, but there is little 
difference between the inhibitory performance of teenagers and adults – at least in 
typical development (Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). 
Additionally, measuring inhibitory control, fraught with difficulties as it is in 
childhood, as discussed above, is even more problematic in adulthood because as 
other cognitive mechanisms mature, they are more easily recruited to compensate for 
shortcomings in inhibitory control. Brain imaging studies show that the brain areas 
activated during the completion of inhibitory control tasks are different in 
adolescence and in adulthood (Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2005). For this 
reason, we hoped to be better able to isolate inhibitory control in a young population.  
As for focusing on children with autism who can be described for convenience 
as ‘high-functioning’, our decision was informed by the fact that the interaction 
between learning disabilities and impaired inhibitory control in autism is poorly 
understood (Passolunghi & Siegel, 2001) and therefore including children with 
autism who also have a diagnosis of a learning disability would have introduced 
another layer of complexity into our investigation. For the purposes of this review, 
we defined ‘high-functioning’ as scoring within one standard deviation of the 
population mean on a standardised test of general cognitive ability (IQ).  
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This systematic review and meta-analysis is reported in accordance with the 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) 
Guidelines compiled by Moher et al. (2009).   
Method 
Literature search  
Relevant articles were identified in several stages. First, we consulted the reference 
sections of seven previously published reviews of executive functioning in autism 
(Geurts et al., 2014; Hill, 2004; Kenworthy et al., 2008; O’Hearn et al., 2010; 
Pellicano, 2011; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Russo et al., 2007) This yielded a 
pool of 72 potentially relevant research reports (excluding duplicates).  
A search of Web of Knowledge was conducted with the following keywords: 
autism (“autism” or “ASC” or “ASD” or “autistic” or “PDD-NOS” or “asperger”) 
and inhibition (“inhibition” or “inhibitory control”). For practical reasons, search 
results were restricted to articles published in English, and in the past 30 years (i.e. 
since 1983). The 182 search results were further winnowed down by excluding 
patents (57), reviews (6), letters to the editor (4), data sets (1), data studies (1), 
editorials (1), and corrections (1), leaving 111 titles in total. Ancestor searches 
performed on the ten most recent studies included in the analysis helped locate three 
studies not identified in earlier stages of the process.  
 
Criteria for inclusion  
The abstracts (and, where necessary, the Method sections) of each of the 186 
potentially relevant studies that had been identified by this stage were then read and 
assessed for inclusion. To be selected, an article had to satisfy the following criteria: 
(a) the study was conducted on children (i.e. participants under the age of 18); (b) 
one of the groups consisted of children with a diagnosis of high-functioning autism 
(defined as having a full-scale IQ over 85); (c) a typically-developing comparison 
group was included; and (d) inhibitory control was measured in both groups of 
children. At this stage, 139 studies were excluded: 120 of these did not meet the 
inclusion criteria (inhibitory control not measured: 75; adult participants: 11; no TD 
comparison group: 19; children with autism not high functioning: 8; non-human 
animal subjects: 6; only abstract available in English: 1), and 19 were inaccessible 
(e.g. conference presentations). In five studies, the published information did not 
allow the calculation or estimation of effect sizes; these were excluded from further 
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analyses, leaving a final pool of 42 (see Figure 1). Altogether, the studies involved 
2,256 participants (1,054 children with HFA, and 1,202 TD children).  
A randomly selected sample of 21 abstracts (10%) was also assessed for 
inclusion by a second coder; there was perfect agreement between the coders on 
whether each study should be included in the meta-analysis.  
 
 
Figure 1. Details of the literature search and study selection process 
 
Data extraction  
The following details were recorded for each study included in the meta-analysis (see 
Table 1):  
- year of publication; 
- number of participants;  
- proportion of genders (where reported);  
- age (mean and standard deviation) of the participants;  
- IQ of the participants (verbal, performance and/or full-scale, as reported);  
- inhibition task(s) used (including modality of stimuli);  
- dependent variable(s) reported.  
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Table 1. Summary of details for studies included in the meta-analysis 
Authors and  
year of publication 
Number of  
participants 
Age  
M (SD) 
FSIQ  
M (SD) 
Task  
(stimulus) 
Paradigm 
Dependent  
variable 
Effect size  
Hedges's g 
Adamo et al., 2014 
HFA:  46 10.00 (1.00) 109.00 (17.00) go/no-go  
 (numbers) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.33 
TD:  36 10.00 (1.00) 112.00 (14.00) 
Adams & Jarrold, 2009 
HFA:  24 13.45 (1.71) 
 
Stroop 
(colour/word) 
Stroop interference  on RT -0.39 
TD:  24 9.76 (0.18) 
Adams & Jarrold, 2012 
HFA:  15 14.42 (1.73) 
 
flanker 
(arrows) 
flanker RT on incongruent trials -0.28 
TD:  15 9.83 (1.03) 
 
   Stop-signal  
(pictures/auditory) 
stop-signal commission errors 0.30 
   
Bishop & Norbury, 2005 
HFA:  14 8.30 (1.00) 107.20 (15.60) TEA-Ch 
 (numbers) 
opposite worlds time difference 0.98 
TD:  18 8.60 (1.00) 110.80 (10.40) 
 
   
 
walk/don't walk 
(visual/sound) 
stop-signal accuracy 1.15 
   
Brandimonte et al., 2011 
HFA:  30 8.25 (2.44) 
 
stop-signal  
(pictures/pictures) 
stop-signal accuracy 0.35 
TD:  30 8.33 (1.91) 
Chan et al., 2009 
HFA:  16 10.54 (1.73) 96.75 (18.72) Continuous  
Performance Test 
go/no-go commission errors -0.06 
TD:  38 9.31 (2.20) 114.70 (16.60) 
Chan et al., 2011 
HFA:  20 10.75 (2.07)  go/no-go  
 (coloured balls) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.59 
TD:  20 9.80 (1.88)  
Christ et al., 2007 
HFA:  15 8.20 (1.60) 
 
flanker 
(simple shapes) 
flanker RT on incongruent trials 2.05 
TD:  48 10.77 (2.85) 
 
   go/no-go 
(simple shapes) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.95 
   
    Stroop (colour/word) Stroop RT on incongruent trials 1.46 
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Authors and  
year of publication 
Number of  
participants 
Age  
M (SD) 
FSIQ  
M (SD) 
Task  
(stimulus) 
Paradigm 
Dependent  
variable 
Effect size  
Hedges's g 
Christ et al., 2011 
HFA:  28 13.10 (2.80)  flanker 
 (arrows) 
flanker 
accuracy on incongruent 
trials 
0.65 
TD:  49 13.30 (2.70)  
 
   
 digit count other accuracy 0.16 
   
Corbett & Constantine,  
2006 
HFA:  15 10.01 (2.04) 97.70 (17.47) Continuous  
Performance Test 
go/no-go response control quotient 2.31 
TD:  15 9.56 (1.89) 117.40 (15.17) 
Corbett et al., 2009 
HFA:  18 9.44 (1.96) 94.17 (17.79) Continuous  
Performance Test 
go/no-go response control quotient 1.30 
TD:  18 9.56 (1.81) 112.22 (14.84) 
 
   
 
D-KEFS 
(word/colour) 
Stroop 
standardised 
interference score 
1.46 
   
Geurts et al., 2009 
HFA:  18 10.30 (1.60) 108.00 (19.00) go/no-go 
 (faces) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.42 
TD:  22 10.30 (1.40) 103.20 (24.10) 
Geurts et al., 2008 
HFA:  22 10.10 (1.60) 102.70 (15.00) flanker 
 (pictures) 
flanker RT on incongruent trials 0.15 
TD:  33 9.40 (1.10) 103.30 (14.00) 
Geurts et al., 2004 
HFA:  41 9.40 (1.80) 98.30 (18.40) Change Task 
 (picture/auditory) 
stop-signal stop-signal reaction time 0.73 
TD:  41 9.10 (1.70) 111.50 (18.00) 
 
   
 
circle drawing other time difference 0.68 
   
 
   TEA-Ch 
(numbers) 
opposite worlds time difference 0.37 
   
Goldberg et al., 2005 
HFA:  17 10.30 (1.80) 96.50 (15.90) Stroop 
 (colour/word) 
Stroop interference  on RT -0.11 
TD:  32 10.40 (1.50) 112.60 (12.10) 
Happé et al., 2006 
HFA:  32 10.90 (2.40) 99.70 (18.70) go/no-go 
 (pictures) 
go/no-go commission errors -0.19 
TD:  32 11.20 (2.00) 106.80 (13.40) 
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Authors and  
year of publication 
Number of  
participants 
Age  
M (SD) 
FSIQ  
M (SD) 
Task  
(stimulus) 
Paradigm 
Dependent  
variable 
Effect size  
Hedges's g 
Jahromi et al., 2013 
HFA:  20 4.90 (0.90)  day/night 
 (pictures) 
opposite worlds accuracy 0.34 
TD:  20 4.20 (0.90)  
Johnson et al., 2007 
HFA:  21 12.20 (2.40) 97.30 (12.30) SART 
 (numbers) 
go/no-go commission errors 1.25 
TD:  18 11.10 (1.90) 107.70 (11.60) 
Joseph et al., 2005 
HFA:  37 7.01 (1.75)  day/night 
 (pictures) 
opposite worlds accuracy 0.32 
TD:  31 8.25 (2.08)  
 
   
 
knock/tap 
(gesture) 
other accuracy 0.57 
   
Larson et al., 2012 
HFA:  28 13.00 (2.00) 105.00 (16.00) flanker 
 (arrows) 
flanker RT on incongruent trials 0.07 
TD:  36 14.00 (2.00) 19.00 (11.00) 
Lee et al., 2009 
HFA:  11 10.20 (1.60) 113.30 (17.30) go/no-go 
 (letters) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.26 
TD:  10 11.00 (1.80) 114.90 (10.30) 
Lemon et al., 2011 
HFA:  23 11.04 (0.00) 94.86 ( - ) stop-signal 
 (colours) 
stop-signal stop-signal reaction time 0.60 
TD:  22 11.18 (0.00) 107.36 ( - ) 
Marotta et al., 2013 
HFA:  14 10.60 (2.70) 107.63 (9.15) Posner cueing task 
 (face/cross) 
other reaction time 0.41 
TD:  14 10.40 (2.00) - 
Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999 
HFA:  40 12.60 (3.40) 95.20 (18.80) Stroop 
 (colour/word) 
Stroop accuracy 0.40 
TD:  29 12.10 (1.00) 107.80 (10.80) 
Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997 
HFA:  13 13.90 (2.50) 101.00 (18.80) negative priming 
 (letters) 
other interference on accuracy 0.56 
TD:  13 13.10 (1.40) 100.10 (11.90) 
 
   
 
stop-signal 
(words) 
stop-signal SSRT 0.49 
   
Ozonoff et al., 1994 
HFA:  14 12.43 (2.47) 101.90 (17.17) go/no-go 
 (simple shapes) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.04 
TD:  14 12.15 (1.73) 100.40 (13.39) 
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Authors and  
year of publication 
Number of  
participants 
Age  
M (SD) 
FSIQ  
M (SD) 
Task  
(stimulus) 
Paradigm 
Dependent  
variable 
Effect size  
Hedges's g 
 
   
 
global-local task 
(letters) 
other accuracy 0.47 
   
Pellicano, 2007 
HFA:  30 5.63 (0.97)  Luria hand game 
 (gestures) 
other accuracy 0.26 
TD:  40 5.48 (0.96)  
Pellicano et al., 2006 
HFA:  40 5.60 (0.91)  Luria hand game 
 (gestures) 
other accuracy 0.67 
TD:  40 5.48 (0.96)  
Pooragha et al., 2013 
HFA:  15 9.33 (1.79)  Stroop 
 (colour/word) 
Stroop interference  on accuracy 1.07 
TD:  15 10.13 (2.44)  
Rinehart et al., 2008 
HFA:  24 12.00 (3.54) 96.80 (16.38) Posner cueing task 
 (cross) 
other commission errors 0.67 
TD:  24 11.80 (3.61) 100.15 (10.41) 
Robinson et al., 2009 
HFA:  54 12.54 (2.80) 103.53 (10.54) Junior Hayling Test 
 (sentences) 
other accuracy 0.42 
TD:  54 12.08 (2.34) 104.80 (9.07) 
 
   
 
Stroop 
(colour/word) 
Stroop interference on RT 0.29 
   
Schuh, 2011 
HFA:  13 13.00 (2.70) 106.00 (12.00) homograph task 
 (words) 
other accuracy 0.36 
TD:  22 13.10 (2.70) 105.00 (12.00) 
Semrud-Clikeman et al.,  
2010 
HFA:  15 10.60 (2.60) 100.80 (13.00) D-KEFS 
 (word/colour) 
Stroop 
standardised 
interference score 
0.47 
TD:  32 9.80 (2.10) 109.40 (10.00) 
Sinzig et al., 2008 
HFA:  20 14.30 (3.00) 112.00 (17.70) 
go/no-go go/no-go commission errors -0.17 
TD:  20 13.10 (3.00) 113.00 (11.90) 
Solomon et al., 2009 
HFA:  20 15.17 (1.67) 107.00 (14.00) POP task 
 (arrows) 
other accuracy 0.97 
TD:  23 15.92 (2.08) 113.00 (11.00) 
Solomon et al., 2008 
HFA:  31 12.30 (2.50) 110.00 (20.00) POP task 
 (arrows) 
other accuracy 0.52 
TD:  32 12.20 (2.50) 115.00 (12.00) 
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Authors and  
year of publication 
Number of  
participants 
Age  
M (SD) 
FSIQ  
M (SD) 
Task  
(stimulus) 
Paradigm 
Dependent  
variable 
Effect size  
Hedges's g 
Tsai et al., 2011 
HFA:  15 7.85 (0.79) 
 
Posner cueing task 
(cross and arrow) 
other interference on RT 0.85 
TD:  16 7.51 (0.85) 
Vaidya et al., 2011 
HFA:  15 10.80 (1.30) 113.90 (15.40) Posner cueing task 
 (arrows) 
other accuracy 0.61 
TD:  18 11.00 (1.30) 119.20 (14.20) 
Verté et al., 2005 
HFA:  61 9.10 (1.90) 99.20 (17.10) TEA-Ch 
 (numbers) 
opposite worlds time difference 0.56 
TD:  47 9.40 (1.60) 112.10 (9.70) 
 
   
 
circle drawing other time difference 0.72 
   
 
   Change Task 
(picture/auditory) 
stop-signal stop-signal reaction time 0.90 
    
Verté et al., 2006 
HFA:  66 8.70 (2.00) 101.50 (18.20) stop-signal 
(pictures) 
stop-signal stop-signal reaction time 0.54 
TD:  82 9.20 (1.70) 112.20 (16.00) 
Xiao et al., 2012 
HFA:  19 10.11 (2.08) 99.26 (9.03) go/no-go 
 (simple shapes) 
go/no-go commission errors 0.87 
TD:  16 9.69 (1.74) 105.63 (13.12) 
 
   
 
Stroop 
(colour/word) 
Stroop RT on incongruent trials 0.19 
   
Yoran-Hegesh et al.,  
2009 
HFA:  23 15.10 (3.60) 
 Stroop Stroop RT on incongruent trials 1.55 
TD:  43 15.50 (0.60) 
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Analysis  
Effect sizes 
Effect sizes were calculated as the standardised difference between the mean scores 
of the HFA and TD groups, divided by the pooled standard deviation (i.e. Hedges’s 
g), which is a good and accepted measure (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). A positive 
effect size indicates impaired performance in the HFA group. Because of the slight 
upward bias of this value, we applied the small-sample correction factor 
recommended by Hedges and Olkin (1985). For clarity, the formula used to compute 
the effect size is given below:  
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The reported effect sizes were weighted by the inverse variance including a random-
effects variance component, which Hedges and Olkin (1985) showed to be ideal for 
meta-analyses. This ensures that studies with small samples that report extreme 
effect sizes do not have undue influence on the final estimate.  
 
Outliers and publication bias 
Potential outliers were identified through visual inspection of the forest plot (see 
Figure 3). Although one study (Corbett & Constantine, 2006) appeared to be an 
outlier (z-score = 3.27), no Cook’s distance was above the threshold of 1 
recommended by Cook and Weisberg (1982) for identifying studies with undue 
influence on the model. Nonetheless, the meta-analysis was repeated with this 
potential outlier excluded, and yielded the same results, which are therefore not 
reported separately below.  
In order to locate relevant unpublished results, the corresponding authors of the 
research studies included in this meta-analysis were contacted, along with other 
researchers  who the literature review suggested might potentially have such results. 
Of these 73 researchers, 27 responded (37%), but none held relevant unpublished   
data.  
Possible publication bias was explored using a funnel plot (see Figure 2), the 
regression test recommended by Sterne and Egger (2005), and the trim-and-fill 
method proposed by Duval and Tweedie (2000). The regression test indicated no 
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asymmetry in the funnel plot (z = 0.87, p = .383), and the trim-and-fill analysis 
suggested that no studies were missing from either side of the distribution. These 
results point to no publication bias resulting from the suppression of extreme results 
in either direction.  
 
 
Figure 2. Funnel plot 
 
Results 
In the first step, a random-effects model was fitted to the data in order to aggregate 
effect sizes from all studies while accounting for variation in the observed effect 
sizes due to sampling error and the impact of potential moderators. This analysis 
revealed that the mean effect size for IC impairment was significantly above zero, 
g = .58 [0.45, 0.71], p < .001 (see Figure 3). The homogeneity statistic (Cochran’s Q) 
indicated significant heterogeneity across the studies, Q(56) = 156.77, p < .001, 
suggesting that the effect size is affected not only by sampling error but also other 
confounding variables.  
 
Moderator analysis 
The potential moderating effects of choice of experimental paradigm, participant age, 
full-scale IQ (FSIQ), and the difference in FSIQ between the HFA and TD groups 
were explored using weighted meta-regression. Age and cognitive ability were 
examined because both of these factors are known to affect IC (Huizinga, Dolan, & 
van der Molen, 2006; Carlton & Moses, 2001), and were found to be significant 
predictors of ES in Geurts et al.’s aforementioned meta-analysis (2014). The 
potential impact of the difference in general cognitive ability between the TD and 
HFA participants was investigated in order to ensure the comparability of the 
experimental groups.  
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Experimental paradigm 
Choice of experimental paradigm was not a significant moderator of IC impairment 
effect size, QM(5) = 0.36, p = .996, and heterogeneity between studies remained 
significant after accounting for its effect, QE(51) = 155.22, p < .001. The mean effect 
size was calculated for each paradigm separately; these ranged between 0.50 and 
0.63, and were all significantly above zero (see Table 2). An experimental task was 
categorised as ‘other’ if it had been used in fewer than five studies included in the 
meta-analysis.  
 
Age and full-scale IQ 
The effects of age and FSIQ of the HFA participants were analysed using weighted 
meta-regressions. There was no significant effect of age on the size of IC 
impairment, QM(1) = 2.69, p = .101, and the residual heterogeneity was still 
significant, QE(55) = 151.29, p < .001. As not all studies reported the FSIQ of the 
HFA group, the effect of this variable was tested on a subset of effect sizes (n = 48). 
Overall, the FSIQ of the HFA group did not emerge as a significant moderator, 
QM(1) = 0.15, p = .699, and a significant amount of heterogeneity remained, 
QE(46) = 90.15, p < .001.  
 
Group difference in full-scale IQ 
The relative cognitive ability of the TD comparison group was indexed as the 
standardised effect size (i.e. Hedges’s g) for the difference between the FSIQ of the 
two groups. These figures were reported in 39 studies. The effect of IQ difference 
emerged as a significant moderator, QM(1) = 8.22, p = .004, and accounted for a 
substantial amount of variance in effect sizes (31.79%). Nevertheless, the excess 
heterogeneity remained significant, QE(37) = 69.27, p = .001.  
As the difference in FSIQ between the groups was substantial (M = -0.44, 
SD = 0.43), the basic meta-analysis was repeated on a subset of the studies where the 
HFA and TD groups were closely matched on FSIQ, i.e. where the absolute value of 
the standardised mean difference between the FSIQ scores of the two groups did not 
exceed 0.3. The purpose of this analysis was to test whether the overall significant 
ES was due to the difference in FSIQ between the groups. The mean ES in the subset 
of studies where the HFA and TD groups were closely matched on FSIQ (n = 16) 
was significantly above zero, g = 0.39 [0.24, 0.54], p < .001. Cochran’s Q-test 
indicated that residual heterogeneity was not significant, Q(15) = 11.82, p = .692.  
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Table 2. Mean effect size of inhibitory impairment by experimental paradigm 
Paradigm Number 
of ESs 
Mean ES 
(g) 
95% CI p 
Flanker 5 0.54 [0.10, 0.99] .017 
Go/no-go 13 0.59 [0.30, 0.88] < .001 
Opposite worlds 5 0.50 [0.06, 0.94] .026 
Stop-signal 8 0.63 [0.28, 0.99] < .001 
Stroop 10 0.63 [0.31, 0.95] < .001 
Other 16 0.55 [0.30, 0.80] < .001 
Overall 57 0.58 [0.45, 0.71] < .001 
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Figure 3. Forest plot of effect sizes by paradigm and overall 
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Discussion 
In this systematic review, we sought to answer two main questions: first, whether 
inhibitory control is impaired in children with HFA, and second, whether this 
impairment, if it exists, is evident on some, but not all, measures of inhibitory 
control. Through a meta-analysis of 57 effect sizes, reported in 42 studies, we found 
strong evidence for a substantial impairment: the weighted average standardised 
mean difference between the HFA and TD groups was 0.58, above the threshold for 
a ‘medium-sized’ effect according to Cohen’s (1992) guidelines. There was, 
however, no evidence of differential performance across experimental paradigms: 
effect sizes were calculated separately for each paradigm, and they varied within a 
relatively narrow range (Hedges’s g’s between 0.50 and 0.63), and were all 
significantly above zero, showing a relatively similar degree of impairment in HFA. 
Moderator analysis confirmed that choice of experimental measure did not have a 
significant impact on the degree of inhibitory impairment observed.  
Exploratory moderator analyses were carried out to test the effect of participant 
age, FSIQ, and the difference between the HFA and TD comparison groups’ general 
cognitive ability (indexed as the standardised mean difference between the FSIQs of 
the HFA and comparison groups in each study). We found that whereas participant 
age and IQ were not associated with the size of the IC impairment shown by the 
HFA group, the difference in cognitive ability between the HFA and TD comparison 
groups was. Specifically, a larger IC impairment was reported in the studies where 
the TD comparison group was relatively more able than the HFA participants (as 
indexed by the difference in FSIQ between the groups). The meta-analysis was 
repeated on a subset of the studies, in which the HFA and TD groups were closely 
matched on FSIQ. This analysis showed a reduced, but still substantial effect size, 
suggesting that the apparent inhibition is partly, but not wholly, due to the matching 
of participants with HFA to a TD comparison group with higher general cognitive 
ability.  
 
The effect of choice of experimental task 
Although the executive dysfunction account has been an influential model of autistic 
symptomatology, there is considerable uncertainty as to the exact nature and pattern 
of impairments in the various executive functions, including inhibitory control, that 
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define the disorder (for a recent review, see Pellicano, 2011). This uncertainty stems 
from the equivocality of experimental findings.  
Various tentative explanations have been proposed for this diversity of the 
results, mostly in terms of differences between the diverse experimental tasks used to 
test inhibitory control. Some of these explanations highlight differences in the type of 
inhibitory control measured, e.g. the distinction between prepotent response 
inhibition and interference suppression (Hill, 2004), the former of which is supposed 
to be impaired in autism, and the latter, intact. Others focus on task characteristics, 
such as the use of arbitrary rules (Bíró & Russell, 2001) the availability of alternative 
strategies to solve the task (O’Hearn et al., 2010), or whether the task requires the 
recruiting of cognitive mechanisms other than inhibition for success, i.e. direct 
versus indirect measures of inhibition (Russo et al., 2007). None of these hypotheses 
had been tested empirically, however, and in the studies that used more than one 
measure of inhibition, the pattern of results has been inconsistent. For example, 
Adams and Jarrold (2012) found that children with autism were impaired on 
inhibiting interfering stimuli, but not prepotent responses, while Hill (2004) suggests 
the opposite trend.  
In this meta-analysis, we found no difference in the degree of inhibitory 
impairment shown by the HFA group across the various experimental paradigms. 
The choice of task did not emerge as a significant predictor of effect size, thus our 
results do not support any of the theories that purport to explain the difference in 
performance across tasks as outlined above, simply because there appears to be no 
such difference. This result is in accordance with the conclusions of a recent 
systematic review that contrasted prepotent response inhibition  and interference 
suppression studies (Geurts et al., 2014), which found that the performance of 
participants with HFA relative to TD comparison groups did not differ significantly 
between studies that used either a prepotent response inhibition or an interference 
suppression paradigm.  
Instead, sampling error and low power are the most likely explanation for the 
aforementioned equivocality of experimental results, which had clouded the question 
of whether inhibitory control is impaired in autism. The power of the studies 
included in this meta-analysis ranged between .37 and .96; the mean was .67. While 
this is considerably higher than the figure typical in psychological research (Cohen, 
1962; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989), it still means that 
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there was, on average, a 1 in 3 chance of a Type II error, i.e. failing to find the 
inhibitory impairment that characterises HFA children, in each study. Low statistical 
power is an unfortunate, but often inevitable characteristic of behavioural research: 
keeping the Type II error rate at the level conventional for Type I errors (i.e. 5 per 
cent) would have required over 130 participants in each of the studies included in 
this meta-analysis, which is rarely feasible. Nonetheless, careful consideration of the 
potential impact of low statistical power when interpreting non-significant results 
may help avoid unnecessary theorising and the search for non-existent ‘factors’.  
While Type II errors arising from low statistical power must be responsible for 
a considerable amount of variation in past experimental results, the heterogeneity 
diagnostics calculated in the meta-analysis suggested the existence of moderating 
factors, which we also explored.  
 
The effect of age 
In our meta-analysis, we found no association between participant age and the size of 
inhibitory impairment in the HFA group. IC improves considerably with age in 
typical development (Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Schachar & Logan, 
1990; Williams et al., 1999), but the lack of a statistically significant link between 
participant age and inhibitory impairment in the HFA group suggests that the 
performance gap is not widening between the two populations. One possible 
explanation is that the developmental trajectory of inhibition is the same, albeit 
delayed, in HFA as in typical development. Alternatively, as children with HFA 
mature, they may become able to recruit other, intact, cognitive mechanisms to 
compensate for their impaired inhibition.  
This finding of no age effect on inhibitory impairment is partly in contradiction 
with Geurts et al.’s (2014) systematic review of prepotent response inhibition and 
interference suppression: while they, too, found no link between participant age and 
interference control, age did emerge as a significant moderator of the effect size in 
prepotent response inhibition: generally, studies with older participants found a 
smaller impairment of this ability. The two reviews differed in their age range: 
whereas we only analysed studies with under-18s, Geurts et al. included studies on 
adult participants, as well. Taken together, the reviews seem to suggest that HFA 
children have consistently poorer inhibition than TD peers, but once adult levels of 
inhibition are reached in typical development, individuals with HFA have the 
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potential to ‘catch up’ through either (or both) of the mechanisms proposed above, 
and the apparent IC impairment lessens with age.  
 
The effect of IQ 
The relationship between executive functions and intelligence is complex (for an 
overview, see Friedman et al., 2006), but there is strong evidence that performance 
on tests of inhibitory control is linked to IQ (e.g. Ardila, Pineda, & Rosselli, 2000; 
Friedman et al., 2006; Geurts et al., 2014; Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan, & Shum, 2011). 
The results of our meta-analysis are in line with previous research inasmuch as we 
found that while the FSIQ of the HFA group was not a predictor of the reported 
inhibitory impairment in itself, the difference in FSIQ between the HFA and TD 
participants was, and it explained a substantial amount of variance in effect sizes. 
This means that when the general cognitive advantage of the TD comparison group 
was larger, the inhibitory impairment shown by the HFA was also larger.  
In the studies included in our meta-analysis, the TD participants typically had 
substantially higher FSIQs than the HFA children, so in order to test whether the 
inhibitory impairment effect found was entirely explicable by this difference in 
general cognitive ability, we reran the meta-analysis on a subset of the studies in 
which the two groups were closely matched on FSIQ. In these studies, the inhibitory 
impairment was still significantly above zero, but about a third smaller, suggesting 
that a substantial portion of the apparent inhibitory impairment is due to the fact that 
the TD comparison group often has considerably higher general cognitive ability 
than the participants with HFA. This highlights the fact that poor matching of the 
clinical and TD groups on mental age can lead to inflation of the observed effect 
sizes on the cognitive ability of interest.  
 
Methodological considerations  
As detailed above, sampling error, inconsistent matching of the comparison group, 
and low power can account for much of the apparent diversity of results in studies 
that investigated the inhibitory control of children with HFA. Diagnostics calculated 
in the meta-analysis showed, however, that a significant amount of residual 
heterogeneity exists in the results even after taking these factors into account, 
pointing to the existence of other moderators. Using the Go/no-go Task as an 
example, we will argue below that the lack of standardisation of experimental tasks, 
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including the dependent variables reported, may be partly responsible for this 
unexplained variance in study results.  
In the Go/no-go Task, the participant is presented with two types of stimulus: 
‘go’ trials, on which a motor response (e.g. button press) must be given, and ‘no-go’ 
trials, on which the response must be withheld. ‘Go’ trials are more salient, creating a 
tendency in the participant to respond on all trials (‘prepotent response’), which then 
must be inhibited for successful completion of the task. The higher salience of ‘go’ 
trials is typically achieved through their higher relative frequency (Cragg & Nation, 
2008). Of the 13 studies included in this meta-analysis that used the Go/no-go Task, 
only seven reported the proportion of ‘no-go’ trials: these ranged from 11 to 50 per 
cent. The low number of studies for which ‘no-go’ trial frequency data were 
available precluded the performance of moderator analysis on this variable, but there 
is evidence from both brain imaging (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001) 
and behavioural studies (Berwid et al., 2005; Durston, Thomas, Worden, Yang, & 
Casey, 2002) that the frequency and distribution of ‘no-go’ trials has a large impact 
on performance on this task. Yet, the effect of this heterogeneity is universally 
ignored when results are interpreted.  
The proportion of ‘no-go’ trials on which a response was given (i.e. the rate of 
‘commission errors’ or ‘false alarms’) is the universally reported dependent variable 
in the Go/no-go Task. All of the Go/no-go studies in our meta-analysis reported this 
statistic, and only one (Happé, Booth, et al., 2006) also included a measure of 
sensitivity (A′). The rate of commission errors, as prima facie examples of failed 
inhibition, seems an obvious choice for outcome variable, but it is extremely 
sensitive to bias: since success on the Go/no-go Task requires inaction, the score of 
participants who are distracted or fail to understand the task will be inflated, 
distorting the analysis. A measure of sensitivity that takes into account overall 
performance on the task should be used instead. One such option is A′, a 
nonparametric measure of sensitivity proposed by Norman and Pollack (1964) and 
formulated by Grier (1971) as  
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where H is the probability of a correct response on a ‘go’ trial (i.e. a ‘hit’), and FA is 
the probability of an incorrect response on a ‘no-go’ trial (i.e. a ‘false alarm’). The 
benefit of A' over the commission error rate is that no false alarms resulting from 
responding to no trials at all or from flawless inhibitory performance are easily 
distinguished in the score. More recently, Zhang and Mueller (2005) proposed a 
more sophisticated, although computationally more intensive version of this measure, 
which they called A, and which also allows for the calculation of a bias arising from 
the difference in the distribution of hit and false alarm scores.  
The Go/no-go Task aside, there was a substantial amount of heterogeneity in 
task characteristics across all the studies that were included in our meta-analysis (e.g. 
type and modality of stimulus, inter-stimulus interval, number of trials, relative 
frequency of ‘no-go’, ‘stop’, or incongruent trials, etc.). A detailed evaluation of 
these manipulations and their potential effect on the pattern of results is beyond the 
scope of this paper. An experimental study on the effect that systematically varying 
task characteristics has on performance could cast more light on the issue, but it is 
clear from the evidence available that they do influence task performance (Adams & 
Jarrold, 2012; Geurts et al., 2004).  Similarly, the choice of dependent variable may 
affect results, and therefore inconsistency across studies in this regard will make the 
interpretation of the pattern of findings more difficult. For example, in their review 
of studies into prepotent response inhibition and interference suppression in autism, 
Geurts et al. (2014) found that the choice between reaction time and accuracy as the 
outcome measure of interest was a significant moderator of impairment effect sizes.  
 
Conclusions and implications  
In our meta-analysis of experimental studies comparing inhibitory control in children 
with HFA and typical development, we found strong evidence for a substantial 
deficit in HFA. We found that while age was not a significant moderator of effect 
sizes, a large amount of variance was explicable by difference in the FSIQ of the 
HFA and TD comparison groups, lending further support to the link between 
intelligence and executive functions, and highlighting the importance of using 
appropriate matching procedures.  
Importantly, the inhibitory deficit was apparent across all commonly used 
experimental tasks, casting doubt on the relevance of theories that have attempted to 
explain the diverse pattern of results in terms of a differential inhibitory impairment 
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in autism. We suggest instead that previous equivocal findings were the result of 
typically underpowered studies, a great degree of heterogeneity in the experimental 
measures, including the choice of dependent variable, and inconsistent matching of 
the TD comparison group on general cognitive ability to the participants with HFA. 
The standardisation of experimental tasks and careful consideration of the impact of 
low power when interpreting non-significant findings are recommended as 
improvements to current research practice. 
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Article 2: Inhibitory control is a prerequisite of cooperation 
in high-functioning children with autism 
Abstract 
Cooperation is impaired in autism, but the proximate causes of this difficulty are 
little understood. Previously identified candidate mechanisms include theory of mind 
and joint attention. In older high-functioning children with autism (HFA), however, 
these capacities are relatively unimpaired, while cooperation continues to be poor. In 
search of an alternative explanation, we tested the link between cooperation and 
inhibition. Twelve HFA children attending mainstream primary schools and twelve 
age-matched typically-developing peers completed tests of join attention, false-belief 
understanding, inhibition and a cooperative drawing task. A parent-report measure of 
social functioning was obtained using the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
We found that while HFA children performed at normal levels on a false-belief task 
and in joint attention, they were impaired in inhibitory control, and the degree of this 
impairment was linked to effective cooperation in an experimental task and to 
parental reports of everyday social functioning, even after accounting for the effect 
of verbal ability. The results highlight the potential of inhibition to contribute to an 
account of social impairments in autism. 
 
Introduction 
The ability to cooperate is important for children’s social development because it is 
an essential component of social play. Social play, in turn, allows children to 
experiment with social roles, learn about understanding their own and others’ 
emotions, and gain expertise in social interaction through developing essential social 
skills such as coordinating their attention and actions with others or discussing and 
jointly developing ideas. It also provides an opportunity to forge friendships (Jordan, 
2003), which support psychological well-being (Bauminger, Shulman, & Agam, 
2004). The skills fostered by social play are also needed to succeed in the classroom: 
lack of proficiency in skills such as interpersonal communication, turn-taking and 
proxemics have an adverse effect on a child’s ability to engage with the curriculum 
in group learning settings.  
Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) suffer significant and wide-
ranging impairments in their capacity for social interaction, including cooperation 
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(Downs & Smith, 2004). Yet, cooperation is one of the relatively less well-studied 
aspects of social impairments in autism. The paucity of research into this area is 
exacerbated by the fact that there exists no ‘gold standard’ test or even a universally 
accepted definition for cooperative skills and behaviours. Here, cooperation is 
defined following Bratman’s (1992) criteria as an activity performed by mutually 
responsive partners who support each other in attaining a shared goal. Cooperation 
requires joint engagement with and a shared understanding of the task at hand, and 
may also involve a continuous exchange of ideas and flexibly shifting behaviour in 
response not only to the requirements of the task but also the reactions of the partner 
or partners.  
The causes of poor cooperation in ASD have been tentatively posited to lie in 
impaired theory of mind (Downs & Smith, 2004; Hill, Sally, & Frith, 2004; Sally & 
Hill, 2006) and joint attention (Colombi et al., 2009; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), but the evidence only partly supports these theories.  
Sally and Hill (2006), for example, suggested that mentalising ability is linked 
to making more ‘cooperative’ (i.e. trustful or fair) decisions in strategic games (the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Dictator and Ultimatum scenarios, described below). 
Contrary to their expectations, however, success on a second-order false-belief test 
did not predict the ability of children between the ages of 6 and 10 to ‘cooperate’ in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and to make fair offers in the Ultimatum Game. Also, 
children with ASD were no less cooperative than typically-developing (TD) children 
in these strategic games. In a similar set-up, Downs and Smith (2004) found that 
children with ASD between the ages of 6 and 10 were no less cooperative in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma than TD controls matched on IQ. The proposition that 
considering the play partner’s mental states is a prerequisite of cooperative behaviour 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is further undermined by self-reports of verbally able 
adults with ASD. In Hill, Sally and Frith’s (2004) study, participants were asked to 
complete three versions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma task, and then took part in a semi-
structured interview designed to identify the spontaneous strategies they had used in 
the game. It was expected that TD controls would use a strategy based on the mental 
states attributed to the play partner, and would therefore be more cooperative. In fact, 
individuals with ASD displayed the same level of cooperation as the TD controls, 
and both groups reported using a purely logical approach to maximising their 
payoffs.  
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Using a similar social hunting game, Yoshida et al. (2010) compared the 
strategies employed by adults with and without autism. Contrary to the results of 
Hill, Sally and Frith (2004), they found that control participants were more likely to 
use a strategy based on inferring the opponent’s goals, but participants with autism 
tended to stick to either a cooperative or a competitive strategy throughout the 
experimental session. Problematically for the explanatory power of these results, 
however, mentalising ability was not measured directly in this study, and none of the 
correlations were significant between the severity of autistic symptoms and using 
what the authors labelled as the ‘theory of mind strategy’ in the game.   
One explanation for the failure to link theory of mind to cooperation lies in the 
unsuitability of the methodology used to measure the latter construct. In the Dictator 
Game, one of the players (the Dictator) is assigned a quantity of valuable resources, 
which she is then free to share with the other player as she deems fit. The Ultimatum 
Game introduces an element of interaction: the second player has the option to reject 
the split, in which case neither player receives anything. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(PD) scenario, the two players may choose, independently and blind to the other 
player’s decision, to either ‘cooperate’ or to ‘compete’. The payoff matrix is so 
defined that although mutual cooperation results in the best outcome for both parties, 
a player who chooses to cooperate exposes herself to exploitation by an 
uncooperative partner, and so the rational (self-interested) decision is for both 
players to compete, which then leads to the worst overall outcome.  
The problem with these economic ‘games’ in measuring cooperation is that 
they were developed specifically to eliminate social factors: personal interaction of 
any kind between the partners is explicitly forbidden under the rules, and in order to 
eliminate the expectation of future reciprocation, the play partner is typically a 
stranger or even non-existent. Although acting trustfully or prosocially in these 
scenarios is referred to as ‘cooperating’ in the research literature, it might be more 
accurate to discuss it in terms of understanding abstract social norms of reciprocity 
and fairness. There is little similarity between making such a decision and the 
behaviours that comprise cooperation as defined above (characterised by mutually 
supportive partners working towards a shared goal and also, potentially, by co-
location, shared attention and verbal and non-verbal communication). These 
characteristics make the game theory paradigm particularly ill-suited for the study of 
cooperation in episodes of social play and learning. In order to gain a more 
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ecologically valid measure of cooperation, it is important to observe real-life 
activities, such as joint drawing or construction.  
For our study, we chose the Interactive Drawing Task (van Ommeren, Begeer, 
Scheeren, & Koot, 2012)1, a joint drawing activity that involves co-located partners 
sharing a workspace and allows for, although it does not require, real-time 
communication and joint attention. Although interacting with an unknown adult (i.e. 
the experimenter) in an experimental setting obviously has important differences 
from a spontaneous peer play session, the IDT is a good measure of cooperative play 
because it comprises an activity that is familiar and inherently enjoyable (i.e. 
drawing), the pace and level of interaction is dictated by the child, and there are no 
arbitrary rules to learn and keep in mind. The IDT has been used successfully to 
assess the cooperative play of children, both typically developing, with autism, and 
with learning disabilities. 
We also used the parent-report Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire to 
obtain an independent measure of social competence in everyday peer interactions.  
In addition to theory of mind, the ability to share intentions and attention has 
been put forward as essential prerequisites of successful cooperation, in line with the 
evolutionary account proposed by Tomasello et al. (2005). Colombi et al. (2009), for 
example, set out to identify the correlates of cooperative ability in preschool children 
(mean age: 3.5 years) with ASD or developmental delay (DD), and concluded that a 
deficit in the ability to respond to joint attention (RJA) is responsible at this age for 
impaired cooperation. Similarly, Liebal et al. (2008) found that children with autism 
showed less cooperation than DD controls, and were also less likely to invite the 
adult partner to re-engage with the task when the experimenter stopped playing. The 
authors interpreted these results in terms of an impaired ability to form shared 
intentions and engage in joint attention. Travis, Sigman and Ruskin (2001) measured 
social understanding and social responsiveness in children with ASD (mean age: 
12.7 years), operationalised as initiating joint attention (IJA), false-belief 
                                                          
 
 
1
 Although the first author’s surname is Backer-van Ommeren, the study is cited as 
above in academic databases. In the interest of ease of identification, we use this 
(incorrect) form here and in the References section, with apologies to Dr Backer-van 
Ommeren. 
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understanding, affective perspective-taking, empathy and concern to distress. Of 
these variables, only empathy and IJA showed a significant relationship with 
prosocial behaviour and spontaneous engagement in peer play on a playground.  
While the capacity for shared intentions and attention is, by definition, an 
essential component of cooperation, it is clearly not sufficient in itself. Several 
studies (e.g. Leekam & Moore, 2001; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1994; Sigman & 
Ruskin, 1999) have shown that the severity of impairments in RJA lessens in autism 
with increasing chronological or mental age, but this improvement is not paralleled 
by an increase in the quality of peer interactions. Similarly, Mundy et al. (1994) 
found no relationship between RJA and the intensity of social symptoms in pre-
school children with ASD. This leaves open the question of what residual 
impairments are responsible for poor cooperation in HFA children beyond the 
preschool years.  
Executive dysfunction has been proposed as one such candidate component of 
a multiple-deficit model of social impairments in autism (for a recent review, see 
Pellicano, 2011), but the evidence is equivocal. In a longitudinal investigation of the 
predictive power of specific cognitive skills on autistic symptoms, Pellicano (2013) 
found that at three-year follow-up, EF (planning, cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory 
control) uniquely predicted social communication and repetitive behaviours and 
interests in children with autism. Early individual differences in EF and central 
coherence were linked to social functioning, but ToM (false-belief understanding) 
did not contribute to the explanatory power of the model. Similarly, McEvoy, Rogers 
and Pennington (1993), for example, found that level of executive functioning (EF) 
at the age of five was significantly related to the ability to engage in joint attention 
and social interactions, even after controlling for verbal ability. Griffith et al. (1999) 
demonstrated a link between the number of perseveration errors committed by 
children with ASD and measures of initiating and responding to joint attention. 
These findings lend support to the idea of specific subdomains of EF acting as a 
prerequisite of fully functioning social skills. Happé et al. (2006), for example, 
showed that performance on a variety of executive function tasks was related to 
specific aspects of social communication and adaptive behaviours, and negatively 
correlated with symptoms of hyperactivity. Similarly, Ozonoff et al. (2004) showed 
that performance on the CANTAB suite of EF tests was correlated with adaptive 
behaviour (as measured on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales). In an 
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investigation of the relationship between EF, false-belief understanding and social 
competence in a longitudinal sample, Razza and Blair (2009) concluded that 
preschool performance on measures of inhibitory function, working memory and set-
shifting predicted social competence both in preschool and a year later. A similar 
link between EF and social functioning was found in Fahie and Symon’s (2003) 
study: teacher and parent reports of social problems were related to performance on 
measures of impulsivity, attention and working memory, even after the effect of 
theory of mind was accounted for. The evidence for an EF account of social 
impairments is far from conclusive, however: a number of studies failed to find a 
relationship between EF and social capacities in autism (e.g. Bennetto, Pennington, 
& Rogers, 1996; Pennington et al., 1997; Rumsey, 1985; Russell, 1997), and in other 
cases, the explanatory power of EF disappeared when verbal ability was accounted 
for (e.g. Bishop & Norbury, 2005; Liss et al., 2001; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & 
Maley, 2006).  
In a recent study, Li et al. (2014) investigated the predictive power of ToM and 
EF on the performance of children with and without HFA on two tests of 
cooperation: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and an ‘implemental task’. They found that 
children with HFA had an uneven cooperation profile: there was no significant 
difference between the groups in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but the TD children 
outperformed the participants with HFA on the implemental task. Importantly, EF 
was predictive of cooperation in both tasks. 
There is considerable evidence that the equivocality of findings in the area of 
executive dysfunction in autism is partly caused by methodological issues, namely 
the nature of the tasks used and the choice of matching tasks and control groups (see 
Hill & Bird, 2006; and Russo et al., 2007). Inhibitory control is a domain of EF 
where the choice of task, age and comparison group plays a particularly substantial 
role in whether individuals with ASD are found to have impairments (for reviews, 
see Hill, 2004; O’Hearn, Asato, Ordaz, & Luna, 2010; Russo et al., 2007). As Garon, 
Bryson and Smith (2008, p. 40) poignantly state: “Ironically, one of the challenges in 
understanding the development of response inhibition is the multitude of response 
inhibition tasks.” Two recent meta-analyses have investigated the impact of choice of 
measure on inhibitory performance. Geurts et al. (2014) compared tests of ‘prepotent 
response inhibition’ with tests of ‘interference suppression’, and found that children 
with HFA showed impaired performance both types of task. Similarly, Borbely 
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(submitted) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that directly compared inhibition in 
children with HFA with TD controls, and found that while choice of experimental 
measure was not a significant predictor of inhibitory performance, there was a large 
amount of heterogeneity across studies that could not be explained by the age or 
cognitive ability of the participants. This suggests that methodological differences 
across measures of inhibition as well as between how the same task is administered 
by different researchers have a profound impact on performance. Until the details of 
this interaction between methodological details and experimental performance are 
clearly understood, inhibition should be measured using a battery of diverse tasks to 
ensure a comprehensive picture.  
We hypothesised that HFA children struggle in cooperative situations partly 
because they are less able to accept the play partner’s contributions, as a result of 
their difficulty in inhibiting the prepotent response, which is to follow their own 
plans and preferences for the play session. The objective of this study was, therefore, 
to contribute to the EF account of social impairments in autism by testing the 
hypothesised link between inhibitory control and cooperation, and between 
inhibitory control and everyday social functioning in a primary school age sample, 
expanding on previous investigations into the correlates of cooperation in autism. As 
our autistic sample consisted of high-functioning children, we expected that they 
would not show impairments in false-belief understanding and joint attention, but 
would nonetheless be less able than their TD peers to engage in a cooperative task, 
and that they would experience more difficulties related to everyday social 
interaction. In terms of the causes of these social problems, we hypothesised that the 
HFA sample would show impairments in inhibitory control and that the degree of 
this impairment would be linked to the severity of difficulties in social interaction.  
 
Method 
Participants  
Twelve high-functioning children (11 males) with a diagnosis of autism spectrum 
disorder between the ages of 5;6 and 11;5 (M = 8;5, SD = 1;9) and an equal number 
of typically-developing peers (8 males) aged between 6;6 and 11;5 (M = 8;2, 
SD = 1;9), groupwise matched on chronological age, participated in the study.  
The HFA participants were recruited from a play scheme run for children with 
special educational needs and from autism charities. The TD children were recruited 
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from local primary schools. Those in the HFA group did not have a comorbid 
diagnosis of any other developmental disorder (e.g. ADHD).  
Matching children by chronological age (rather than verbal mental age) was 
chosen because the inhibitory tasks and the cooperative activity were predominantly 
visual-motor in nature. The HFA children in our sample had lower than average 
verbal ability, and so using a verbal matching measure would have resulted in 
choosing a comparison group with lower general ability. Since visuo-spatial and 
nonverbal skills are relatively intact in autism (Shah & Frith, 1983), however, 
comparison with such a low-ability control group would have led to an 
overestimation of the HFA group’s performance.  
 
Measures  
Baseline measures 
Verbal ability: The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-III, Dunn & Dunn, 
2009) was used, a test of receptive verbal ability that provides a standardised verbal 
IQ score and an equivalent verbal mental age.  
Theory of mind: Mentalising ability was tested using two standard measures of first-
order and second-order understanding of false beliefs: the Sally-Ann (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985) and the birthday puppy (Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) tasks, 
respectively. The stories were acted out with Playmobil figures.  
Joint attention: An adapted version of the Early Social Communication Scales 
(Seibert, Hogan, & Mundy, 1982) was used to gauge the participants’ ability to 
initiate and respond to joint attention and behavioural requests. The experimenter 
invited the participant to engage in a 10-minute joint building task using Lego Duplo 
blocks. The experimenter performed a series of predefined actions intended to elicit 
each of these behaviours (e.g. withhold a brick needed by the child for the 
construction task in order to elicit asking or looking and pointing at the construction 
model while giving the instructions for the task).  
These sessions were videotaped and the child’s behaviour coded for the 
frequency of asking questions, making behavioural requests and initiating joint 
attention (showing or pointing) as well as for the proportion of responses to questions 
and behavioural requests made by the experimenter, and responding to joint 
attention.  
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Inhibitory control  
The Bear/dragon Task (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996; 
Reed, Pien, & Rothbart, 1984) is a version of the ‘Simon Says’ game. Children 
receive instructions to perform a series of self-directed actions (e.g. “Clap your 
hands”), given alternately by a “nice bear” or a “naughty dragon”, and must comply 
with the instructions of the bear while refraining from following the orders of the 
dragon. In this study, the experimenter used hand puppets of a (nice) fairy and a 
(naughty) crocodile, and gave the commands in a high-pitched voice (for the fairy) or 
in a low, gruff voice (when speaking as the crocodile). After confirming that the 
participant was able to perform each of the actions, there were two practice rounds, 
followed by ten trials. Regardless of performance, the children were reminded of the 
rules halfway through. Following the coding scheme used by Kochanska et al. 
(1996), each of the crocodile trials (i.e. when children had to refrain from complying 
with the command) was coded on a scale of 0 to 3 (0 = command fully performed; 
1 = command partially performed; 2 = wrong movement; 3 = no movement). The 
fairy trials were coded reversely (i.e. 0 for no movement and 3 for command fully 
performed).  
In a computerised Go/no-go Task, images of cats and robots were presented in 
a random sequence on a 15” laptop screen for 750 ms each, with an inter-stimulus 
interval of 1250 ms. The participants were instructed to press the space bar for cats, 
and to refrain from any action on the robot trials. After ten practice trials, the 
participants completed fifty trials (in which the ratio of cat and robot pictures was 
4:1) and were given generic praise, regardless of performance. Anticipatory 
responses (i.e. responses given within an excessively short time of exposure to the 
stimulus) were not excluded from the analysis because they represent a prima facie 
example of failed motor inhibition.  
The Windows Task (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991) was 
originally proposed as a measure of the capacity for strategic deception. It involves 
two opaque boxes that have an opening on one side. They are placed between the 
experimenter and the participant in a manner that the latter can see their contents, but 
the former cannot. A desirable object is then placed in one of the boxes, which the 
participant can acquire by pointing to the empty box. This task was used as a 
measure of inhibitory control because the salient response of pointing to the desirable 
object must be suppressed in order to acquire it. In this study, a piece of sweet was 
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placed in a randomly chosen box, and the rule of the game was explicitly explained 
to the participant. After two practice trials, the rules were reiterated, followed by 
twenty rounds of the game. The task was terminated early if the participant either 
failed or passed all of the first six trials. In order to eliminate social considerations on 
the part of the participant (e.g. failing the test deliberately so as not to appear greedy 
or to make sure that the sweets are evenly distributed between the participant and the 
experimenter), the game was not framed as a competition but as a chance to ‘win’ 
sweets. Sweets lost by the participant were returned to the original container, rather 
than going to the experimenter.  
Delay inhibition was measured using the gift delay task used by Kochanska et 
al. (1996). The participant was told that they would get a gift but in order that it 
could be a surprise, they were asked to close their eyes. The experimenter then 
proceeded to noisily wrap the gift for 60 seconds. The participants’ behaviour was 
videotaped and coded for whether they peeked and, if so, for the onset time of the 
peeking.  
 
Parental questionnaire on adaptive behaviours  
The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997) is a parent-rated 
measure of behavioural problems in four domains: emotional; conduct; 
hyperactivity-inattention; and peer relations. In addition, it gauges the frequency of 
prosocial behaviours. The SDQ contains five questions in each domain (for a total of 
25), the order of which was randomised for administering. The measure has good 
internal consistency (mean Cronbach’s  = .73) and test-retest reliability (mean 
correlation = .62) (Goodman, 2001). The questionnaire was handed out to parents in 
hard copy, who returned it to the first author when completed.  
 
Cooperation  
Cooperation was measured using the Interactive Drawing Test (van Ommeren et al., 
2012), which involves taking turns to draw on an A3 sheet of paper with different 
coloured markers. The participant is simply told: “We are going to draw together”. 
The experimenter followed a predefined routine throughout the task. In the first 
stage, he drew a simple house, followed by two shapes: a semicircle and a wavy line. 
In the second stage, he contributed to the participant’s drawings, at first 
constructively (‘appropriate input’, e.g. adding windows to a house), then in a 
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manner that altered the nature of the child’s drawing (‘radical input’, e.g. turning the 
house into a robot). This task was terminated after approx. 10 minutes. After each of 
his turns, the experimenter turned the sheet over (so that it would face the child) and 
passed it across the table. Using the coding method developed by Backer van 
Ommeren et al., the drawings were scored for collaborative reciprocity (i.e. number 
of times the child joined the experimenter in drawing an object), turn–taking (i.e. 
number of times the paper was passed back to the experimenter, with or without 
turning it over), and degree of accepting the experimenter’s input (separately for 
appropriate and radical contributions). The experimenter’s contribution was 
considered as accepted if the child continued the drawing or made a positive verbal 
acknowledgment (e.g. “Yes, that’s good.”), while abandoning the drawing for 
another one, crossing out the addition and negative verbal comments (e.g. “Don’t do 
that. Draw your own!”) were coded as rejection. A second coder was trained on three 
video recordings. A sample of another six video recordings (25 per cent) was double-
coded and perfect inter-rater agreement was achieved on both degree of reciprocity 
and acceptance of experimenter input.  
 
Procedure  
The experimental tests were administered by the first author, in the order described 
above, except that the gift delay task was performed last, as a natural conclusion of 
the session. The experimental sessions lasted approx. 45 minutes. Participants were 
tested individually in a quiet room at a play scheme for children with special 
educational needs or in a laboratory. Parental consent and the participants’ assent 
were obtained, and we checked prior to testing whether the participants understood 
their right to withdraw from the study. The study was approved by the university’s 
ethics committee.  
 
Results 
Baseline measures 
Age and gender: There were no significant differences between the groups with 
respect to gender, Barnard’s exact test p > .05, or age, t(22) = .28, p = .779.  
Verbal ability: HFA participants showed lower verbal ability than controls. A one-
tailed between-subjects t-test on standardised scores on the BPVS showed that HFA 
participants had a significantly lower verbal IQ (M = 92.91, SD = 18.87) than the 
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controls (M = 115.58, SD = 13.92), t(21) = 3.30, p = .003, d = 1.38. The effect of 
verbal ability was therefore included as a covariate in the main group comparisons, 
and was partialled out in all subsequent correlation analyses.  
Theory of mind: There was no difference between the HFA and TD groups’ 
performance on first-order theory of mind, i.e. the Sally-Ann task (Barnard’s exact 
test p > .05); HFA participants did perform more poorly, however, on the birthday 
puppy story (Barnard’s exact test p < .05,  = .60). All but one TD participant passed 
the second-order false-belief task, but only a third of the HFA participants did.  
Joint attention: Mann-Whitney U tests revealed no difference between the HFA and 
TD groups on initiating joint attention (p = .279), responding to joint attention 
(p = .71), the frequency of making behavioural requests (p = .505), or the proportion 
of behavioural requests made by the experimenter that the participant complied with 
(p = 1) (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1. Participant characteristics, joint attention and theory of mind performance 
  TD 
M (SD) 
Range 
HFA 
M (SD) 
Range 
Difference between groups 
 N 12 12  
 CA (years) 8.2 (1.72) 
6.5-11.42 
8.4 (1.74) 
5.5-11.42 
ns, p = .779 
 VIQ (BPVS-II) 92.91 (18.87) 
73-132  
115.58 (13.92) 
92-133 
TD > HFA, p = .003 
Joint attention     
 Initiating joint attention 4 (4.04) 
0-8 
2.38 (2.88) 
1-13 
ns, p = .369 
 Behavioural requests made 4.88 (3.91) 
0-11 
3.5 (4.34) 
0-11 
ns, p = .516 
 Responding to joint attention  
(proportion of bids responded to) 
.95 (.12) 
.25-1 
.89 (.2) 
.38-1 
ns, p = .51 
 Complying with behavioural 
requests 
(proportion of bids responded to) 
All behavioural requests were complied with in both groups. 
Theory of Mind    
 First-order false belief  
(pass / fail) 
11 / 1 8 / 4 ns, p >.05 
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 Second-order false belief 
(pass / fail) 
11 / 1 4 / 8 TD > HFA, p < .05 
 
Inhibitory control  
In order to account for the non-normal distribution of scores on inhibition tasks, one-
tailed t-tests were calculated with bias-corrected accelerated bootstrapping. These 
tests revealed that the HFA group performed more poorly on all measures of 
inhibitory control, i.e. proportion of correct responses in the Windows Task, 
t(11.28) = 2.62, p = .012, d = 1.02, average score for dragon trials in the Bear/dragon 
Task, t(11) = 2.46, p = .016, d = 0.88, the proportion of incorrect responses on no-go 
trials in the Go/no-go Task, t(11.22) = 1.82, p = .048, d = 0.74, and peeking onset on 
the gift delay task (in seconds), t(18.48) = 1.8, p = .044, d = 0.73 (See Table 2). In 
order to address the theoretical issues regarding the measurement of inhibitory 
control that were raised above, an aggregate inhibition score was computed for each 
participant by taking the average of the proportion of correct responses on each of 
the above tasks. In the case of the gift delay task, the proportion was calculated as the 
number of seconds until peeking divided by the total length of the task (i.e. 60 
seconds). As such, a child who peeked immediately would score 0/60 = 0, and a 
child who did not peek at all would score 60/60 = 1. Thus, a single inhibitory control 
score was obtained, which ranged between 0 (poor inhibition) and 1 (faultless 
performance on all inhibitory control tasks completed). Of the 96 data points (scores 
on each of four tasks for each of 24 participants), only a few were missing due to 
technical problems (n = 4) or participant non-compliance (n = 2), and each 
participant completed at least three of the four measures of inhibition. This 
distribution of aggregate inhibition scores was approximately normal in the HFA 
group, but had a strong positive skew (skew z = 4.71, p < .001) in the TD group 
because five children in this group completed all inhibitory tasks faultlessly.  
 
Table 2. Inhibitory performance across groups  
 TD 
M (SD) 
HFA 
M (SD) 
Difference between 
groups 
Proportion of correct responses on Windows Task .98 (.04) .66 (.43) TD > HFA, p = .012 
Proportion of incorrect responses on no-go trials .96 (.05) .85 (.2) TD > HFA, p = .048 
Average score on dragon trials (max.: 3) 3 (0) 2.12 (1.24) TD > HFA, p = .016 
Average seconds’ delay to peek on gift delay task (max.: 60) 55.54 (15.46) 40.4 (24.68) TD > HFA, p = .044 
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Aggregate inhibition score .97 (.06) .71 (.33) TD > HFA, p = .007 
 
Social functioning  
Children in the HFA group scored significantly higher on the hyperactivity, 
t(19) = 4.10, p < .001, d = 1.81, emotional symptoms, t(19) = 2.28, p = .018, d = 1 
and peer problems, t(19) = 4.63, p < .001, d = 2.04, subscales of the Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire, as well as on the difficulties composite, t(19) = 4.38, 
p < .001, d = 1.93. There was no significant difference between the groups on 
conduct problems (p = .062), and HFA children scored significantly lower on the 
prosocial behaviours subscale, t(19) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 2.04 (See Table 3.).  
Even after accounting for differences in verbal ability, inhibitory control 
remained a significant predictor of the total difficulties composite score, r(10) = -.42, 
p = .018, as well as of scores on three subscales: emotional symptoms, r(10) = -.51, 
p = .014; prosocial behaviour, r(10) = -.40, p = .044, and peer problems, r(10) = -.43, 
p = .033. The significant correlation between inhibitory control and hyperactivity 
was reduced to borderline significance after partialling out the effect of verbal 
ability, r(10) = -.39, p = .051. Because of ceiling effects in the TD group, which 
could have distorted correlational analyses, Pearson’s r was calculated for the HFA 
group only. 
 
Table 3. Parent report of social functioning on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire 
  TD 
M (SD) 
HFA 
M (SD) 
Difference between groups 
 Prosocial behaviour 7.5 (2.36) 3.22 (2.44) TD > HFA, p < .001 
Difficulties    
 Hyperactivity 3.83 (1.03) 6.22 (1.64) TD < HFA, p < .001 
 Emotion regulation 2.92 (0.79) 3.89 (1.17) TD < HFA, p = .017 
 Conduct problems 6.5 (0.91) 6 (0.5) ns, p = .153 
 Peer relations 1.58 (1.93) 5.22 (1.56) TD < HFA, p < .001 
 Difficulties composite score 14.83 (3.69) 21.33 (2.87) TD < HFA, p < .001 
 
Interactive Drawing Test  
Drawing process: One-tailed t-tests revealed no significant difference between the 
groups on the number of turns taken or the proportion of turns in which the 
participant shifted (p = .137) or shifted and rotated (p = .98) the paper.  
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Reciprocity: Each participant’s every contribution to the drawing was rated as 
showing no reciprocity, basic reciprocity or collaborative reciprocity as defined by 
Backer-van Ommeren et al. (2012). Drawing elements that were more than 2 cm 
away from the experimenter’s drawing were coded as ‘no reciprocity’, unless they 
were thematically related to it. If the participant drew in the vicinity (within 2 cm) of 
the experimenter’s contribution or if their drawing showed awareness of it (e.g. they 
copied experimenter), the turn was coded as ‘basic reciprocity’. The ‘collaborative 
reciprocity’ label was used for turns when the participant added a detail to a drawing 
that the experimenter had contributed to, i.e. the two members of the dyad were 
‘drawing something together’.  
One-tailed t-tests with bias-corrected accelerated bootstrapping revealed that 
the proportion of ‘no reciprocity’ contributions was significantly higher in the HFA 
group, t(17) = 3.13, p = .003, d = 1.44. There was no significant difference between 
the groups on the proportion of basic reciprocity, p = .183. The HFA group engaged 
in significantly less collaborative reciprocity, t(17) = 2.62, p = .009, d = 1.20. After 
partialling out the effect of verbal ability, the correlation between inhibition and the 
proportion of turns with collaborative reciprocity was reduced to non-significance 
(p = .188), but the relationship between inhibition and the proportion of turns with no 
reciprocity remained significant, r(10) = -.45, p = .037.  
Accepting partner’s input: In the turns when the experimenter made an appropriate or 
radical (i.e. inappropriate) contribution to the participant’s drawing, the participant’s 
response was coded as accepting or rejecting. One-tailed t-tests with bias-corrected 
accelerated bootstrapping showed that children in the HFA group rejected both 
appropriate and radical contributions significantly more often than the TD controls: 
t(10.95) = 3.81, p = .002, d = 1.67 for appropriate and t(17) = 2.03, p = .030, d = 0.93 
for radical contributions. There was no significant difference between the groups on 
response to radical contributions, p = .139. This was presumably due to the 
dichotomous distribution of results: participants either accepted all radical 
contributions (44% in the TD and 20% in the HFA condition) or rejected all, with no 
participant in either group accepting some and rejecting some.  
Correlations between cooperation (i.e. accepting partner input and 
collaborative reciprocity in the IDT) and verbal intelligence, first and second-order 
false-belief understanding, and responding to joint attention scores were calculated in 
the HFA group, but none of these relationships reached significance (lowest 
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p = .064). However, the aggregate measure of inhibition showed high correlations 
with accepting both appropriate input, r(10) = .66, p = .002, and radical input, 
r(10) = .52, p = .017, even after the effect of verbal intelligence was accounted for.  
Two typical examples are provided to illustrate the difference between the 
performance of TD and HFA children on this task. Figure 1 shows part of a drawing 
created by a 9-year-old TD girl. When the experimenter added roller-skates to her 
drawing of a cat, she turned it into a jet-propelled sabre-toothed cat, demonstrating 
both acceptance of the experimenter’s radical input and collaborative reciprocity. In 
contrast, an 8-year-old HFA boy ignored the experimenter’s drawing (an upside 
down house) and filled the page with robots, completely disregarding the cooperative 
aspect of the activity (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 1. Drawing of a 9-year-old TD girl 
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Figure 2. Drawing of an 8-year-old HFA boy 
 
Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of inhibitory control on the 
ability to engage in a cooperative task, and on general social functioning. In 
accordance with our hypothesis, we found that children with HFA performed at age-
typical levels on first-order false-belief understanding and joint attention, but showed 
impaired performance on all tests of inhibitory control. The degree of this 
impairment was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to accept the play 
partner’s input in a collaborative drawing task. Additionally, performance on 
experimental measures of inhibition was found to predict parent reports of certain 
aspects of social competence (emotion regulation, prosocial behaviour and peer 
relations) in everyday life, even after the effect of verbal ability has been accounted 
for.  
We set out to investigate the hypothesised effect of impaired inhibition on the 
ability of HFA children to engage in cooperative interaction, and found that 
inhibition was negatively correlated with the quality of cooperation, operationalised 
as reciprocity and accepting the play partner’s input on the Interactive Drawing Task. 
While the relationship between inhibitory control and reciprocity weakened once the 
effect of verbal intelligence was included in the model, inhibition remained a strong 
predictor of accepting the play partner’s input. One possible explanation of this effect 
is that inhibitory control enables the individual to suppress their own preferences for 
the drawing and reach a compromise with the play partner. Accepting the play 
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partner’s contributions is strongly linked to the quality of cooperation, because 
without it, no activity can be truly cooperative. Our results fit a model of social 
impairments in which inhibition is a prerequisite of cooperative behaviour because 
one’s own intentions and desires need to be suppressed before the play partner’s 
contributions can be taken into account and accepted. If this interpretation is correct, 
the level of inhibitory control would effectively act as a limit on the extent of 
cooperation. In previous work with toddlers, Colombi and colleagues (2009) 
concluded that RJA was the underlying proximate cause of good cooperation. 
Importantly, however, we found no sign of impaired RJA in an older sample to 
explain poor cooperation. Colombi et al.’s regression model did not include any 
measures of executive function, so our findings represent an interesting contribution 
towards fully mapping out the prerequisite cognitive capacities of cooperation at 
different stages of social and cognitive development. Our results also highlight the 
importance of investigating the correlates of the capacity for cooperation across 
multiple stages of socio-cognitive development, because the processes underlying 
impaired cooperation in HFA children will likely change as new skills are acquired.  
Inhibitory function was also found to be related to day-to-day social adaptation 
as measured by the peer relations, prosocial behaviours and emotional difficulties 
subscales, as well as the total difficulties score, on the Strengths and Difficulties 
Questionnaire. Our finding that inhibitory control is linked to parental reports of 
effective social functioning is in line with several previous studies that found a 
relationship between executive function and social adaptation (e.g. Fahie & Symons, 
2003; Happé et al., 2006; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Razza & Blair, 2009). Although other 
researchers reported no significant relationships or relationships that were reduced to 
non-significance after accounting for the effect of verbal intelligence, it is likely that 
the equivocality of findings is, at least in part, due to methodological differences and 
the difficulty of investigating a link between two very broad areas (i.e. executive 
function and social competence), which are defined and operationalised in diverse 
ways by different researchers (for discussions of methodological concerns, see 
Hill & Bird, 2006; Russo et al., 2007).  
In this study, individual differences in the level of inhibitory control naturally 
did not account for all the variability in performance on the IDT. Of course, 
inhibition is only one domain of executive control, and although the unique 
contributions of other executive functions to children’s cooperative play is beyond 
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the scope of this paper, this is an important area for future research.  Cognitive 
flexibility, i.e. the ability to disengage from one cognitive set and shift to another is a 
particularly strong candidate as a mechanism that underlies the difficulties in social 
play that arise from behavioural rigidity in autism, not only because of the intuitive 
link between cognitive and behavioural inflexibility, but also because impairments in 
this domain of executive function are well documented in autism (for reviews, see 
Hill, 2004; Pellicano, 2011). 
The typically-developing participants in our study were matched to the HFA 
group on chronological age, rather than verbal ability. This decision was made for 
two reasons. First, because our focus was on how the cooperative play of children 
with HFA compares to that of age-matched peers that they would interact with daily, 
e.g. at school. Second, because the primary measures of interest (the inhibitory tasks 
and the IDT) are non-verbal, and so a comparison group matched on verbal age but, 
presumably, of lower chronological age would have been outperformed by our HFA 
group, distorting the results. Nonetheless, an extended replication of this study using 
a TD comparison group matched on verbal mental age would be useful, not only to 
clarify the picture further, but also in the light of the results of a meta-analysis on 
inhibitory control in HFA that has been completed since the conclusion of this study 
(Borbely, under review). This meta-analysis showed that difference between the 
general cognitive ability of the HFA and TD participants was a significant predictor 
of effect size. When only studies that used participants closely matched on general 
cognitive ability were considered, the difference in inhibitory performance was 
substantially lower, although still significant. 
Through investigating the degree of impairment in inhibitory control displayed 
by primary-aged children with HFA, and linking this impairment to social 
difficulties, both in everyday life and in an experimental task, our study represents a 
step towards clarifying the role of executive dysfunction in autistic symptomatology. 
In the model we proposed, inhibition acts as a moderator between social 
understanding and social behaviour. Future research regarding the relationship 
between executive function and social competence would benefit from a better 
understanding of the landscape of executive impairments in autism.   
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Article 3: Inhibitory control and fairness in distributive 
justice in autism and typical development  
Abstract 
There has been little research on the understanding and practice of fairness in high-
functioning children with autism (HFA), but parent and teacher reports suggest a 
pattern of self-centred behaviour, which hinders integration and social interaction. In 
this study, we gauged the moral reasoning, sharing behaviour, and inhibitory control 
of 17 HFA children between the ages of 5 and 11, and 15 TD controls, using the 
Early Positive Justice Levels Interview, the Dictator Game, and a computerised 
Go/no-go Task, respectively. Results indicated no group difference between the 
children on moral reasoning or sharing, but the HFA children performed significantly 
worse on the inhibition task. Inhibitory control predicted acting fairly in the Dictator 
Game, after controlling for mental age, moral reasoning level, and theory of mind. 
The results lend support to a model of the judgement-behaviour gap in which 
impaired inhibitory control moderates the relationship between intact moral 
knowledge and impaired moral behaviour. The generally poorer inhibition of HFA 
children may play a role in their typically self-centred behaviour. 
 
Introduction 
Acquiring an understanding of fairness that is in line with prevalent norms, and 
learning to behave accordingly are important aspects of a child’s social development, 
and are essential for becoming an effective social agent. Because so many personal 
interactions are based on explicit or implicit social negotiations, an individual 
without a solid understanding of conventional norms of fairness will find day-to-day 
social situations more difficult to navigate. Importantly, fairness also facilitates 
building early friendships, which are essential for social adjustment (Bauminger-
Zviely & Agam-Ben-Artzi, 2014; Ladd, Kochenderfer, & Coleman, 1996), because 
individuals perceived as unfair can expect negative treatment from their peers (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986), while children as 
young as 3 years old show more positive attitudes towards people they witness 
sharing fairly with others (Ng, Heyman, & Barner, 2011), and are prepared to 
sacrifice a reward in order to  punish those who transgress moral norms of sharing 
(Robbins & Rochat, 2011). 
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The foundations of much of the research into moral development over the past 
decades had been laid by of Piaget’s model, first outlined in The Moral Judgment of 
the Child (Piaget, 1932). Piaget argued for a two-stage model, where ‘heteronomy’, 
i.e. a strict observance of externally imposed rules is transformed, through 
unregulated, symmetrical social interaction with peers into an internally-originating, 
‘autonomous’ mode of moral thinking, based on sympathy, mutuality, and the 
recognition of reciprocal rights and duties as ‘justice’. Kohlberg (e.g. Kohlberg & 
Candee, 1984) built on and extended Piaget’s model by increasing the number of 
stages to a total of six and, importantly, suggesting that while earlier moral beliefs 
grow out of internalised societal norms, in later, more sophisticated stages, the 
individual’s morality stems from a recognition of universal ethical principles, which 
may contradict current norms of behaviour (including laws). In contrast to 
Kohlberg’s idea that all moral reasoning is based on decisions about the value of 
human life, Damon proposed a system of stages in the development of positive 
justice, i.e. the allocation of resources. He used the Early Positive Justice Levels 
Interview (among other measures) to investigate a progression from wishes and 
desires (4-5 years) through equality and reciprocity of action (5-9 years), to a 
context-specific morality, where decisions are based on the particular demands of the 
situation and people involved. Importantly, Damon concludes (1977; Gerson & 
Damon, 1978) that moral judgement and behaviour were only very loosely related to 
each other before the age of around 10. 
When discussing the development of fairness, a distinction is therefore usually 
drawn between reasoning about it and acting upon it, because it is a well-established 
finding in psychology that there is no direct correspondence between a child’s moral 
judgement in hypothetical scenarios and their behaviour in similar but practical 
situations when personal interest is at stake (Damon, 1977; Gerson & Damon, 1978). 
This discrepancy between moral reasoning and moral behaviour has been repeatedly 
demonstrated since the earliest of judgement-behaviour studies, e.g. when 
Hartshorne and May (1928) found no relationship between children’s familiarity 
with the Ten Commandments and their behaviour in experimental situations that 
allowed them to cheat and lie. Although later research rarely compared moral 
knowledge and behaviour directly, and tended instead to focus either on reasoning 
about fairness (e.g. Olson & Spelke, 2008; Peterson, Peterson, & McDonald, 1975; 
Rochat et al., 2009) or on sharing behaviour (e.g. Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & 
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Tungodden, 2010; Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008), a comparison of findings across studies suggests that the 
developmental trajectories of moral thought and behaviour are indeed different. The 
few recent studies that tested both children’s moral reasoning and their behaviour 
(Gummerum, Keller, Takezawa, & Mata, 2008; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013; 
Takezawa, Gummerum, & Keller, 2006) have also identified this ‘judgement-
behaviour gap’. Yet, systematic research into its causes has been scarce. 
There is some recent evidence pointing to inhibitory control as one potential 
explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the level of moral reasoning and 
sharing behaviour. In this model, even a relatively well-developed understanding of 
the social norm of fairness may not manifest itself in practice because of 
underdeveloped inhibitory control which is not sufficiently strong for suppression of 
the prepotent response of acting selfishly. For example, Blake and McAuliffe (2011) 
found that when children between the ages of 4 and 7 were presented with unfair 
resource divisions that favoured them (i.e. advantageous inequity), they took longer 
to reject these offers than to accept them. This suggests that inhibitory control needs 
to be engaged to suppress the prepotent response of accepting an advantageous offer. 
In the same study, eight-year-olds were just as quick to reject advantageous inequity 
as to reject it, which may reflect the maturation of inhibition.  
Inhibitory control has been linked to other aspects of competence in social 
interactions (e.g. Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996), and 
Borbely and Yuill (under review) showed that inhibitory control can predict the 
degree to which high-functioning children with autism (HFA) accept the 
contributions of a play partner in a joint drawing task. This bears a conceptual 
similarity to fair resource allocation, because it involves suppressing the prepotent 
response, which is to stick with one’s own ideas. To date, however, there has only 
been one study that directly tested the role of inhibitory control in the judgement-
behaviour gap. Smith et al. (2013) used two measures of inhibition, the Day/night 
Task  (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994) and the bear/dragon task (Kochanska et 
al., 1996) with children aged between 3 and 8, and found that while performance on 
the Day/night Task  was marginally correlated with fair sharing, this relationship was 
fully mediated by participant age. They therefore concluded that inhibition was not 
linked to the ability to act fairly in a resource allocation paradigm. The fact that there 
was no significant relationship in this study between performance on the two 
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inhibition tasks (r = .24, p = .07), however, calls into question whether either of them 
was a reliable measure of the construct of interest in this sample. Thus, the question 
of whether inhibitory control contributes to the judgement-behaviour gap remains 
unanswered. 
The case of children with HFA represents an interesting opportunity to put the 
inhibitory model of the judgement-behaviour gap to the test because such children 
commonly display difficulties in both inhibition (Hill, 2004; Pellicano, 2011; 
Borbely & Yuill, in preparation) and in various aspects of social interaction 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although there has been very little 
research on the understanding and practice of fairness in autism (for an exception, 
see Sally & Hill, 2006), anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that children with 
autism struggle in social situations that involve sharing and their resource allocation 
decisions tend to be dominated by self-interest. Investigating the moral reasoning and 
behaviour of children with HFA also makes it possible to evaluate an alternative 
explanation for the judgement-behaviour gap, namely a mentalising model, which 
assumes that acting unfairly reflects the individual’s failure to take into account other 
people’s interests, needs, and mental states.  
This mentalising account rests on the finding that selfish behaviour seems to be 
due, at least in part, to a consideration of what one can ‘get away with’. According to 
this interpretation, selflessness stems, at least in part, from the recognition that selfish 
acts will be punished by others. For example, the average offer is consistently higher 
in Ultimatum Games than in Dictator Games (40 per cent and 25 per cent, 
respectively) (for reviews, see Camerer, 2003; Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Kuilen, 2004). 
In the latter, the participant can make a unilateral decision about sharing a pool of 
resources with a partner. The Ultimatum Game, however, allows the partner to reject 
the share offered, in which case neither party receives anything. The threat of 
retaliation evidently encourages fair behaviour (Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In an 
innovative setup that allowed participants to act unfairly in the UG without fear of 
punishment because some of the coins were only visible to the proposer, Overgaauw 
et al. (2012) showed that strategic considerations start playing a part in acting fairly 
at an early age. All participants offered fewer coins when the recipient could not see 
all of them, but there was an interaction between age and condition: adult 
participants and children aged 10 to 12 acted more strategically than 8- to 9-year-
olds, whose offers in the typical and hidden conditions tended to be less different. 
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Mentalising ability, i.e. the capacity to predict the play partner’s reactions to 
one’s own actions, has been shown to be linked to fairness in typical development 
(e.g. Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010). The impaired 
ability of individuals with autism to simulate their reputation in others’ eyes could 
therefore explain why they are more prone to acting selfishly. Izuma et al. (2011), for 
example, found that whereas TD adults donated significantly more to charity when 
they knew they were being observed, there was no such difference in a group of 10 
adults with ASD. In the presence of an observer, both groups performed better on a 
test of executive function, suggesting intact general social facilitation in autism. Cage 
et al. (2013) replicated these results, but also refined them by showing that when the 
participants believed the observer was the recipient of their donations, and would 
later have the opportunity to reciprocate, adults with ASD also donated more, 
although the difference was not as large as in the TD group. Taken together, these 
results suggest that adults with ASD do not spontaneously manage their reputations 
in sharing situations, but are capable of doing so, although to a lesser extent than TD 
peers, when they have a vested interest in doing so.  
There has been only one study so far that put this hypothesised link between 
theory of mind and fairness to the test in children with autism (Sally & Hill, 2006), 
and it has not shown a clear link between the two constructs. Sally and Hill found 
that although children with HFA were impaired on both first-order and second-order 
theory of mind, their offers in the Ultimatum Game were not significantly different 
from those of their typically-developing (TD) peers. These results cast some doubt 
on the explanatory power of the mentalising account for the judgement-behaviour 
gap. In our study, we set out to evaluate the hypothesis that inhibition moderates the 
relation between moral knowledge and moral behaviour in resource allocation 
decisions. We used a sample of primary school children, both typically-developing 
and with high-functioning autism, because previous research suggests this is a period 
of transition, from strictly egalitarian to equity-based thinking (Hook & Cook, 1979). 
We combined the moral reasoning and resource allocation paradigms to directly 
gauge the gap between children’s understanding and practice of fairness. We 
expected that this difference would be stronger in the children with HFA than in an 
age-matched TD comparison group, because children with autism typically show 
underdeveloped inhibitory control for their mental age (Geurts et al., 2014).  
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In order to be able to also test a mentalising account of the judgement-
behaviour gap, we assessed the participants’ theory of mind (operationalised as false-
belief understanding and the ability to attribute situation-specific emotions to others). 
A hierarchical regression model was used to identify the best predictors of fair 
sharing, allowing us to directly compare and evaluate the mentalising and inhibitory 
control accounts of the judgement-behaviour gap.  
In what is the first direct comparison of moral reasoning and sharing behaviour 
in children with HFA, we set out to test three hypotheses pertaining to an inhibitory 
control model of the judgement-behaviour gap. As previous research on other aspects 
of moral reasoning in autism have been inconclusive as to whether this capacity is 
impaired, we made no predictions regarding how the moral reasoning of children 
with HFA about fairness would compare to that of age-matched TD peers but, in line 
with previous research, we expected children with HFA to show impaired 
performance on tests tapping into the ability to inhibit a prepotent response. 
Secondly, we hypothesised that the severity of this impairment would predict the 
degree of unfairness in distributive justice and thirdly, therefore, expected that 
children with HFA would make more unfair decisions (favouring themselves over 
the recipient) than children in the TD comparison group in a Dictator Game framed 
as a reward allocation task. We also evaluated a mentalising account of the 
judgement-behaviour gap, but made no predictions as to whether fairness in resource 
allocation would be associated with theory of mind.  
 
Method 
Participants and power  
Seventeen high-functioning children with autism (13 males), between the ages of 
5.25 and 10.83 (M = 8.40, SD = 1.62), and fifteen typically-developing children (8 
males), between the ages of 7.42 and 10.75 (M = 9.03, SD = 1.14) participated in this 
study. For the purposes of eligibility to participate, ‘high-functioning’ children were 
defined as those without a comorbid diagnosis of a learning disability or other 
developmental disorder, and including those with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome 
and  pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). Three 
additional participants with HFA had been recruited but excluded from the analysis 
because they did not complete all experimental tasks. Participants in the HFA group 
were recruited from play schemes for children with special educational needs and 
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through autism charities. All the children in this group had a diagnosis of high-
functioning autism, and no other developmental disorders (e.g. ADHD). The TD 
children were recruited from local primary schools and play schemes. Four 
participants in the HFA group had also taken part in an earlier, unpublished study on 
the role of inhibitory control in cooperation. 
Six children with HFA were of Hungarian nationality, and tested in Hungarian 
by a native speaker (the first author). There was no difference between the English 
and Hungarian participants on any of the variables measured in this study (lowest 
p = .111), and so the two groups were analysed together.  
In a previous study that compared the performance of TD children and children 
with HFA on a battery of inhibition tests (Borbely & Yuill, in preparation), a 
substantial impairment was found in the autism group on all measures (Cohen’s d’s 
ranging between 0.74 and 1.1). Using the average of these effect sizes (0.88) as a 
guide, an a priori power calculation showed that the power of groupwise 
comparisons on inhibition in our current study (with 32 participants) would be near 
0.80.  
 
Measures  
Verbal ability  
As the articulation of moral knowledge requires verbal skills, the participants’ 
linguistic ability was gauged with the British Picture Vocabulary Scales-I (Dunn & 
Dunn, 1982), which provides standardised scores and verbal mental age equivalents. 
The verbal ability of all Hungarian participants had been recently (i.e. within 12 
months) assessed using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-IV, 
Wechsler, 2003), so they were not re-tested.  
 
Emotion attribution and false-belief understanding  
In order to ascertain whether the participants could attribute situationally adequate 
emotions to others and, therefore, understand the potential consequences of their 
resource allocation decisions (see below) on another child’s mental states, a subset of 
the emotion prediction tasks described by Harris and collaborators (1989) was 
administered.  
The participants were introduced to a toy animal that had a strong preference of 
snack: “This is Bruno the Bear. His favourite snack is honey. He really doesn’t like 
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chocolate, only honey.” Understanding of the preference was checked by asking “If 
Bruno can choose between having honey and chocolate for lunch, which one will he 
choose?” All children identified the correct snack at this stage.  
In the first part of the emotion attribution task, the participants were asked how 
Bruno would feel (happy or sad) if he got honey or chocolate for lunch (presented in 
a counterbalanced order). In the second part of this task, a neutral container was 
presented, along with the following story and questions:  
 
“Bruno the Bear wants a snack so we’re going to give him one. It’s here 
in this box. Bruno doesn’t know what’s inside the box but he’s 
wondering what’s inside. What if Bruno thinks there’s honey inside? 
Will he be happy or sad if he thinks we’ve given him honey? Now, 
Bruno is wondering what’s inside the box, but remember, he doesn’t 
know yet what’s inside. Oh look, it’s chocolate! So is Bruno happy or sad 
now?” 
 
The same props were also used for testing false-belief understanding through a task 
similar to the Sally-Ann (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) story. Mickey the Monkey was 
introduced and shown to replace the contents of a box of honey (the preferred snack) 
in Bruno’s absence. The participants were asked to predict Bruno’s emotional 
response (happy or sad), first on seeing the container, and then on opening it and 
finding the dispreferred snack (chocolate) inside.  
 
Moral reasoning  
In the first part of this test, the participant’s ability to make fair decisions and reason 
about morality in resource allocation was tested using the Early Positive Justice 
Levels Interview. This interview was designed by Damon (1977), and consists of a 
series of hypothetical situations. In the first scenario, primary-school children sold 
paintings they had produced, and made various claims to a larger than equal share of 
the profits based on their effort, gender, age, good behaviour, the quality of their 
work, and need. In the second scenario, a teacher had to choose between rewarding a 
gifted but lazy pupil or another, who was hard-working but struggled with the 
curriculum. The third situation concerned the participant sharing toys with a friend 
during a play date. In each of these scenarios, the participant was invited to give their 
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opinion on how the resources (money, good marks, or toys) should be allocated, and 
to evaluate the claims of each child in the story. The participants’ responses were 
recorded and scored using Damon’s (1977) coding scheme, which is summarised 
below in Table . Inter-rater agreement was calculated on 20 per cent of the sample, 
and Cohen’s kappa (with linear weighting to account for the ordinal nature of the 
dependent variable) indicated a high level of reliability on this measure ( = .92).  
As per Damon’s (1977) original procedure, the participants’ responses on the 
Early Positive Justice Levels Interview were scored in chunks, with each chunk 
consisting of an utterance or group of utterances conveying a coherent idea or 
meaning. A composite score for each participant was obtained by taking the highest 
level of moral reasoning demonstrated during the interview. According to Damon, 
this ‘best performance’ approach allows the child to fully demonstrate their 
reasoning ability by, for example, disregarding impulsive first answers if a more 
reasoned and more sophisticated one follows later. 
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Table 1. Coding scheme for the Early Positive Justice Levels interview (excerpt, based on 
Damon, 1977) 
Lvl Focus of reasons given  Conflict Resolution of conflict Characteristics of 
reasoning 
0-A own desire self’s desire  
vs obstacles to fulfilling it 
assimilating other’s 
and own desires 
no objective reasons;  
reassertion of desire 
 
0-B self-serving but external characteristics  
rudimentary reciprocity (impression 
management) 
 
self’s desire  
vs other’s desires 
preferential treatment 
of self and liked others 
external, observable facts;  
fluctuating and post-hoc 
arguments 
 
1-A equal shares in all circumstances person vs person; 
self-interested equals  
no weighing different 
claims against each 
other 
 
equal treatment; 
no mitigating 
circumstances allowed 
reference to parties’ self-
interest;  
prevention of fighting;  
unilateral and inflexible  
1-B reciprocal actions / deserving; 
notions of merit and fair exchange; 
sense of obligation in exchange of reward  
 
deserving claims  
vs more deserving 
claims; 
merit is sole basis of 
deserving  
 
differential treatment 
based on merit; 
reward a direct 
payback for work 
(achievement, talent, 
effort) 
 
notions of reciprocal 
obligation;  
inflexible, reciprocity is 
absolute as was equality in 
1A 
2-A plurality of acceptable justice claims;  
equality of persons rather than acts; 
equality of outcomes; 
compromise between claims, not direct 
resolution 
  
plurality of disparate 
claims 
compromise (often 
quantitative); 
need often given 
special consideration to 
ensure equal outcome 
 
moral relativity; 
each party is right ‘in a 
way’ 
2-B situationally flexible; 
reject situationally irrelevant claims; 
realising decision can serve various ends;  
decision based on most appropriate goal 
plurality of disparate 
claims 
exclude all but best 
claim; 
respect all claims but 
arrive at definitive 
judgement as per 
situational goal  
integrating reciprocity 
(merit, fair exchange) and 
equality (needs, equal acts) 
in a way that allows 
differential application in 
different contexts 
 
Inhibitory control  
The battery of tests gauging the ability to inhibit a prepotent response was presented 
as a production task: participants were informed that they would be earning points 
based on their performance, which they could exchange for toys at the end of the 
experimental session.  
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In a computerised Go/no-go Task, different images of cats and robots (five 
cartoon drawings and five photos each) were presented in a random sequence on a 
15 laptop screen for 500 ms each, with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms. 
The participants were instructed to press the space bar for cats, and to refrain from 
any action on the robot trials. After ten practice trials, in which there was an equal 
number or cat and robot pictures, the participants completed fifty trials, 80 per cent 
of which were cat (“go”) trials and the remaining 20 per cent, robot (“no-go”) trials. 
At the end of the task, a message was displayed that told participants, regardless of 
performance, that they had done “very well”.  
A spatial conflict task was also administered as another test of inhibition, but 
analysis of preliminary results suggested that this had proven too difficult for the 
participants, with over half of the trials missed (M = 58.94%; SD = 17.05%). There 
was no difference between the TD and HFA groups on the proportion of trials missed 
(p = .624). Consequently, no further analyses were conducted for the participants’ 
performance on this test.  
 
Sharing (Dictator Game) 
At the conclusion of the tests of inhibition, children were presented with a picture of 
an unknown child, matched on age and gender, and were told that the second child 
had also completed the production task (i.e. the computerised tasks), but had not 
received their reward yet, and now it was up to the participant to divide rewards 
between themselves and the other child. The experimenter produced ten poker chips, 
each of which was exchangeable for a small toy of the participant’s choice. Two 
paper bags, labelled with the participant’s and the other child’s name, were provided 
to place the poker chips in. The participant was informed about the other child’s 
performance on the production tasks: the results were rigged in a manner that the 
other child always outperformed the participant by 50 per cent (60 points to 40), but 
the participant was explicitly told that they could divide the rewards in any way they 
liked, including keeping all tokens. The experimenter left the table while the resource 
allocation decision was made.  
 
Procedure  
After obtaining informed consent from the parents and assent from the participants, 
the tests were run individually by the first author. All participants were tested in a 
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quiet room of their choice in their homes (i.e. the Hungarian participants were tested 
in Hungary and the British participants, in England). Assessment of verbal ability 
was followed by the Early Positive Justice Levels Interview. The tests of the 
inhibitory battery were completed in the above order. The experimental session was 
concluded with the resource allocation task (Dictator Game). Overall, each 
experimental session lasted between 40 and 50 minutes, with no breaks between the 
tasks. Comfort breaks were offered to the children, but none of them took one.  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics  
There was no significant difference between the groups in the distribution of genders, 
Fisher’s exact test p = .266, or on chronological age, t(30) = 1.26, p = .219, d = 0.45. 
The TD group had significantly higher verbal IQ (M = 112.07, SD = 11.07) than the 
HFA group (M = 99.29, SD = 16.17), t(27) = 2.50, p = .019, d = 0.93.  
 
Mentalising ability  
Every child completed the belief-based emotion attribution task successfully, i.e. 
they were all able to understand that being deceived in one’s expectations and 
receiving a non-preferred outcome would make one disappointed (‘sad’).  
One of the TD children (7%), and five of the HFA participants (29%), 
however, failed the first-order false-belief task; Fisher’s exact test showed that 
although children with HFA found this task more difficult than their TD peers, the 
difference was not significant, p = .178.  
 
Inhibitory control 
Performance on the Go/no-go Task was quantified using Grier’s (1971) formulation 
of a nonparametric measure of sensitivity (A') proposed by Norman and Pollack 
(1964), calculated using the following formula:  
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where H is the probability of a correct response on a ‘go’ trial (i.e. a ‘hit’), and FA is 
the probability of an incorrect response on a ‘no-go’ trial (i.e. a ‘false alarm’). An A' 
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value of 0.5 reflects chance performance, and 1 corresponds to perfect sensitivity on 
the task. The TD group performed significantly better on this measure (M = .81, 
SD = .12) than the HFA group (M = .71, SD = .08), t(30) = 2.88, p = .007, d = 1.02.  
A point-biserial correlation revealed no significant association between 
performance on the false-belief task and A' scores, r(30) = .07, p = .723.  
 
Moral reasoning  
There was no significant difference between the groups on the highest level of moral 
reasoning demonstrated in the Early Positive Justice Levels Interview, t(30) = 1.35, 
p = .187, d = 0.48. The median level attained was 2A in both groups, which was also 
the mode. (See Figure 4.)  
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Figure 4. Highest level of moral reasoning demonstrated in the EPJLI 
 
Quotes from the participants demonstrating each level of moral reasoning are given 
for illustration in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2. Examples of reasoning in the Early Positive Justice Levels Interview  
Level Focus of reasons given  Typical examples 
0-A own desire “I wouldn’t give any of these toys to my brother because I never 
share with him.” 
“I should have the most cake because it’s fun to be able to eat a 
lot of cake.” 
0-B self-serving but external characteristics  
rudimentary reciprocity (impression management) 
“Boys should get more [money for their paintings] because they 
are better at football.” 
“Children should get more than adults.” 
1-A equal shares in all circumstances “Everyone should get the same [amount of money] because 
getting more than others is greedy.” 
“If someone got more than others, there would be a fight in tha 
class.” 
1-B reciprocal actions / deserving; 
notions of merit and fair exchange; 
sense of obligation in exchange of reward  
“The teacher should be able to keep all the money because it 
was her idea to draw the pictures in the first place.”  
“It’s okay not to share with someone if he hasn’t shared with you 
before because you’re just doing to them what they did to you.” 
2-A plurality of acceptable justice claims;  
equality of persons rather than acts; 
equality of outcomes; 
compromise between claims, not direct resolution  
“Everyone should get the same, but the poor classmate should 
get a bit more because he has less toys than the others at 
home.” 
“They should give all the money to charity, because some people 
don’t have as good opportunities as them.”  
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2-B situationally flexible; 
reject situationally irrelevant claims; 
realising decision can serve various ends;  
decision based on most appropriate goal 
“Fairness means everyone gets the same. Kindness means you 
give more to those who need more.”  
“[When deciding how much money the children get] the question 
is if it was a competition. If they did it together, they should split 
the money equally. But if everyone worked on their own, then 
they should get what they earned.” 
 
 
Sharing in Dictator Game 
The result of the production task was rigged so that the play partner always 
outperformed the participant by 50 per cent (i.e. achieving 60 points to the 
participant’s 40). Therefore, keeping four tokens corresponds to proportional equity, 
while keeping five represents an egalitarian division. Keeping more than five or 
fewer than four tokens is not justified under conventional interpretations of fairness 
(labelled ‘selfish’ and ‘generous’, respectively, on the chart below). The tokens were 
exchangeable for small toys at the end of the experiment. One HFA child declined to 
split the tokens because he was not interested in any of the rewards available. 
The difference between the average number of tokens retained by children with 
HFA (M = 5.63, SD = 2.06) and by TD children (M = 5.40, SD = 0.91)was not 
significant, t(29) = 0.39, p = .701, d = -0.14. (See Figure 5.) 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of tokens kept in the Dictator Game (out of 10) 
 
Predictors of fair sharing  
A hierarchical regression was performed in two steps. The first model included 
verbal mental age and diagnosis. Theory of mind (operationalised as false-belief 
understanding and emotion attribution) awas not included in the model because of 
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the lack of variance in performance on both tasks. None of these variables was a 
significant predictor of the number of tokens kept by the participants in the Dictator 
Game. In the second step, level of moral reasoning and inhibition (performance on 
the Go/no-go Task) were entered, and the latter emerged as the sole predictor of fair 
sharing. (Standardised betas and associated significance levels are shown in Table 3 
below).  
Table 3. Hierarchical regression on number of tokens kept in Dictator Game 
   p 
Step 1    
 Verbal mental age -0.29 .184 
 Diagnosis -0.05 .806 
Step 2   
 Verbal mental age -0.32 .105 
 Diagnosis -0.33 .121 
 Moral reasoning 0.11 .567 
 Inhibitory control -0.632 .004** 
Model 1: F(2,26) = 1.00, p = .380; R2: .07 
Model 2: F(4,24) = 3.28, p = .028; R2: .35 
Discussion 
We set out to evaluate the inhibitory control account of the judgement-behaviour 
gap, both in typical development and in children with HFA. To this end, we used a 
hierarchical regression model to identify predictors of self-interested sharing 
behaviour in a Dictator Game, using age, diagnosis, theory of mind, level of moral 
reasoning, and inhibitory control as potential predictors. Of these, only inhibition had 
a significant association with the number of tokens shared.  
In this study, children with HFA demonstrated age-typical levels of moral 
reasoning in the Early Positive Justice Levels Interview and, similarly to the age-
matched TD comparison group, mostly elected to share resources equally with an 
unknown child in a Dictator Game. When compared to TD participants, children 
with HFA had an uneven performance profile on theory of mind tests: a substantial 
minority of them were impaired on a first-order false-belief task, but they could all 
attribute situationally appropriate emotions to others. Performance on a measure of 
prepotent response inhibition (the Go/no-go Task) was significantly worse in the 
HFA group.  
In order to investigate the understanding of fairness in children with HFA in 
primary school, a research area that has received little attention so far, we used the 
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Early Positive Justice Levels Interview (Damon, 1977) to gauge moral reasoning, as 
well as a Dictator Game to assess moral behaviour (sharing). We also measured 
inhibitory control and mentalising so as to test an explanatory model of the 
judgement-behaviour gap, in which poor inhibitory control moderates the 
relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour. We found that neither 
level of moral reasoning, nor mentalising ability, nor verbal mental age predicted fair 
sharing; a perhaps counterintuitive finding that is, nonetheless, in line with previous 
studies in this field (e.g. Gummerum et al., 2008; Sally & Hill, 2006; Smith et al., 
2013), providing further evidence that moral reasoning and moral behaviour develop 
along similar, but distinct trajectories. In line with the prediction of the inhibitory 
control account of the judgement-behaviour gap, however, performance on the 
Go/no-go Task emerged as a significant predictor of the number of toys children 
were prepared to give away to a deserving stranger.  
Earlier studies (e.g. Takagishi et al., 2010) found a relationship between 
fairness and theory of mind in preschool children. The participants in our study were 
considerably older, and despite the well-documented difficulties in mentalising 
associated with autism, nearly all completed both theory of mind tasks (i.e. false-
belief understanding and emotion attribution) faultlessly. Because of the lack of 
variance in theory of mind scores, they could not be entered into regression analysis. 
Future research should investigate whether using more challenging tasks, which 
require more sophisticated mentalising and are thus able to differentiate between 
typically-developing children and those with HFA could cast light on the unique 
contributions of theory of mind and inhibitory control to fairness in action. 
Our finding that inhibition moderates the link between social knowledge and 
social behaviour is in contradiction with Smith and colleagues’ (2013) results, who 
found in a sample of TD children between the ages of 3 and 8 that although 
performance on a measure of inhibition predicted fair sharing, this relationship was 
fully mediated by participant age. We offer two tentative explanations for this 
disagreement between the two studies. Firstly, our sample included a mix of TD 
children and children with HFA, who were also, on average, older than in the Smith 
et al. study. The discrepancy therefore might be due to a wider range in the 
participants’ inhibitory control. Secondly, there is increasing evidence that variation 
in the details of administering an experimental task, such as the modality of stimuli 
or choice of dependent variable (e.g. reaction time or accuracy) have a substantial 
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and unintended impact on inhibitory performance (Hill & Bird, 2006). Recent meta-
analyses on inhibitory control in autism by Borbely (submitted) and Geurts at al. 
(2014) have identified substantial variation in effect sizes after participant age, 
cognitive capacity, and experimental paradigm had been controlled for, suggesting 
that understood task characteristics which are as yet poorly understood can lead to 
mistaken conclusions about the inhibitory performance of children with autism. In 
the Smith et al. study, there was no significant correlation between performance on 
the two tests of inhibition administered, and only one was related to fair sharing. 
Further research is needed to investigate whether the correlation between inhibition 
and moral behaviour is specific to certain subdomains of inhibitory control, tapped 
into by some measures, but not others.  
We had made no predictions as to any differences between the level of moral 
reasoning shown by HFA and TD children because earlier results had been 
inconclusive: while some researchers reported that the moral judgement of children 
with HFA was at an age-typical level (e.g. Grant, Boucher, Riggs, & Grayson, 2005; 
Leslie, Mallon, & Dicorcia, 2006; Li, Zhu, & Gummerum, 2014), others found 
evidence for an impairment (e.g. Moran et al., 2011; Takeda, Kasai, & Kato, 2007; 
Zalla, Barlassina, Buon, & Leboyer, 2011). While TD children and children with 
HFA demonstrated similar levels of reasoning about fairness in our sample, this does 
not explain the diversity of findings, and we tentatively suggest that it may be due to 
methodological differences or sampling error, calling for a systematic review of the 
relevant studies to conclusively answer the question whether moral reasoning is 
impaired in HFA.  
While children with HFA tended to make more ‘selfish’ decisions than their 
TD peers in the resource sharing task (Dictator Game), this difference also failed to 
reach significance. This latter result is in line with the only previous study on fair 
sharing in autism (Sally & Hill, 2006), which found a similar but also non-significant 
difference between the size of offers made by TD children and children with HFA in 
a strategic resource allocation game. Further research is needed, however, to 
ascertain whether failure to find a significant difference is due to Type II error; 
achieved power in the current study was only .27 for this comparison. Another 
possible explanation for the lack of a group difference may lie in the TD children’s 
deliberate ‘underperformance’ on this task, as explained below. There is a substantial 
body of earlier research (for a review, see Hook & Cook, 1979) suggesting that from 
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around the age of six, children make sharing decisions based on ordinal equity, rather 
than strict equality, therefore we expected the TD children to prefer an equity-based 
decision over a less sophisticated, egalitarian split, but this was not the case. In our 
study, the overwhelming majority of children in both groups split the rewards equally 
between themselves and another, even though the other child had substantially 
outperformed them on the production task. It might be a mistake, however, to 
interpret this action as a failure on their part to apply the principle of merit in reward 
allocation. In fact, a substantial majority of the TD children argued in the positive 
justice interview that effort, rather than performance, should be rewarded. Following 
this line of reasoning, getting fewer points on the production task is no reason to 
receive a smaller share of the rewards because the poorer performer is no less 
deserving, as long as they ‘did their best’. The TD children’s choice to reward 
themselves for effort with an equal split, and thus, potentially, not to demonstrate the 
best of their ability on our measure of acting fairly may have masked an existing 
difference between the groups on sharing behaviour. This is an important 
consideration for future research because a failure to appreciate the underlying 
motives of the participants can make a sophisticated resource-allocation decision 
appear as selfish behaviour, and thereby confound the interpretation of the results. 
Strategic games are very widely used in the research or moral decision-making for 
their simplicity and adaptability, but care must be taken when explaining behavioural 
results in terms of psychological processes that have not been gauged directly.  
Our results support the inhibitory control model of acting fairly, but the study 
suffers from two weaknesses that must be considered: a small sample size and a 
question over the reliability of the measures of inhibition. The issues arising from the 
small sample will be considered first. While the power of our study was adequate for 
detecting the large effect we expected on the basis of previous research (see in 
Method, above), our non-significant findings (such as no difference in moral 
reasoning and sharing behaviour between the TD and HFA participants) must be 
treated with caution, as the achieved power of our study for a medium-sised effect 
(Cohen’s d = 0.5) is .46, which is very low, although regrettably typical for 
psychological research (Schmidt & Hunter, 2003). Additionally, point estimates (i.e. 
effect sizes) are provided in line with current best practice, but it must be noted that 
they can only serve as very rough approximations. This is an unfortunate, but 
inevitable fact, because in order to specify Cohen’s d for a medium-sised effect even 
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to just the first decimal (i.e. within +/- .05), over six thousand participants would 
need to have been tested (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004).  
The other difficulty in interpreting our results originates from the uncertainty 
inherent in the measurement of inhibition. There is considerable disagreement among 
researchers over the comparability of the various tests of inhibition (Hill & Bird, 
2006; Hill, 2004; O’Hearn, Asato, Ordaz, & Luna, 2010; Russo et al., 2007). There 
are few studies that have directly tested whether performance on different measures 
of inhibition is comparable, and their results are equivocal. For example, Smith and 
collaborators (2013) found a non-significant correlation between performance on the 
day/night and the bear/dragon tasks, but in an earlier study (Borbely & Yuill, 
submitted) we found significant correlations ranging from .51 to .79 between four 
measures of inhibition (the Bear/dragon, Go/no-go, Gift Delay, and Windows Tasks). 
Recent meta-analyses (Borbely & Yuill, under review; Geurts et al., 2014) suggest 
that while children with HFA show impairments on all commonly used measures of 
inhibition, the degree of this impairment varies across tests. In an effort to eliminate 
this problem, we used two tests of prepotent response inhibition that have a similar 
structure: a Go/no-go Task and a spatial conflict task. Unfortunately, although the 
tasks were successfully piloted on a small number of children, the participants in our 
study struggled with the latter, leaving performance on the Go/no-go Task as the sole 
indicator of their inhibition. As a result, further research is required to confirm 
whether the relationship between inhibition and fair sharing that we found in this 
study would generalise to other tests of inhibition.  
Mentalising ability was measured in this study through two tasks: a (first-
order) false-belief task and an emotion attribution task. These were chosen because 
they tap into the ability to attribute cognitive and emotional states to others that are 
different from the individual’s own, which is a prerequisite of being able to evaluate 
the impact of one’s actions on others, and thus acquire an understanding of fairness. 
The other consideration when selecting these tasks was their simplicity: 
understanding and following the instructions does not require a level of cognitive 
ability that would not be expected from our participants, and therefore failure on the 
tasks could confidently be attributed to impaired theory of mind, rather than to poor 
verbal ability, for instance. This strength is also weakness, however, because 
participants in both groups achieved near ceiling-level performance on both tasks. In 
future replications, more difficult tasks, tapping into more sophisticated aspects of 
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mentalising ability should be included to more extensively map out the contribution 
of theory of mind to unfair behaviour. 
These caveats notwithstanding, our study contributes to the investigation of 
moral development of primary school children, both in autism and in typical 
development, through providing evidence for a novel account of the judgement-
behaviour gap, in which inhibitory control moderates children’s ability to act on their 
social knowledge. Although theory of mind had previously been identified as a 
predictor of fair sharing in typically-developing children aged 5 to 6 (Takagishi et al., 
2010), we found no evidence for this link, either in our sample of older typically-
developing children, or in the HFA group, which is in line with previous work on 
fairness in autism (Sally & Hill, 2006). Our results also have methodological 
implications inasmuch as they highlight the importance of interrogating motivation 
in research into moral decisions, even if a strictly behavioural paradigm, such as a 
strategic game, is used, because important developmental differences may otherwise 
be masked by the limited number of action options.  
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Article 4: ‘I prefer playing together, but sometimes I wish 
my brother would just disappear’ – Typically-developing 
children’s experience of cooperative play with their autistic 
sibling 
Abstract 
Cooperative play has a range of developmental benefits, which high-functioning 
children with autism (HFA) cannot fully enjoy because of well-documented 
impairments in various aspects of social interaction. This also means that in families 
with more than one children, the typically-developing (TD) sibling will be exposed 
to atypical play. In this study, we qualitatively investigated TD children’s experience 
of engaging in cooperative play with their sibling who has a diagnosis of HFA. Six 
children between the ages of 5 and 11, who had a HFA sibling in the same age range 
were interviewed, and their reports analysed using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA). Five themes emerged: poor emotion regulation, restricted interests, 
and no acceptance of the playmate’s contributions reduced the hedonistic value of 
joint play for the participants, but these were mitigated by appreciation for the HFA 
sibling’s creativity and adjustment to the HFA sibling’s behavioural atypicalities. 
Results are discussed in terms of their relevance for developing support programmes 
for TD siblings and social skills training for HFA children.  
 
Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD, autism) affects not only the approximately 1 in 88 
children who have the diagnosis (Baio, 2012), but also those they are in daily contact 
with, including classmates, parents, and siblings. As around 80 per cent of people in 
Europe and the United States grow up in a family with more than one children 
(Dunn, 2002), and the prevalence of autism has been rising dramatically in recent 
decades (Boyle et al., 2011), partly as a consequence of earlier diagnosis, meaning 
that a large number of typically-developing children spend their most formative years 
with a sibling who has a diagnosis of autism.  
Sibling relationships have a profound impact on children’s development: they 
are often the most long-lasting relationships in a person’s life, and their quality had 
been linked to various aspects of social and cognitive development, such as socio-
emotional understanding (Herrera & Dunn, 1997; Howe, Aquan-Assee, Bukowski, 
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Lehoux, & Rinaldi, 2001) and adjustment problems (Patterson, 1986). A positive 
sibling relationship can be a valuable source of social support, and has been linked to 
lower levels of loneliness and conduct problems, as well as a stronger sense of self-
worth (Stocker, Burwell, & Briggs, 2002).  
Although having a sibling with any kind of disability or developmental 
disorder poses challenges to the TD child (Ferraioli & Harris, 2009; Seltzer, 
Greenberg, Orsmond, & Lounds, 2005), the decidedly social nature of the 
impairments that define autism, and particularly the deficits in developing, 
maintaining, and understanding interpersonal relationships (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) represents a heightened risk factor for poor sibling relationship 
quality. For example, in dyads of siblings, one of whom had a diagnosis of autism, 
Knott et al. (1995) observed less frequent and more impoverished interaction and 
imitation than in TD pairs. Indeed, some research suggests that having a sibling with 
autism may have enduring negative effects on development: children with a sibling 
who has autism are more likely than those with a TD sibling to develop internalising 
behaviour problems (Ross & Cuskelly, 2006), have poorer social and behavioural 
adjustment (Orsmond & Seltzer, 2007; Verté, Roeyers, & Buysse, 2003), and fewer 
friends (Bågenholm & Gillberg, 1991). This effect is magnified by the presence of 
any demographic risk factors (Macks & Reeve, 2007).  
Previous research on the quality of sibling relationships between TD children 
and children with autism suggests that they are characterised by a unique set of 
difficulties and strengths. For example, McHale, Sloan, and Simeonsson (1986) 
interviewed TD siblings of children with autism, of children with Down’s syndrome, 
or of other TD children, and found no group differences in the reference children’s 
reports of sibling relationship quality, with all three groups giving generally positive 
ratings. In Bågenholm and Gillberg’s (1991) study, however, siblings of children 
with autism reported less positive attitudes towards their sibling and rated their 
sibling’s role in the family more negatively than siblings in the comparison groups 
(i.e. siblings of TD children and of children with a learning disability). This 
discrepancy may be due to a broader spectrum of experiences in families where one 
of the children has a diagnosis of autism: while McHale et al. (1986) reported no 
overall group difference in sibling relationship quality, they pointed out the 
substantially higher variability of children’s ratings in the autism and Down’s 
syndrome groups. A large number of reference children had either a very positive or 
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a very negative view of their sibling relationships. Kaminsky and Dewey (2001) 
found that the sibling relationships of children with autism were characterised by less 
intimacy, prosocial behaviour, and nurturance, compared to where one of the siblings 
had a learning disability, or both were TD. On the other hand, the TD siblings of 
children with autism reported higher levels of admiration for their sibling, along with 
less fighting and rivalry than TD dyads. Other studies (e.g. Konidaris, 1997), 
however, suggest that although sibling relationships are typically ambivalent, they 
may be even more so when one of the children has autism, because of the often 
unpredictable and violent behaviour (aimed at the self or others) displayed by these 
children.  
Although there is a rich literature on the sibling’s perspective of living with 
autism, one area that has received unduly little attention is that of cooperative 
(social) play between the siblings. This is unfortunate, because cooperative play has 
numerous developmental benefits (e.g. Gagnon & Nagle, 2004). For example, 
repeated opportunity to practise social skills in the context of cooperative play has 
been linked to increased social competence (Newton & Jenvey, 2011). Playing with 
the TD sibling also provides the child with autism with a safe ‘training ground’, 
where social skills can be practised and transgressions are more likely to be tolerated 
and forgiven. The behavioural profile of autism, however, especially the well-
documented impairments in imaginative play, restricted interests, and behavioural 
inflexibility can mean that both the child with autism and their TD sibling miss out 
on these developmental opportunities, because social play requires cooperation, 
adaptation, and sharing (Creasey, Jarvis, & Berk, 1998) that the sibling with autism 
may be unable to offer.  
TD siblings are ideally positioned to offer insight into what makes play 
interactions successful or break down, because they are typically the most frequent 
playmates of their sibling with autism and because the everyday experience of living 
with autism allows them to develop a better understanding of the difficulties 
associated with the disorder (Powell & Gallagher, 1993). El-Ghoroury and 
Romanczyk (1999) compared the play of children with autism when the play partner 
was a parent or a (TD) sibling. They found that although siblings made fewer 
attempts to engage with the child with autism than did the parents, these overtures 
were more often successful, making the siblings more effective play partners overall. 
The study of the TD sibling’s experience of cooperative play with their autistic 
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sibling can therefore have important implications for the development of both social 
skill training interventions and support programmes for the families of children with 
autism.  
The goal of this study was to explore TD children’s experience of engaging in 
cooperative play with a sibling who has a diagnosis of high-functioning autism, with 
a view to identifying behavioural patterns that hinder smooth and mutually rewarding 
interaction between the children. Although our theoretical understanding of the social 
impairments that make cooperative play challenging to children with autism is 
relatively sophisticated, the objective of this research was to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the diverse positive and negative aspects of the complex and varied 
interactions collectively referred to as ‘playing together’. For this, a qualitative 
approach was deemed most appropriate, and interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA) in particular, because of its focus on the lived experience of the 
individual. IPA is ideally suited to the study of personal and complex issues (Smith, 
2004) with a focus on the participant’s interpretation of them. This qualitative 
approach can not only help acquire a better understanding of the issues at hand, but 
also help inform further, quantitative research. We expected that first-hand accounts 
of the primary play partners of high-functioning children with autism would be 
exceptionally useful in highlighting problem areas as well as the specific strengths 
that children with autism can bring to cooperative play situations, and thus in 
informing the development of targeted support and intervention programmes.  
Alternative qualitative research methods were also considered, including 
thematic analysis and grounded theory. The reasons for choosing IPA over these are 
briefly outlined below.  
Generally speaking, thematic analysis requires a larger sample size and is more 
versatile than IPA. Also, while the focus in IPA is on the individual participants and 
the patterning of meaning across participants, thematic analysis focuses primarily on 
the latter, and is therefore better suited for the investigation of research questions that 
are not about the individual’s experience and perspectives (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 
2006). IPA was deemed better suited to our study because of its idiographic focus 
and the relatively small sample size (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). 
Grounded theory is an umbrella term for a variety of approaches to 
systematically analysing qualitative data (Birks & Mills, 2011). The common 
characteristic of these approaches is the focus on producing a theory grounded in 
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data. This involves employing particular types of research questions, often with a 
focus on social processes (Charmaz, 2006). As the purpose of our investigation was 
not the development of a new theory but, rather, an exploration of typically 
developing children’s lived experience and evaluating the contribution of executive 
deficits in the poor social play of children with autism, IPA was chosen over 
grounded theory as methodology. 

Method 
Participants 
Six Hungarian children (two males) took part in this study (for participant and sibling 
details, see Table ). Because IPA requires a homogeneous sample in order to 
minimise the effect of extraneous variables on life experiences, prospective 
participants had to satisfy the following criteria:  
(a) be between the ages of 5 and 11; and  
(b) be TD, i.e. not be diagnosed with or suspected of having ASD or any other 
developmental disorder (as confirmed by the parents); and  
(c) live with two parents; and  
(d) live with one sibling, who  
a. has a diagnosis of high-functioning ASD (including Asperger 
syndrome and PDD-NOS) without a concurrent diagnosis of any other 
developmental disorder; and who  
b. is also between the ages of 5 and 11.  
Families were recruited via autism charities and parental support groups. All 
participants had received a diagnosis using the ADOS and ADI-R, and parental 
reports indicated that there were no other cases of autism or other developmental 
disorders in the immediate family.  
 
Table 1. Participant and sibling details 
Participant 
number 
Participant (TD child) Sibling with ASD 
initials gender age (y;m) initials gender age (y;m) 
1 AK male 7;0 LK male 10;0 
2 LS female 11;0 ES male 8;0 
3 MZ male 5;6 DZ female 7;3 
4 AN female 6;0 SN male 10;8 
5 AS female 7;11 ZS male 6;7 
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6 RM female 10;6 BM male 8;0 
 
Informed consent 
The study had been approved by the appropriate university ethics committee. 
On obtaining written parental consent, participants were informed about the 
content and purpose of the study. After giving verbal assent, the children were asked 
if they wanted a parent to be present during the interview, but all declined.  
 
Procedure and interview schedule 
The interviews were conducted in Hungarian, by the first author, who is a native 
speaker of the language, and were recorded for subsequent analysis. Each session 
started with building rapport through general talk about the participant’s hobbies, 
favourite subject at school, the family pet, etc. This phase lasted for as long as was 
deemed appropriate. The interview was semi-structured and administered in a 
flexible way, i.e. a set of standard questions was complemented by requests for 
elaboration as needed, new questions were introduced and subsequent questions 
adapted in the light of the participant’s responses. Participants were encouraged to 
add anything or ask questions during the interview. Throughout the discussion, the 
interviewer never used the term ‘autism’, even if the participant was aware of their 
sibling’s diagnosis. 
The interview schedule was designed to probe both positive and negative 
experiences of cooperative play instances with the autistic sibling, and to identify the 
characteristics of the sibling’s playing style that make these interactions pleasant or 
unpleasant for the participant. The emphasis was placed on how the participants 
made sense of their experiences, i.e. on their thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, as 
expressed during their description of past events. The questions centred on three 
main themes: (i) positive and negative (i.e. enjoyable and upsetting) aspects of 
playing with the sibling; (ii) how playing with the sibling compares to the 
participant’s experience of playing with other children; and (iii) the strengths and 
difficulties of the sibling relative to other children. The interview ended with an 
open-ended question about the participant’s experience of play with their sibling in 
order to elicit elaboration of previously mentioned themes, or the introduction of new 
ones.  
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The discussion was paced by the participants, and therefore the length of the 
interviews varied, but generally, older children tended to speak longer, presumably 
due to more developed vocabulary and perhaps a better understanding of their 
sibling’s and their own behaviour.  
 
Analysis 
Interviews were transcribed and translated in full by the first author, who is a 
qualified translator with substantial relevant professional experience. As there are no 
prescriptive rules for conducting IPA (Smith, 1996), the process followed is 
described below in detail.  
The analysis started with several readings of the interview transcripts in order 
to familiarise with the text. Initial observations were recorded in the margin. 
Emergent themes were identified and organised into clusters of superordinate themes 
in an iterative process, whilst continually referring back to the transcripts. 
Commonalities and differences across the participants’ experiences were noted and 
considered as part of this process in order to identify convergent and divergent 
themes. In line with Smith’s (1996) guidelines, the importance of a theme was 
determined not solely on the basis of the frequency with which it was mentioned by 
the participants, but also with reference to how it helped understand other parts of the 
interviews.  
 
Results and discussion 
Although no group of individuals can ever be perfectly homogeneous, the 
participants in this study share a number of important characteristics: they all live in 
a city (Budapest), attend state primary schools, only have one sibling, who has a 
diagnosis of autism without a concurrent diagnosis of a learning disability or other 
developmental disorder, and have parents who are educated to degree level. As such, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that there will be similarities in their lived experience 
of playing with their siblings. Indeed, there was substantial convergence in the 
participants’ accounts, which clustered around five superordinate themes: poor 
emotion regulation, not accepting the play partner’s input, restricted interests, and 
appreciation and enjoyment of togetherness. An underlying theme of adjustment, e.g. 
the development of coping strategies by the respondents or birth-order reversal, was 
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also identified. Each of these themes is discussed below with relevant excerpts from 
the interview transcripts for illustration.  
 
Emotion regulation  
The poor regulation of (negative) emotions on the part of the sibling with autism was 
a universal theme that each of the respondents highlighted as a source of tension and 
upset during play. Violent outbursts occur across a variety of contexts, and can be 
triggered by different events, such as losing in a game, having to wait, or in revenge 
for a perceived slight.  
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The risk of overreactions makes the autistic sibling’s behaviour unpredictable, which 
appeared to be a source of anxiety and emotional tension for the participants. It also 
affected the siblings’ ability to arrive at a compromise by bargaining.  
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Notably, physical violence was reported in only one of the dyads, which was also the 
only pair of two brothers. In this case, the participant also felt that his brother does 
not love him, and his account included examples of emotional and verbal abuse.  
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No acceptance of the play partner’s input 
Another universally reported experience was related to the autistic siblings’ tendency 
to disregard the cooperative nature of joint play, and treat the play partner as a 
‘prop’, i.e. an aspect of play that they can fully control. One participant commented, 
‘When I ask him to do something, it’s in one ear and out the other’. This can reduce 
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the hedonistic value of playing together for the TD sibling, especially when the play 
is centred on the autistic child’s special interest (see also below), which the TD 
sibling does not share. 
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By the time the play interaction starts, the child with autism often had the the entire 
story arc planned out. Their reluctance to accommodate the play partner’s 
contributions manifests in behavioural inflexibility. The TD child’s insistence on 
changing an aspect of the game will typically cause anxiety and upset to the sibling 
with autism.  
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This, of course, makes play interactions rather one-sided, which respondents felt was 
unfair on them.  
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Narrow interests 
Restricted interests are a defining feature of ASD, and these emerged in the 
participants’ accounts as a severe limitation of the range of play experiences they 
could share with their sibling. Each child with autism in our sample had one or more 
‘special interests’ (e.g. trains, Lego, or Minecraft), which had to feature in every play 
interaction, regardless of its original theme. 
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The participants reported finding this restricted range of play activities monotonous 
and less appealing. 
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The TD children’s attempts to involve their sibling in other activities (e.g. playing 
with stuffed animals, going shopping, etc.) were rarely, if ever, successful.
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Appreciation and enjoyment  
Despite the various difficulties in cooperative play reported by the participants, they 
almost universally reported enjoying playing with their sibling. The only exception 
to this was the dyad of brothers, whose relationship was reportedly marred by regular 
verbal and physical abuse by the older (autistic) sibling. In the other sibling pairs, all 
participants said they preferred playing together with their sibling to playing on their 
own.  
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Although the participants acknowledged the narrowness of their sibling’s interests, 
they evidently appreciated and admired their sibling’s creativity within that particular 
area, which reportedly made play interactions a lot more enjoyable.  
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Adjustment and coping 
All but the youngest respondent were aware of their sibling’s diagnosis, but there 
were differences between them in the extent to which they understood its 
implications in terms of behavioural and cognitive difficulties. Younger participants 
struggled not to take behavioural manifestations of the disorder personally, and often 
interpreted emotional outbursts or anxiety over a change of routine as lack of 
affection or ‘whining’.  
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Older participants seemed to have a better understanding of which aspects of their 
sibling’s behaviour are affected by autism, and made inferences about their impact 
on their sibling’s effectiveness as a social agent, suggesting, for example, that their 
sibling’s narrow social circle may be due to their atypical behaviour. 
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It was evident that the older participants had also adjusted their behaviour so as to 
minimise conflict and accommodate the needs of their sibling, sometimes assuming a 
caregiver role in the process. This often meant that the child with autism makes 
unreasonable demands on the TD sibling’s time, who reluctantly complies out of a 
sense of obligation.  
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Younger siblings, on the other hand, reported perceived birth-order reversal, mostly 
manifest in ‘immature’ behaviour that they had grown out of but their sibling had 
not.  
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Yet, the participants appeared to have taken the difficulties associated with growing 
up with a sibling who has autism in their stride. There was an emphasis on positive 
experiences, many of which seemed to be of minor importance from an etic 
perspective. For example, one participant expressed her appreciation of the fact that 
her brother would ‘sometimes’ agree to her coming up with her own lines when role-
playing. Several participants claimed that they would not change anything about their 
sibling.  
 
 
Conclusions and implications 
In this study, we qualitatively investigated TD children’s experiences of playing with 
their sibling who has HFA, and found that the sibling’s poor emotion regulation, 
reluctance to accept the playmate’s ideas, and restricted interests reduced the 
hedonistic value of cooperative play for the TD children, and were sources of tension 
and anxiety for them. These negative effects, however, were mitigated by the 
participants’ admiration for their sibling’s creativity (typically expressed within their 
domain of special interest), and by behavioural adjustment to the sibling’s 
difficulties, such as birth-order reversal or assuming a pseudo-caregiver role. These 
findings have important implications for the development of support programmes for 
TD siblings and social play skill trainings for children with HFA; the results are 
generally in line with previous research on TD children’s experiences of having a 
sibling with HFA, but thanks to the narrower focus of our study on cooperative play, 
they have more specific implications.  
The poor regulation of negative emotions, which is common amongst children 
with HFA (Mazefsky et al., 2013), and which TD siblings often report as causing 
anxiety and upset in everyday interactions with their siblings (Konidaris, 1997; 
Mascha & Boucher, 2006), was also universally reported by our participants as a 
factor hindering enjoyable cooperative play. Amplified emotional responses and poor 
emotional control makes behaviour less predictable which, in turn, induces anxiety in 
the play partner. One participant suggested that unreasonable bouts of anger were the 
primary reason her brother struggled to make friends. Effective training programmes 
designed specifically to enhance the self-regulation of emotions do exist (e.g. 
Schuppert et al., 2012), but they are not routinely administered to children with HFA 
(for a review, see Berking & Whitley, 2014). Our results highlight the importance of 
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emotion regulation with respect to peer interactions, and the potential of targeted 
emotion regulation training to enable children with HFA to engage in more mutually 
enjoyable cooperative play. From the TD child’s perspective, these emotional 
outbursts put a strain on the sibling relationship: Ross and Cuskelly (2006) found that 
they were the most frequently reported interaction problem, and engendered anger.  
Support programmes for TD siblings of children with HFA should emphasise 
strategies for dealing with these effects, as they are at a heightened risk of developing 
internalising behaviour problems (Ross & Cuskelly, 2006).  
Having restricted interests is a core diagnostic feature of autism, but it was 
somewhat surprising that it emerged in our participants’ reports as a major obstacle 
to enjoyable cooperative play, because previous research on the everyday experience 
of having a sibling with HFA did not identify this aspect of the phenotype as 
particularly problematic from the TD child’s perspective. In the context of play, 
however, the restricted interests of the child with HFA severely limit the number of 
options and, as the TD sibling’s interests change through maturation, may lead to a 
situation where there is very little opportunity for the children to engage in mutually 
interesting play activities. This was the case with our oldest participant, whose 
interests were increasingly social in nature (e.g. talking), while her brother was still 
as ‘amazingly keen’ on Lego as he had been years before, and unwilling to play 
anything else.  
On the other hand, TD siblings in our sample universally expressed admiration 
for their sibling’s advanced knowledge and creativity within their domain of special 
interest, which helped make even the otherwise monotonous activity engaging. This 
result is in line with previous quantitative studies, which reported higher levels of 
admiration for the sibling with HFA than in TD dyads (Kaminsky & Dewey, 2001). 
Sibling support programmes that emphasise the HFA child’s talents and unique 
contributions may help increase the appreciation of their role within the family, 
which is typically lower in the TD siblings of children with HFA than in TD dyads or 
in families with a child who has a learning disability (Bågenholm & Gillberg, 1991).  
All participants in our study reported that their siblings tend to dominate play 
interactions, and do not usually accept changes to the storyline or rules that are 
suggested by the TD child. This insistence on one’s own ideas emerged as a separate 
theme from narrow interests and poor emotion regulation, but the three are related: 
several participants reported that if they wanted to introduce new elements to the 
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play, their sibling would either terminate the interaction or get angry. This finding 
coincides with some previous quantitative research (van Ommeren et al., 2012), 
which showed that compared to TD peers, children with HFA were less likely to 
engage in reciprocal interaction and accept an adult play partner’s input in a 
collaborative drawing task (the Interactive Drawing Test, IDT), even if the input was 
constructive. Using the same task, Borbely and Yuill (in preparation) found that 
inhibitory control was linked to the ability to accept the play partner’s input, whether 
it matched the intentions of the child with HFA or introduced new ideas. These 
results suggest that executive function training might have the potential to enhance 
cooperative play ability.  
Despite the various difficulties that the participants in our study experienced in 
daily play interactions, it was clear from their accounts that they had adjusted to their 
siblings’ behavioural atypicalities. This adjustment manifested itself in different 
ways, for example in perceived birth-order reversal, where a younger sibling 
highlighted problem behaviours that she had grown out of but her brother had not. 
Older participants had recognised that the balancing of needs which typically 
characterises sibling relationships (Burton & Parks, 1994) was not always possible, 
and they gave the impression of feeling an obligation to engage in less enjoyable 
play in order to please their sibling, whom they perceived as being less able (rather 
than unwilling) to adapt and take the TD sibling’s preferences into account. Overall, 
the participants mostly reported being satisfied with their sibling relationship, and 
showed an obvious appreciation for minor but positive events and aspects of 
cooperative play with their sibling. Perhaps due to their rarity, fun and mutually 
enjoyable interactions were not taken for granted.  
There is an interesting question about the specificity of our findings to the 
relationship between a typically developing child and their sibling with autism. The 
participants in our study only had one sibling, and so could not comment on the 
differences and similarities between the pleasures and difficulties of playing with a 
sibling with ASD as opposed to a typically developing sibling. Considering the 
themes that emerged from their reports, some appear to be linked specifically to the 
sibling’s autism (narrow range of interests, adjustment and coping), while others 
reflect the broader difficulty of coping with poor social competence (no acceptance 
of the partner’s input, lack of emotion regulation). The latter, especially, are also 
characteristic of playing with a typically developing but younger sibling (e.g. Brody, 
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1998; Kennedy & Kramer, 2008). The last theme (appreciation and enjoyment) is 
one that characterises all happy sibling relationships (e.g. Lamb & Lamb, 1982). 
Interestingly, differential treatment by parents did not emerge as a theme in the 
participants’ account, despite the presumably high level of parental adjustment 
necessitated by the fact that a child has ASD. 
The focus of this study was typically-developing children’s experience of 
playing with their sibling who has a diagnosis of autism. Although the social and 
non-social deficits in autism are well-documented, as are these children’s difficulties 
in social play, the relationship between these two areas is poorly understood. We set 
out to investigate the relative importance of these deficits from an emic point of 
view, interrogating the siblings’ lived experience, rather than through imposing a 
theoretical model of interaction on the personal accounts.  
An equally interesting question, of course, is what the autistic children’s 
experience of playing with their typically-developing sibling is like. Although 
beyond the scope of this paper, further research should explore what the reports of 
children with autism on playing with their siblings reveals about the unique 
characteristics of these relationships. Through a comparison of playing with a sibling 
rather than a classmate or friend, such investigations would also be uniquely 
positioned to comment on how the unique dynamics of these play sessions may help 
or hinder children with autism in acquiring and practising transferable social skills. 
Birth order is known to play a role in children’s play with others (Dunn, 2004), 
and to affect the experience of having a disabled sibling (Breslau, 1982). At the 
simplest level, older siblings typically have an experience of living in a family 
without a disabled child, while younger siblings grow up into a family that includes 
an atypically developing child. In our study, this variable was not kept constant: there 
were an equal number of younger and older siblings so that we can examine dyads 
with both birth orders. Although the gap between the siblings was narrow (no age 
difference exceeded 3 years), there were differences in how younger and older 
siblings adapted to autism in the family. While older children tended to adopt an 
ersatz carer role, younger children reported more conflicted feelings about what they 
perceived as immature behaviour on their older siblings’ part. 
Our study is the first qualitative investigation of TD children’s lived experience 
of cooperative play with their HFA sibling. Making use of the unique insight 
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afforded by an emic approach, we identified promising avenues for further research 
into developing sibling support and social skill training programmes.  
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General discussion  
This thesis constitutes a methodologically diverse investigation into the role of 
inhibitory control in the cooperative play deficits that are typical of children with 
HFA. The motivation for this research was the puzzling discrepancy between 
relatively intact social knowledge and profoundly impaired social (play) behaviour in 
children with HFA. We hypothesised that deficits in cooperative play may be due to 
impairments in a cognitive capacity (namely, inhibitory control) which acts as a 
moderator, and prevents relatively well-developed social knowledge from 
manifesting in real-life social interactions. In a series of studies, we (i) aggregated 
previous research to establish whether inhibition was impaired in children with HFA; 
(ii) used lab-based experiments to test whether children with HFA had relatively 
intact social knowledge, operationalised as age-typical performance on measures of 
joint attention, theory of mind, and moral reasoning; (iii) investigated whether 
inhibitory control impairments could predict deficits in three aspects of cooperative 
play (reciprocity, accepting the play partner’s input, and fairness), independently of 
theory of mind and cognitive ability; and (iv) employed a qualitative approach to 
explore TD children’s lived experience of cooperative play with their sibling who 
has a diagnosis of HFA in order to find out whether atypical behaviours associated 
with poor inhibitory control would be reported by the TD participants as hindering 
effective cooperative play.  
Taken together, these studies lend support to a model of cooperative play 
deficits in children with HFA in which poor inhibitory control acts as a moderator 
between social knowledge and social behaviour. The evidence for this model, the 
strengths and limitations of the studies, and the theoretical, methodological, and 
clinical implications of the findings are discussed below in detail. The thesis 
concludes with a highlight of three important areas for further research that have 
been touched upon in this work: the relationship between executive function and 
theory of mind; the role of inhibitory control in emotion regulation; and the utility of 
null hypothesis significance testing in psychological research.  
The thesis concludes with a highlight of three important areas for further 
research that have been touched upon in this work: the relationship between 
executive function and theory of mind; the role of inhibitory control in emotion 
103 
 
regulation; and the utility of null hypothesis significance testing in psychological 
research.  
 
1. Study 1: Systematic review and meta-analysis  
1.1. Background and motivation 
Narrative reviews of the executive function impairments in autism, published over a 
period of fifteen years (from Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996 to Pellicano, 2011), were 
unable to conclusively answer whether inhibitory control is impaired in autism. 
Empirical findings were equivocal, and based on a wide array of inhibitory tasks, 
which made results difficult to compare across studies. The heterogeneity of results 
had been put down to purported differences between the measures used, either in 
terms of task characteristics (e.g. arbitrary vs. naturalistic rules) or of the type of 
inhibition measured (e.g. prepotent response vs. interfering stimuli). We expected 
that the landscape of findings was distorted by the low power that is typical of 
psychological investigations, and which increases sampling error, and leads to 
frequent Type II errors.  
The purpose of our systematic review and meta-analysis, therefore, was 
twofold: (i) to test whether inhibition is impaired in autism; and (ii) to compare the 
degree of impairment shown on different measures in order to evaluate different 
hypotheses about the cause of differential impairment across tasks.  
 
1.2. Summary of findings  
By employing advanced statistical methods, we were able to provide evidence for a 
deficit in inhibitory control in children with HFA, and show that differential 
performance across measures of inhibitory control was artefactual, due in fact to 
sampling error arising from a combination of low statistical power, the lack of 
standardisation in experimental methodologies, and inappropriate matching of the 
TD comparison group.  
We found that participant age, FSIQ, and choice of paradigm did not 
significantly influence the size of impairment shown. The difference in FSIQ scores 
between the participants with and without HFA, however, was positively associated 
with the size of the impairment, i.e. children with HFA performed relatively worse 
on measures of inhibition when they were compared against a group of TD children 
with better cognitive ability. In most studies, the difference in FSIQ was substantial, 
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and this fact explained a significant amount of heterogeneity in the effect sizes across 
studies, so the analysis was repeated on a subset of studies in which the HFA and TD 
participants were closely matched on FSIQ. This second analysis revealed a 
considerably smaller, although still significantly positive impairment in inhibitory 
performance in the HFA group.  
 
1.3. Strengths and limitations  
In a similar review published shortly before the completion of our report, Geurts et 
al. (2014) aggregated the results of 41 studies that directly compared the inhibitory 
performance of individuals with autism and TD controls, using either a prepotent 
response inhibition or an interference suppression paradigm, and concluded that (i) 
individuals with autism showed a significant impairment on both kinds of inhibition; 
(ii) the choice of paradigm did not have a significant effect on the degree of 
impairment shown; (iii) the age of the participants was not related to the size of the 
inhibitory impairment (after excluding outlier studies); but (iv) the FSIQ of the 
participants with autism was positively correlated with inhibitory performance, i.e. 
more cognitively able individuals showed less of an impairment.  
Although similar in approach, the focus of our review was different: we only 
included studies on (i) children; with (ii) ‘high-functioning’ autism. These 
restrictions of scope allowed us to reduce the variance in effect sizes across the 
studies, and control for confounding variables arising from the development of 
alternative strategies for solving inhibitory tasks in adulthood, or from the knock-on 
effect of impairments in other cognitive domains in participants with a comorbid 
learning disability.  
Another difference between our study and that of Geurts et al. is that they 
tested one particular taxonomy of inhibitory measures (i.e. prepotent response 
inhibition vs. interference suppression), whereas we compared all commonly used 
experimental paradigms. The advantage of our approach is that it makes no a priori 
assumptions about the type of inhibition measured by each task. This categorisation 
is not a trivial exercise, as illustrated by the example of the Stroop task. According to 
Nigg’s (2000) taxonomy, it is a measure of interference control, whereas Friedman 
and Miyake (2006) consider it a test of prepotent response inhibition. Because 
dissociation between the two types of inhibition would be most easily shown by 
differential performance on the tasks, there is an element of circularity to this 
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argument, without an immediately obvious way of resolving disagreements of 
categorisation. Geurts et al. circumvented this problem by running their analysis 
twice: once with the Stroop task classed as a test of prepotent response inhibition, 
then as a test of interference control. It seems to us that a distinction that allows for 
placing a task in either of two mutually exclusive categories is in need of a better 
definition, and may not be meaningful at all. Indeed, Geurts et al. found no 
difference between the results of their two analyses, and in fact no difference 
between purported measures of prepotent response inhibition and of interference 
control, on the size of impairment shown by the participants with autism.  
Our approach was to estimate population effect sizes separately for each 
paradigm, then test for a significant difference across them. This allowed us to 
evaluate all currently available hypotheses about differences between the tasks 
simultaneously, or to construct a new classification, grounded in data, if need be. We 
found no evidence for differential performance across tasks: effect sizes varied in a 
narrow range (+/- 11% from the mean), with no significant difference between any 
two paradigms. As such, none of the hypotheses concerning the causes of differential 
performance across tasks seems to be valid, quite simply because there is no 
differential performance to explain in the first place.  
The most important limitation of our review is that we were not able to identify 
all sources of heterogeneity in effect sizes across the studies. We entered age, 
participant FSIQ, and paradigm into exploratory moderator analyses, and found that 
none of these factors explained a significant amount of variance. In studies where the 
TD group had relatively better general cognitive ability, however, the apparent size 
of the inhibitory impairment was also larger, suggesting that a significant portion of 
the impairment is actually due to the poor choice of a comparison group. This fact 
also highlights the possibility of additional, as yet unidentified, confounding 
variables that may be responsible for the poorer inhibitory performance shown by 
children with HFA (see, for example, the Triple I theory, below).  
 
1.4. Implications  
The comparison of experimental methodologies showed that the procedural details of 
inhibitory tasks differed greatly across the studies included in the meta-analysis. In 
the case of studies that used the Go/no-go Task, for example, the proportion of 
incongruent (“no-go”) trials varied between 11 and 50 per cent (where reported). 
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Considering that the prepotence of the “go” response relies on its higher frequency, 
this manipulation will presumably have an effect on the construct validity of the test, 
but this is not routinely considered by researchers. Similarly, the dependent variable 
reported (typically reaction time and/or accuracy) varies across studies. Again, the 
choice is not trivial: Geurts et al. (2014) found that effect sizes calculated on the 
basis of reaction times and of accuracy rates were significantly different.  
Thus, the implications of our study pertain to experimental methodology as 
well as to the theoretical understanding of inhibitory impairments in autism, and we 
suggest that concentrated efforts should be made to standardise experimental tasks on 
the basis of empirically confirmed considerations in order to ensure comparability 
across studies and, ultimately, accelerate the accumulation of knowledge in the field.  
 
2. Study 2: Inhibition, reciprocity, and accepting play partner input 
2.1. Background and motivation 
Despite the developmental importance of cooperative play and the well-documented 
impairments of children with autism in this domain, there has been relatively little 
research into the proximal causes of these difficulties. One exception to this was 
Colombi et al.’s (2009) study on pre-schoolers with autism, which identified 
imitation and responding to joint attention as the primary reasons for deficits in 
cooperative play. We expected that despite showing deficits at an earlier stage in 
development, imitation and joint attention will have reached age-typical levels by the 
time children with HFA are in primary school (which was the age group of interest in 
this thesis). This development, however, is not reflected in substantially improved 
cooperative play, which led us to hypothesise that impairments in other cognitive 
domains may be responsible. We therefore tested the contribution of responding to 
joint attention, imitation, theory of mind, and inhibitory control to the ability of 
primary-aged children with HFA to engage in cooperative play.  
 
2.2. Summary of findings 
In this lab-based, experimental study, we found that children with HFA performed at 
age-typical levels on measures on first-order false-belief understanding, imitation, 
and joint attention. They were impaired, however, on verbal ability, second-order 
false-belief understanding, and inhibitory control, as well as on reciprocity and 
accepting the play partner’s input on our measure of cooperative play, the Interactive 
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Drawing Test (IDT, van Ommeren, Begeer, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012). In the HFA 
group, we found an association between the degree of inhibitory impairment and the 
ability to engage in reciprocity and accept the play partner’s input, although the 
former of these correlations failed to reach significance after the effect of cognitive 
ability (i.e. verbal IQ) was accounted for.  
 
2.3. Strengths and limitations 
This study was the first experimental investigation of the proximal causes of poor 
cooperative play in primary-aged children with HFA, and provided evidence for the 
role of inhibition in accepting the play partner’s input, which is essential for a 
mutually satisfying interaction. We were also the first to use the IDT outside of the 
research group who developed it, and verified that it was a useful measure of 
cooperative play that could be easily adapted for use in a British sample, and also in 
TD children. We replicated the main findings of the authors regarding the pattern of 
play shown by children with HFA, corroborating the reliability of the IDT.  
The main limitation of our study lies in its small sample size (12 children in 
either group), which potentially increased the probability of Type II errors. 
Reassuringly, however, the pattern of findings is generally in line with previous 
research, suggesting that low power did not lead to spurious null results.  
The TD comparison group was matched on chronological, rather than on 
mental age, to the participants with HFA, which is reflected in their significantly 
higher verbal ability. The reason for this decision was twofold: on the one hand, the 
HFA participants in our sample typically attend mainstream primary schools, where 
their classmates and, therefore, potential play partners and friends, would be of a 
similar age, although potentially of slightly higher cognitive ability. This comparison 
was therefore deemed more ecologically relevant. Also, the measure of cooperation 
was essentially non-verbal, as were the tests of inhibition administered. A TD 
comparison group matched on verbal mental age would have been younger, and 
presumably have lower non-verbal intelligence, jeopardising the comparability of 
their performance on the non-verbal tasks, which were of primary interest in this 
study.  
The downside of the decision to match participants on chronological age is that 
the TD group showed ceiling effects on several measures, which meant that the 
relationship between cooperative play performance and proposed predictors could 
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only be tested in the HFA group. This led to loss of power, and prevented us from 
investigating whether the relationship between inhibition and the ability to play 
cooperatively is specific to autism or extends to typical development, as well.  
 
2.4. Implications  
In addition to providing evidence for our model of inhibitory control moderating the 
relationship between social knowledge and social behaviour, this study also had 
methodological implications that informed the design of our next empirical 
investigation.  
The results showed that children with HFA were just as unwilling to accept 
constructive input from the play partner as they were with contributions that altered 
the direction of play (e.g. when the experimenter turned the child’s drawing of a 
cloud into a tree). This suggests that the insistence of children with HFA on “having 
their way” during a play session is not solely the result of a desire to see their plans 
carried out, but also involves a lack of appreciation of the collaborative nature of the 
activity. We hypothesised that this may be linked to a failure to realise that a 
mutually enjoyable experience requires that the play partner should also be able to 
contribute to an equal degree, and anything less than that will be perceived as unfair.  
 
3. Study 3: Inhibitory control, moral reasoning, and fairness in action  
3.1. Background and motivation 
The understanding and practice of fairness in autism has received very little attention 
from researchers and when it was studied (e.g. Sally & Hill, 2006), the authors noted 
that their results showed considerably smaller differences between the HFA and TD 
participants than would be expected on the basis of the observation of the real-life 
interactions of children with HFA. This, to us, suggested a methodological error: 
strategic games (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma), which are commonly used in 
behavioural economics, seem ill-suited to a nuanced investigation of fairness in 
autism. We therefore combined an assessment of moral reasoning level with testing 
behaviour in an actual sharing situation so as to be able to directly test the link 
between them. We also administered measures of inhibition to test whether the size 
of the discrepancy between moral judgement and moral behaviour was associated 
with inhibitory deficits.  
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3.2. Summary of findings  
In line with our model, which purports that social knowledge is relatively intact in 
HFA, we found no group differences on mentalising (false-belief understanding and 
emotion attribution), or level of moral reasoning, but the HFA group showed a 
significant impairment on our inhibitory measure (the Go/no-go Task). Contrary to 
our hypothesis, we found no difference between the TD and HFA participants on 
sharing – participants in both groups tended to split resources equally with an 
unknown other. Multiple regression analysis was carried out to identify predictors of 
less self-centred sharing, and we found that, in both the TD and the HFA groups, 
inhibitory control was the only significant variable significantly associated with the 
number of tokens retained by the participants, while age, mentalising ability, and 
moral reasoning level were not.  
 
3.3. Strengths and limitations 
Recent work on the factors affecting moral choices tended to focus on behavioural 
measures, mostly strategic games including the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the 
Ultimatum and Dictator Games (for an exception, see Gummerum, Hanoch, & 
Keller, 2008). In our study, we combined a behavioural measure of fairness with an 
interview, which allowed us to take into account important motivational factors when 
interpreting the pattern of results.  
We found, for example, that both TD and HFA participants tended to keep 
exactly half of the reward offered, even though they had ostensibly been 
outperformed by the unknown child with whom they were sharing. This behavioural 
similarity across the groups was surprising, because on the basis of previous work on 
the development of fairness in childhood (e.g. Hook & Cook, 1979), we had 
expected that TD children would consider the principle of equity in their decisions, 
and keep less than half of the reward. Rather than concluding that, contrary to the 
results of naturalistic observations, HFA children share just as much as their TD 
peers, however, the combination of a behavioural paradigm with interviews about 
moral judgement allowed us to identify the confounding motivational factor that 
potentially masked an existing developmental difference. In the interviews, all TD 
children claimed that effort, rather than performance, should be rewarded, whereas 
the HFA children were mostly of the contrary opinion. The apparently self-centred 
action of the TD participants in the sharing task may actually reflect a “fair” 
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decision, if we accept that reward should be bestowed on the basis of effort, rather 
than talent: if the participant tried their best, they deserved just as much as the other 
child, regardless of actual performance.  
An important limitation of our study lies in the sensitivity of the measures 
used. One of the two inhibitory tasks (the Spatial Conflict Task) administered proved 
too difficult for the participants, despite being completed successfully by the children 
involved in the pilot phase. As a result, performance on the Go/no-go Task was the 
only measure of inhibition included in the analysis. Performance on the tests of 
mentalising was very good in both groups, with no participant making a mistake on 
the emotion attribution task. There is evidence that the recognition of emotions is not 
less accurate in HFA than in typical development (Piggot et al., 2004), but this may 
only apply in the case of “simple” emotions, such as happiness or sadness (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), which were used in our measure. 
It is not entirely clear, therefore, whether the age-typical performance shown by the 
HFA group was due to intact ability or the easiness of the task.  
 
3.4. Implications 
In this study, we demonstrated that inhibitory control, rather than age, mentalising 
ability, or level of moral reasoning was the best predictor of making less self-centred 
decisions in a Dictator Game. The link between inhibition and fairness existed in 
both the TD and the HFA groups. Our results are contrary to Smith et al.’s (2013), 
who also found a significant relationship between a measure of inhibition and 
fairness, but this was fully mediated by participant age. There were a number of 
methodological differences between the two studies (e.g. participant age, inhibitory 
measure used), but further research is needed to establish whether inhibitory control 
plays a role in the judgement-behaviour gap.  
Although beyond the scope of this study, the marked difference between TD 
and HFA children’s opinion on whether effort or performance should be rewarded 
suggests an interesting avenue for further research. Interviews with adolescents or 
adults with HFA could help establish whether the difference is due to a delay in the 
moral development of children with HFA or a different understanding of deserving. 
The latter possibility opens up a whole range of questions about the cognitive or 
social atypicalities in HFA that may underlie this difference.  
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4. Study 4: TD children’s experience of cooperative play with a HFA sibling 
4.1. Background and motivation  
Although the adjustment of TD siblings who grow up in a family with a child with 
HFA has attracted considerable research attention, especially since the early 2000s 
(e.g. Hastings, 2003; Kaminsky & Dewey, 2001; Macks & Reeve, 2007; Rao & 
Beidel, 2009), there has been no specific qualitative investigation into TD children’s 
experience of interacting with the HFA sibling in the context of play. In addition to 
addressing this gap in the literature, the purpose of this study was twofold. First, we 
aimed to triangulate the source of poor cooperative play ability in children with HFA 
by exploring the first-hand experiences of the most frequent play partners: siblings. 
The second goal of this study was to identify avenues for further research. We 
expected that an emic approach would provide unique insight into the factors that 
lead to the breakdown of a smooth play interaction. 
 
4.2. Summary of findings 
Interviews about the experience of cooperative play were conducted with six TD 
children between the ages of 5 and 11, who each had a sibling with HFA in the same 
range. The transcripts were transcribed and analysed using IPA. Five superordinate 
themes emerged: poor emotion regulation, restricted interests, and resistance to the 
play partner’s ideas were reported as the major hindrances to mutually satisfying 
play, but these negative effects were tempered by admiration for the HFA sibling’s 
creativity within their domain of special interest, and behavioural adjustment on the 
part of the TD children to their sibling’s difficulties.  
 
4.3. Strengths and limitations 
In our sample, we had a mix of younger and older siblings of children with HFA, and 
nearly all combinations of gender pairings (no girl-girl dyad was included in the 
study because we could not locate any prospective female participants who had a 
sister with HFA and also satisfied the other eligibility criteria). Our goal was to 
collect reports from a more varied source and, thus, to potentially identify more 
universally applicable themes. This diversity, however, could also be considered a 
weakness of our design: there is evidence that both birth order and gender affect the 
impact of having a disabled sibling (Breslau, 1982). While older siblings have an 
experience of living in a family without an atypically-developing child, younger 
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siblings do not. In our sample, we focused on dyads with a relatively narrow age gap 
(the largest age difference was 3 years) so that this effect of birth order may be 
minimised.  
Using a qualitative method to analyse the TD siblings’ first-hand reports allows 
us to compare the difficulties in cooperative play that were identified in a lab-based, 
experimental task (the Interactive Drawing Test) with the emic reports of frequent 
play partners of children with HFA. There was a reassuring degree of concordance 
between the results: we had found earlier, for example, that children with HFA were 
unwilling to accept the play partner’s input into a cooperative drawing, and the 
participants in this study also universally reported that their siblings’ ideas tended to 
dominate all joint play interactions, which substantially reduced the hedonistic value 
of cooperative play. The siblings’ reports also highlighted issues, however, that did 
not arise in a short interaction with an unknown adult (i.e. the researcher) in an 
experimental setting, such as the destructive effect of emotional outbursts.  
 
4.4. Implications 
There are several interventions that have been used with relative success in the 
training of social interaction (e.g. Baker, Koegel, & Koegel, 1998; Jahr, Eldevik, & 
Eikeseth, 2000; Kohler, Anthony, Steighner, & Hoyson, 2001), but the teaching of 
play, specifically, has proven difficult (Jordan & Libby, 1997). The findings of our 
study suggest that focus on the HFA child’s special interest may be 
counterproductive, because the TD sibling may soon tire of the topic, and not be 
motivated to engage. Enhancing the self-regulation of intense negative emotions, 
however, may make the behaviour of the child with HFA less unpredictable and less 
anxiety-inducing for the play partner, which may increase the frequency of play 
interactions.  
Encouragingly, we found that the sibling relationships of most of our 
participants were characterised by warmth, and all participants reported a desire for 
more joint play and mutually enjoyable shared experiences. Emphasising the talents 
of the sibling with HFA, such as their creativity in connection with their special 
interest, may help TD children build a more positive perception of their sibling’s role 
in the family, which is often a problematic aspect of these sibling relationships 
(Bågenholm & Gillberg, 1991).  
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5. Thesis summary   
5.1. Diversity of research methods 
The four studies that comprise this thesis are methodologically diverse because the 
purpose of this research project was not only to investigate whether a link exists 
between inhibitory control and successful cooperation, but also to contribute to the 
evaluation of the research methods currently used to answer this, and similar, 
questions about the proximal causes of the complex pattern of impairments that 
characterise autism. This was necessary because although autism has a rich literature, 
the specific question posed in this thesis, i.e. the role of executive function in 
cooperative behaviours, is relatively under-researched, especially in the age group of 
interest and involving playful activities. As a result, the research methods used in this 
research project evolved and changed as the studies unfolded.  
For example, at the start of the research programme, the assumption was made 
that individuals with autism demonstrate differential impairments across various 
measures of inhibitory control, which is a result of differences in the exact cognitive 
demands of those tasks. All reviews of executive functioning in autism that were 
available at the time (e.g. Hill, 2004; Kenworthy et al., 2008; O’Hearn et al., 2010; 
Pellicano, 2011; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Russo et al., 2007) agreed that this 
was the case, although there was disagreement across authors as to the exact pattern 
of difficulties, and how they are linked to task characteristics. The experimental tasks 
administered in the first experimental study of this thesis (presented as Articles 2) 
were selected in a way that would allow an investigation of differential performance, 
thus contributing to the theoretical debate. The results showed inhibitory 
impairments across the board, but the low number of participants did not allow 
drawing definitive conclusions as to why. The findings were then followed up in two 
ways. For the second experimental study (presented as Article 3), executive tasks 
selected were selected from a narrower range, focusing on inhibition of a prepotent 
response, so as to avoid any theoretical confounds. But also, preparation for a 
systematic review of research into inhibitory control in autism was commenced so as 
to definitively resolve what had puzzled reviewers for over a decade and a half: on 
which inhibitory measures do individuals with autism perform at a below typical 
level, and why.  
The meta-analysis provided clear evidence for an impairment in the inhibitory 
control of HFA children, and also highlighted the detrimental impact of 
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unstandardised experimental tasks on the research literature in general, as theories 
(about the task characteristics underlying a particular pattern of poor inhibitory 
performance in autism, for example) had been confidently put forward without 
proper appreciation of the weaknesses of the empirical evidence. This finding 
contributed to the decision that the last study included in this thesis should be 
qualitative in nature, allowing a more exploratory approach and a triangulation of 
results.  
The results of the four studies, although reached through different 
methodological pathways, are convergent: HFA children have profound impairments 
in inhibitory control (Article 1), which can be measured using experimental tasks 
(Articles 2 and 3), are linked to the ability to cooperate successfully, both in 
laboratory-based tasks (Article 2) and in real-life play situations (Article 4). 
 
5.2. Implications 
This thesis contributes to the research into social impairments in autism in two 
distinct ways: theoretically, through a refinement of the role executive functioning 
(specifically, inhibitory control) can play in a multiple-deficit account of autism; and 
methodologically, by highlighting the importance of standardising experimental tasks 
and accounting for methodological differences across studies when formulating 
hypotheses on the basis of empirical evidence.  
The systematic review and meta-analysis presented here as Article 1 used 
advanced statistical techniques to investigate the pattern of performance on 
laboratory-based tests of inhibitory control. Narrative reviews published across three 
decades, from Pennington and Ozonoff’s (1996) to Pellicano’s (2011), had been 
unable to establish which subdomains of inhibition are impaired in autism, mostly 
because the impact of low power and methodological differences across the studies 
were not duly appreciated. The meta-analysis confirmed the finding that the 
empirical results of Articles 1 and 2 had suggested, namely that HFA children show 
impaired performance compared to age-matched peers across all tasks of inhibition. 
The experimental studies also showed a clear link between inhibition and important 
components of social interaction, such as reciprocity, accepting other contributors’ 
input, and acting fairly. Taken together, these results help clarify the role of 
executive function in social impairments in autism. Although executive deficits have 
mostly been proposed as an explanation for the non-social aspects of autistic 
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symptomatology (Hill, 2004; Pellicano, 2011), the ‘strong’ version of the executive 
function account posits that they are also responsible for social deficits. The results 
of this thesis lend support to this claim, as clear links have been identified between 
inhibition and effective social interaction, both in experimental tasks and in real-life 
situations. The impact of executive deficits was statistically separable from 
difficulties in mentalising, but there is obvious overlap in the manifestations of these 
cognitive capacities: demonstrating theory of mind, for example, requires using 
various executive functions, and vice versa – for an elaboration of this idea, see the 
Triple I theory proposed by by White (2013). As a result, the results of this thesis 
suggest that the role of executive function in autistic symptomatology may not be as 
easy to clearly delineate as some current multiple-deficit models, such as that 
proposed by Happé, Ronald, and Plomin (2006) suggest, but should rather be 
interpreted as part of a model in which developmental deficits interact longitudinally 
(e.g. Pellicano, 2013).  
An important practical implication of the theoretical finding that inhibitory 
control underlies difficulties in cooperation is that enhancing inhibition, either 
through training or adapting the environment to provide ‘on-line’ support, should 
have a beneficial impact on social interactions. Originally, this thesis was to include 
an intervention-type study to provide empirical evidence for this claim, but this had 
to be abandoned, partly because of practical issues, such as time limitation and the 
difficulty of recruiting suitable participants, and partly because of difficulties 
associated with training executive function (e.g. Dowsett & Livesey, 2000; Houben 
& Jansen, 2011) reliably. Nonetheless, a direct empirical investigation of the impact 
of supporting inhibition on effective social interaction would be the best way to 
establish the direction of causality and, thus, to test the model proposed in this thesis. 
As such, such a study is a logical follow-up of the work presented here.  
Aside from their theoretical importance, the results of this thesis, and of the 
systematic review and meta-analysis in particular, have important implications for 
experimental methodology. Despite the large number of studies inspired by the 
executive function account of autism, researchers could not reach consensus on 
whether inhibition was impaired in this population and, if so, whether that 
impairment was universal or specific to certain types of inhibition. The authors of 
narrative reviews, from Pennington and Ozonoff (1996) to Pellicano were in no 
better position, because “some studies have found problems in inhibitory control 
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while others have not” (2011, p. 231). This diversity of findings was, in fact, due to 
methodological issues, such as comparing HFA participants with a group of TD 
children of substantially higher general cognitive ability, changes to experimental 
methodology, which were often poorly reported, and a failure to appreciate the 
fundamental weaknesses inherent in null-hypothesis significance testing when 
formulating theories on the basis of poor evidence. The practical implications of this 
are clear: making comparisons only across groups that are actually comparable, 
standardising experimental tasks or at least systematically investigating the impact of 
changing the details of administering them, and giving careful consideration to 
statistical power would safeguard against the “barren controversy” that Oakes (1986) 
identified as a hindrance to progress in psychological research.  
Obviously, none of the above proposals are original to this thesis, but have 
been repeatedly formulated by distinguished researchers for several decades. The 
results of this thesis, however, strongly suggest that they bear reiterating.  
 
6. Future directions  
6.1. Inhibitory control and other executive functions  
Lorem ipsum dolor 
 
6.2. Executive function and theory of mind 
In this thesis, theory of mind and executive function (or, more specifically, inhibitory 
control) were not considered as competing explanations, but rather as complementary 
prerequisites of effective social functioning. Although the emphasis was on the 
explanatory power of executive function, the intention was not to dismiss theory of 
mind as an important contributor to social competence, but rather to show that even 
children with HFA whose theory of mind is (relatively) intact have profound 
difficulties in cooperative play. Clearing one hurdle is not enough: both executive 
function and theory of mind are required.  
A lot has been written about the relationship between these two cognitive 
capacities (e.g. Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 
1991; Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999; for a recent review, see Brunsdon & Happé, 
2014), but there is no consensus on whether impairments in one lead to impairments 
in the other and, if such a causal link does exist, in which direction. Longitudinal 
studies (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Pellicano, 
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2010b) suggest that developmentally, executive function is a prerequisite of theory of 
mind. Other researchers such as White (2013), however, argue that executive 
function impairments in autism are illusory, and poor performance on experimental 
tasks is due to the participants’ difficulty in understating the experimenter’s 
expectations. Brunsdon and Happé (2014) speculate that theory of mind deficits, 
such as the difficulty in reflecting on one’s own mental states, may have an impact 
on certain aspects of executive function, e.g. planning.  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that executive function and 
theory of mind are difficult to disentangle experimentally. Nearly all tests of theory 
of mind require a degree of executive function to complete successfully, and vice 
versa. In the Sally-Ann task, for example, which is a widely-used measure of first-
order false-belief understanding, the participant must inhibit the prepotent response 
of pointing to the container they know the toy to be in. Conversely, to succeed on a 
test of inhibition such as the Luria hand-game task (inverse imitation), the participant 
must first infer the experimenter’s intentions correctly (Pellicano, 2007).  
In the two empirical papers included above, there was no statistically 
significant association between measures of theory of mind and inhibitory control, 
but the relevance of this fact to the broader issue is limited. First, because our 
participants, both in the TD and in the HFA groups, tended to pass the theory of 
mind tasks, and this lack of variance made correlation analysis difficult or 
impossible. Second, because our studies were carried out on relatively small samples, 
which were sufficient to detect the large impairment in inhibition, but would be 
underpowered to find if a weaker relationship between theory of mind and executive 
function existed.  
In the meta-analysis, we found that a large part of the inhibitory impairment 
was explained by the participants’ general cognitive ability (full-scale IQ). Full-scale 
IQ, of course, is measured using tests that involve the application of executive 
control to a considerable degree. A similar difficulty exists in attempting to parse 
performance on tests of theory of mind and executive function. Overall, the value 
that an either–or approach can add to future accounts of the autism phenotype is 
questionable.  
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6.3. Emotion regulation and inhibitory control  
The goal of this thesis was to evaluate a model of social impairments in autism in 
which inhibitory control acts as a moderator between social knowledge and social 
behaviour. This hypothesised model, and the design of the studies that were 
conducted to test it, rest on the underlying assumption that inhibitory control is 
synonymous with, or at least closely linked to emotional and behavioural self-
regulation. This assumption remained implicit, but it is crucial, therefore supporting 
evidence is briefly presented below.  
Until relatively recently, research on inhibitory control and on self-regulation 
had been conducted in the largely separate domains of cognitive and social 
psychology, respectively (Baddeley, 2007). Intuitively, the two capacities are related, 
because the self-regulation of emotions and behaviours requires the ability to inhibit 
inappropriate prepotent responses (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). There 
is now an increasing amount of empirical evidence for a link between cognitive 
inhibition and behavioural self-regulation, from fields as disparate as overeating 
(Nederkoorn, Houben, Hofmann, Roefs, & Jansen, 2010) and sexual infidelity 
(Pronk, Karremans, & Wigboldus, 2011).  
For example, Carlson and Wang (2007) tested preschool children’s ability to 
inhibit a prepotent response and to regulate their emotions, and found a significant 
association between these capacities, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. 
The correlations held up for both the understanding and controlling of emotions, of 
both positive and negative valence. In a study on undergraduate students, Logan et 
al. (1997) found a significant relationship between performance on a stop-signal test 
(a measure of cognitive inhibition) and self-reports of impulsivity, suggesting that 
impulsive behaviour is driven by an inability to inhibit a prepotent response. In yet 
another experiment (von Hippel & Gonsalkorale, 2005), participants who performed 
better on a Stroop task were more able to suppress socially inappropriate verbal 
outbursts in response to a visually unpleasant stimulus.  
The pattern of results across our studies also supports this link. Manifestations 
of poor behaviour regulation, such as the reluctance of HFA participants to accept 
the play partner’s input in the Interactive Drawing Test, were statistically linked to 
performance on tests of inhibition. In the interviews, TD children universally 
reported that their siblings’ emotional reactions tended to be disproportionate, and 
that these were linked to perceived challenges to the siblings’ preferred routine.  
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There is direct evidence for the inhibition–emotion regulation link from 
psychopathologies, including depression (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010) and ADHD 
(Schachar & Logan, 1990) but not, to our knowledge, from autism. Therefore, 
although the wealth of corroborating evidence from different populations is 
indicative, further research is needed to verify that deficits in behavioural regulation 
and in inhibitory control are interlinked in autism.  
 
6.4. Null hypothesis significance testing  
The claim that “null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) has not only failed to 
support the advance of psychology as a science but also has seriously impeded it” is 
far from novel. In fact, the quote is from Cohen’s (1994, p. 997) article written 20 
years ago, which he prefaces by unapologetically disclaiming any degree of 
originality, and citing researchers describing NHST as worse than useless from 
nearly 30 years prior. Yet, it bears repeating because NHST continues to be 
universally used and continues to hinder progress in psychological research.  
To illustrate, consider the example of inhibitory control impairments in autism. 
In a 1996 review of executive deficits in several developmental disorders, the authors 
concluded that “deficits in inhibition are prominent in ADHD but not in autism” 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996, p. 80). Fifteen years (and dozens of studies) later, 
Pellicano (2011) was in no better position to say whether inhibition was impaired in 
autism because “some studies have found problems in inhibitory control while others 
have not” (p. 231). This uncertainty has given rise to a number of hypotheses about 
the complex pattern of inhibitory impairments that exist in autism, such as the 
prepotent response–interference suppression distinction (for reviews, see Hill, 2004; 
O’Hearn, Asato, Ordaz, & Luna, 2010; Russo et al., 2007).  
Actually, the pattern of findings across studies is clear, and provides very 
strong support for an inhibitory impairment in autism. If there were really no 
difference between the TD and HFA populations on inhibitory control, only 1 out of 
42 studies included in our meta-analysis should have found a significant impairment 
in the HFA group (as a result of a Type I error). Also, participants with HFA should 
outperform the comparison group in roughly half of the studies (although most of 
these differences would not reach statistical significance), while in fact over 85 per 
cent of the studies reported that participants with HFA scored lower on inhibition. 
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The cause of uncertainty despite overwhelming evidence lies in the misinterpretation 
of non-significant findings.  
The question a researcher wishes to answer by running a statistical analysis is 
this: “Provided a significant effect exists or does not exist in my sample, how 
confident can I be that there is or there is not an effect in the population?” There are 
two fundamental problems with NHST: that it does not answer this question; and 
that, unaware of this, the researcher will proceed as if the question had been 
answered. Taken together, these two facts have a devastating impact on the validity 
of research reports. In Johnson’s poignant summary, p-values “relate to data that 
were not observed under a model that is known to be false” (Johnson, 1999, p. 765), 
and, as such, are irrelevant and misleading.  
Failure to appreciate this fact, along with frequent Type II errors arising from 
low power that is an undesirable but often inevitable trait of psychological research 
(1 in 4 studies in the meta-analysis had a worse than even chance of finding the 
correct answer) lead to a “barren controversy” over the cause of heterogeneity in 
experimental results, and a “continuous search for factors” (Oakes, 1986). The first 
step forward is to take into account the effect of sampling error when theorising on 
the basis of a null result but, ultimately, NHST must be abandoned in psychological 
research for point estimation techniques (Cumming, 2013), Bayesian statistics 
(Dienes, 2011), or likelihood inference (Dempster, 1997).  
  
121 
 
References 
Adamo, N., Huo, L., Adelsberg, S., Petkova, E., Castellanos, F. X., & Martino, A. D. (2014). 
Response time intra-subject variability: commonalities between children with autism spectrum 
disorders and children with ADHD. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 23(2), 69–79. 
doi:10.1007/s00787-013-0428-4 
Adams, N. C., & Jarrold, C. (2009). Inhibition and the Validity of the Stroop Task for Children with 
Autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(8), 1112–1121. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0721-8 
Adams, N. C., & Jarrold, C. (2012). Inhibition in autism: children with autism have difficulty 
inhibiting irrelevant distractors but not prepotent responses. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 42(6), 1052–1063. 
Almås, I., Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2010). Fairness and the Development 
of Inequality Acceptance. Science, 328(5982), 1176–1178. doi:10.1126/science.1187300 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th 
ed.). Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing. 
Ardila, A., Pineda, D., & Rosselli, M. (2000). Correlation Between Intelligence Test Scores and 
Executive Function Measures. Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 15(1), 31–36. 
doi:10.1016/S0887-6177(98)00159-0 
Arthur, M., Bochner, S., & Butterfield, N. (1999). Enhancing peer interactions within the context of 
play. International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 46(3), 367–381. 
Asperger, D. D. H. (1944). Die „Autistischen Psychopathen” im Kindesalter. Archiv für Psychiatrie 
und Nervenkrankheiten, 117(1), 76–136. doi:10.1007/BF01837709 
Atlas, J. A. (1990). Play in assessment and intervention in the childhood psychoses. Child Psychiatry 
and Human Development, 21(2), 119–133. 
Baddeley, A. (2007). Working memory, thought, and action. Oxford University Press. 
Bågenholm, A., & Gillberg, C. (1991). Psychosocial effects on siblings of children with autism and 
mental retardation: A population%based study. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 
35(4), 291–307. 
Bailey, A., Le Couteur, A., Gottesman, I., Bolton, P., Simonoff, E., Yuzda, E., & Rutter, M. (1995). 
Autism as a strongly genetic disorder: evidence from a British twin study. Psychological 
Medicine, 25(01), 63–77. doi:10.1017/S0033291700028099 
Baio, J. (2012). Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders: Autism and Developmental Disabilities 
Monitoring Network, 14 Sites, United States, 2008. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 
Surveillance Summaries. Volume 61, Number 3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Baird, G., Simonoff, E., Pickles, A., Chandler, S., Loucas, T., Meldrum, D., & Charman, T. (2006). 
Prevalence of disorders of the autism spectrum in a population cohort of children in South 
Thames: the Special Needs and Autism Project (SNAP). The Lancet, 368(9531), 210–215. 
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(06)69041-7 
Baker, M. J., Koegel, R. L., & Koegel, L. K. (1998). Increasing the social behavior of young children 
with autism using their obsessive behaviors. Research and Practice for Persons with Severe 
Disabilities, 23(4), 300–308. 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2002). The extreme male brain theory of autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 
248–254. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01904-6 
122 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. (2009). Autism: The Empathizing–Systemizing (E-S) Theory. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 1156(1), 68–80. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04467.x 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a ‘theory of mind’? 
Cognition, 21(1), 37–46. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Scott, F. J., Allison, C., Williams, J., Bolton, P., Matthews, F. E., & Brayne, C. 
(2009). Prevalence of autism-spectrum conditions: UK school-based population study. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 194(6), 500–509. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.108.059345 
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., & Plumb, I. (2001). The ‘Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes’ test revised version: A study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome 
or high%functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(2), 241–251. 
Bauminger, N., Shulman, C., & Agam, G. (2004). The Link Between Perceptions of Self and of Social 
Relationships in High-Functioning Children with Autism. Journal of Developmental and 
Physical Disabilities, 16(2), 193–214. doi:10.1023/B:JODD.0000026616.24896.c8 
Bauminger-Zviely, N., & Agam-Ben-Artzi, G. (2014). Young Friendship in HFASD and Typical 
Development: Friend Versus Non-friend Comparisons. Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders, 1–16. doi:10.1007/s10803-014-2052-7 
Benenson, J. F., Pascoe, J., & Radmore, N. (2007). Children’s altruistic behavior in the Dictator 
Game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28(3), 168–175. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.003 
Bennetto, L., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1996). Intact and impaired memory functions in 
autism. Child Development, 67(4), 1816–1835. 
Bennett, T. A., Szatmari, P., Bryson, S., Duku, E., Vaccarella, L., & Tuff, L. (2013). Theory of Mind, 
Language and Adaptive Functioning in ASD: A Neuroconstructivist Perspective. Journal of 
the Canadian Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 22(1), 13–19. 
Berger, H. J. C., Aerts, F. H. T. M., Spaendonck, K. P. M. van, Cools, A. R., & Teunisse, J.-P. (2003). 
Central Coherence and Cognitive Shifting in Relation to Social Improvement in High-
Functioning Young Adults with Autism. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 25(4), 502–511. doi:10.1076/jcen.25.4.502.13870 
Berking, M., & Whitley, B. (2014). Overview of Current Treatments that Enhance Emotion 
Regulation Skills. In Affect Regulation Training (pp. 47–51). Springer New York. Retrieved 
from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-1022-9_5 
Berwid, O. G., Curko Kera, E. A., Marks, D. J., Santra, A., Bender, H. A., & Halperin, J. M. (2005). 
Sustained attention and response inhibition in young children at risk for Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 46(11), 1219–
1229. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2005.00417.x 
Bettelheim, B. (1967). Empty Fortress. Simon and Schuster. 
Bigham, S. (2010). Impaired Competence for Pretense in Children with Autism: Exploring Potential 
Cognitive Predictors. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(1), 30–38. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0820-6 
Birks, M., & Mills, J. (2011). Grounded theory: A practical guide. London: Sage. 
Bíró, S., & Russell, J. (2001). The execution of arbitrary procedures by children with autism. 
Development and Psychopathology, 13(01), 97–110. 
Bishop, D. V., & Norbury, C. F. (2005). Executive functions in children with communication 
impairments, in relation to autistic symptomatology I: Generativity. Autism, 9(1), 7–27. 
123 
 
Blake, P. R., & McAuliffe, K. (2011). ‘I had so much it didn’t seem fair’: Eight-year-olds reject two 
forms of inequity. Cognition, 120(2), 215–224. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.04.006 
Boucher, J. (1999). Editorial: interventions with children with autism-methods based on play. Child 
Language Teaching and Therapy, 15(1), 1–5. 
Boyle, C. A., Boulet, S., Schieve, L. A., Cohen, R. A., Blumberg, S. J., Yeargin-Allsopp, M., … 
Kogan, M. D. (2011). Trends in the Prevalence of Developmental Disabilities in US Children, 
1997–2008. Pediatrics, peds.2010–2989. doi:10.1542/peds.2010-2989 
Brandimonte, M. A., Filippello, P., Coluccia, E., Altgassen, M., & Kliegel, M. (2011). To do or not to 
do? Prospective memory versus response inhibition in autism spectrum disorder and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Memory, 19(1), 56–66. doi:10.1080/09658211.2010.535657 
Bratman, M. E. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327–341. 
Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Gray, J. R., Molfese, D. L., & Snyder, A. (2001). Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex and Response Conflict: Effects of Frequency, Inhibition and Errors. Cerebral Cortex, 
11(9), 825–836. doi:10.1093/cercor/11.9.825 
Breslau, D. N. (1982). Siblings of disabled children: Birth order and age-spacing effects. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 10(1), 85–95. doi:10.1007/BF00915953 
Brown, J., & Whiten, A. (2000). Imitation, Theory of Mind and Related Activities in Autism An 
Observational Study of Spontaneous Behaviour in Everyday Contexts. Autism, 4(2), 185–204. 
Brunsdon, V. E., & Happé, F. (2014). Exploring the ‘fractionation’ of autism at the cognitive level. 
Autism, 18(1), 17–30. doi:10.1177/1362361313499456 
Burnette, C. P., Mundy, P. C., Meyer, J. A., Sutton, S. K., Vaughan, A. E., & Charak, D. (2005). 
Weak Central Coherence and Its Relations to Theory of Mind and Anxiety in Autism. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35(1), 63–73. doi:10.1007/s10803-004-1035-5 
Burton, S. L., & Parks, A. L. (1994). Self-esteem, locus of control, and career aspirations of college-
age siblings of individuals with disabilities. Social Work Research, 18(3), 178–185. 
Cage, E., Pellicano, E., Shah, P., & Bird, G. (2013). Reputation management: Evidence for ability but 
reduced propensity in autism. Autism Research, 6(5), 433-442. 
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton 
University Press. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=hu&lr=&id=o7iRQTOe0AoC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=Beh
avioral+game+theory:+Experiments+in+strategic+interactio&ots=GqKe9cCl3O&sig=u31MxI
vYIO_V4mgX5n2I4OUD62o 
Carlson, S. M., Mandell, D. J., & Williams, L. (2004). Executive Function and Theory of Mind: 
Stability and Prediction From Ages 2 to 3. Developmental Psychology, 40(6), 1105–1122. 
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1105 
Carlson, S. M., & Moses, L. J. (2001). Individual differences in inhibitory control and children's 
theory of mind. Child development, 72(4), 1032-1053. 
Carlson, S. M., Moses, L. J., & Breton, C. (2002). How specific is the relation between executive 
function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working memory. Infant 
and Child Development, 11(2), 73–92. 
Carlson, S. M., & Wang, T. S. (2007). Inhibitory control and emotion regulation in preschool 
children. Cognitive Development, 22(4), 489–510. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.08.002 
Cartwright-Hatton, S., Roberts, C., Chitsabesan, P., Fothergill, C., & Harrington, R. (2004). 
Systematic review of the efficacy of cognitive behaviour therapies for childhood and 
124 
 
adolescent anxiety disorders. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(4), 421–436. 
doi:10.1348/0144665042388928 
Casey, B. J., Tottenham, N., Liston, C., & Durston, S. (2005). Imaging the developing brain: what 
have we learned about cognitive development? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(3), 104–110. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.011 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (1999). Thimerosal in vaccines: a joint statement 
of the American Academy of Pediatrics and the Public Health Service. MMWR. Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report, 48(26), 563–565. 
Chakrabarti, S., & Fombonne, E. (2001). Pervasive developmental disorders in preschool children. 
JAMA, 285(24), 3093–3099. doi:10.1001/jama.285.24.3093 
Chan, A. S., Cheung, M., Han, Y. M. Y., Sze, S. L., Leung, W. W., Man, H. S., & To, C. Y. (2009). 
Executive function deficits and neural discordance in children with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders. Clinical Neurophysiology, 120(6), 1107–1115. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2009.04.002 
Chan, A. S., Han, Y. M. Y., Leung, W. W., Leung, C., Wong, V. C. N., & Cheung, M. (2011). 
Abnormalities in the anterior cingulate cortex associated with attentional and inhibitory control 
deficits: A neurophysiological study on children with autism spectrum disorders. Research in 
Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5(1), 254–266. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2010.04.007 
Channon, S., Pratt, P., & Robertson, M. M. (2003). Executive function, memory, and learning in 
Tourette’s syndrome. Neuropsychology, 17(2), 247–254. doi:10.1037/0894-4105.17.2.247 
Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing grounded theory: A practice guide through qualitative analysis. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Chen, Y.-H., Rodgers, J., & McConachie, H. (2009). Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours, Sensory 
Processing and Cognitive Style in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(4), 635–642. doi:10.1007/s10803-008-0663-6 
Chevallier, C., Kohls, G., Troiani, V., Brodkin, E. S., & Schultz, R. T. (2012). The social motivation 
theory of autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(4), 231–239. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.02.007 
Christ, S. E., Holt, D. D., White, D. A., & Green, L. (2007). Inhibitory Control in Children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(6), 1155–
1165. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0259-y 
Christ, S. E., Kester, L. E., Bodner, K. E., & Miles, J. H. (2011). Evidence for selective inhibitory 
impairment in individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Neuropsychology, 25(6), 690–701. 
doi:10.1037/a0024256 
Cohen, J. (1962). The statistical power of abnormal-social psychological research: A review. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65(3), 145–153. 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155. 
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p<. 05). American Psychologist, 49(12), 997. 
Colombi, C., Liebal, K., Tomasello, M., Young, G., Warneken, F., & Rogers, S. J. (2009). Examining 
correlates of cooperation in autism Imitation, joint attention, and understanding intentions. 
Autism, 13(2), 143–163. 
Colvert, E., Custance, D., & Swettenham, J. (2002). Rule-based reasoning and theory of mind in 
autism: a commentary on the work of Zelazo, Jacques, Burack and Frye. Infant and Child 
Development, 11(2), 197–200. 
Cook, D. R., & Weisberg, S. (1982). Residuals and influence in regression. New York: Chapman & 
Hall. 
125 
 
Corbett, B. A., & Constantine, L. J. (2006). Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: 
Assessing Attention and Response Control with the Integrated Visual and Auditory Continuous 
Performance Test. Child Neuropsychology, 12(4-5), 335–348. 
doi:10.1080/09297040500350938 
Corbett, B. A., Constantine, L. J., Hendren, R., Rocke, D., & Ozonoff, S. (2009). Examining 
executive functioning in children with autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder and typical development. Psychiatry Research, 166(2–3), 210–222. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2008.02.005 
Cragg, L., & Nation, K. (2008). Go or no-go? Developmental improvements in the efficiency of 
response inhibition in mid-childhood. Developmental Science, 11(6), 819–827. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00730.x 
Creasey, G. L., Jarvis, P. A., & Berk, L. E. (1998). Play and social competence. Multiple Perspectives 
on Play in Early Childhood Education, 116–143. 
Cumming, G. (2013). The New Statistics Why and How. Psychological Science, 0956797613504966. 
doi:10.1177/0956797613504966 
Damasio, A. R., & Maurer, R. G. (1978). A neurological model for childhood autism. Archives of 
Neurology, 35(12), 777–786. doi:10.1001/archneur.1978.00500360001001 
Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. Jossey-Bass Publishers. Retrieved from 
http://www.getcited.org/pub/101787803 
Dempster, A. P. (1997). The direct use of likelihood for significance testing. Statistics and 
Computing, 7(4), 247–252. doi:10.1023/A:1018598421607 
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: Which side are you on? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6(3), 274–290. 
Downs, A., & Smith, T. (2004). Emotional understanding, cooperation, and social behavior in high-
functioning children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 34(6), 625–
635. 
Dowsett, S. M., & Livesey, D. J. (2000). The development of inhibitory control in preschool children: 
Effects of “executive skills” training. Developmental psychobiology, 36(2), 161-174. 
Dunn, J. (1991). Understanding others: Evidence from naturalistic studies of children. 
Dunn, J. (2002). Sibling relationships. Blackwell Publishing. 
Dunn, L. M., & Dunn, D. M. (2009). British picture vocabulary scale: third edition (BPVS-III). 
London: GL Assessment Limited. 
Dunn, L. M., & Dunn, L. M. (1982). British Picture Vocabulary Scale. Windsor: NFER-Nelson. 
Durston, S., Thomas, K. M., Worden, M. S., Yang, Y., & Casey, B. J. (2002). The Effect of Preceding 
Context on Inhibition: An Event-Related fMRI Study. NeuroImage, 16(2), 449–453. 
doi:10.1006/nimg.2002.1074 
Duval, S., & Tweedie, R. (2000). A nonparametric ‘trim and fill’ method of accounting for 
publication bias in meta-analysis. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 95(449), 89–
98. 
Dworzynski, K., Happé, F., Bolton, P., & Ronald, A. (2009). Relationship Between Symptom 
Domains in Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Population Based Twin Study. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 39(8), 1197–1210. doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0736-1 
126 
 
Eisenberg, L., & Kanner, L. (1956). Childhood Schizophrenia Symposium, 1955. 6. Early Infantile 
Autism, 1943-55. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 26(3), 556–566. doi:10.1111/j.1939-
0025.1956.tb06202.x 
El-Ghoroury, N. H., & Romanczyk, R. G. (1999). Play interactions of family members towards 
children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(3), 249–258. 
Elsabbagh, M., & Johnson, M. H. (2010). Getting answers from babies about autism. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 14(2), 81–87. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.005 
Fahie, C. M., & Symons, D. K. (2003). Executive functioning and theory of mind in children 
clinically referred for attention and behavior problems. Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology, 24(1), 51–73. 
Farley, M. A., McMahon, W. M., Fombonne, E., Jenson, W. R., Miller, J., Gardner, M., … Coon, H. 
(2009). Twenty-year outcome for individuals with autism and average or near-average 
cognitive abilities. Autism Research, 2(2), 109–118. doi:10.1002/aur.69 
Fehr, E., Bernhard, H., & Rockenbach, B. (2008). Egalitarianism in young children. Nature, 
454(7208), 1079–1083. 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 137–140. 
doi:10.1038/415137a 
Ferraioli, S. J., & Harris, S. L. (2009). The impact of autism on siblings. Social Work in Mental 
Health, 8(1), 41–53. 
Fombonne, E. (1999). The epidemiology of autism: a review. Psychological Medicine, 29(04), 769–
786. 
Fombonne, E. (2008). Thimerosal disappears but autism remains. Archives of General Psychiatry, 
65(1), 15–16. doi:10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2007.2 
Fombonne, E. (2009). Epidemiology of pervasive developmental disorders. Pediatric Research, 65(6), 
591–598. doi:10.1203/PDR.0b013e31819e7203 
Friedman, N. P., Miyake, A., Corley, R. P., Young, S. E., DeFries, J. C., & Hewitt, J. K. (2006). Not 
All Executive Functions Are Related to Intelligence. Psychological Science, 17(2), 172–179. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01681.x 
Frith, D. U. (1972). Cognitive mechanisms in autism: Experiments with color and tone sequence 
production. Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia, 2(2), 160–173. 
doi:10.1007/BF01537569 
Frith, U. (2001). Mind Blindness and the Brain in Autism. Neuron, 32(6), 969–979. 
doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(01)00552-9 
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 358(1431), 459–
473. doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 
Frith, U., & Happé, F. (1994). Autism: beyond ‘theory of mind’. Cognition, 50(1–3), 115–132. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90024-8 
Frith, U., Happé, F., & Frances, S. (1994). Autism and theory of mind in everyday life. Social 
Development, 3(2), 108–124. 
Gagnon, S. G., & Nagle, R. J. (2004). Relationships between peer interactive play and social 
competence in at%risk preschool children. Psychology in the Schools, 41(2), 173–189. 
127 
 
Gardener, H., Spiegelman, D., & Buka, S. L. (2009). Prenatal risk factors for autism: comprehensive 
meta-analysis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 195(1), 7–14. doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.108.051672 
Garon, N., Bryson, S. E., & Smith, I. M. (2008). Executive function in preschoolers: A review using 
an integrative framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134(1), 31. 
Gelber, R. D., & Goldhirsch, A. (1991). Meta-analysis: The fashion of summing-up evidence Part I. 
Rationale and Conduct. Annals of Oncology, 2(7), 461–468. 
Gerson, R. P., & Damon, W. (1978). Moral understanding and children’s conduct. New Directions for 
Child and Adolescent Development, (2), 41–59. 
Gerstadt, C. L., Hong, Y. J., & Diamond, A. (1994). The relationship between cognition and action: 
Performance of children 312–7 years old on a stroop-like day-night test. Cognition, 53(2), 
129–153. 
Geurts, H. M., Begeer, S., & Stockmann, L. (2009). Brief Report: Inhibitory Control of Socially 
Relevant Stimuli in Children with High Functioning Autism. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 39(11), 1603–1607. doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0786-4 
Geurts, H. M., Luman, M., & Van Meel, C. S. (2008). What’s in a game: the effect of social 
motivation on interference control in boys with ADHD and autism spectrum disorders. Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 49(8), 848–857. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2008.01916.x 
Geurts, H. M., van den Bergh, S. F. W. M., & Ruzzano, L. (2014). Prepotent Response Inhibition and 
Interference Control in Autism Spectrum Disorders: Two Meta-Analyses. Autism Research, 
n/a–n/a. doi:10.1002/aur.1369 
Geurts, H. M., Verté, S., Oosterlaan, J., Roeyers, H., & Sergeant, J. A. (2004). How specific are 
executive functioning deficits in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism? Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(4), 836–854. 
Gillberg, C. (1984). Infantile autism and other childhood psychoses in a Swedish urban region. 
Epidemiological aspects. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines, 
25(1), 35–43. 
Gilotty, L., Kenworthy, L., Sirian, L., Black, D. O., & Wagner, A. E. (2002). Adaptive Skills and 
Executive Function in Autism Spectrum Disorders. Child Neuropsychology, 8(4), 241–248. 
doi:10.1076/chin.8.4.241.13504 
Goldberg, M. C., Mostofsky, S. H., Cutting, L. E., Mahone, E. M., Astor, B. C., Denckla, M. B., & 
Landa, R. J. (2005). Subtle executive impairment in children with autism and children with 
ADHD. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35(3), 279–293. 
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The Neural Bases of Emotion Regulation: 
Reappraisal and Suppression of Negative Emotion. Biological Psychiatry, 63(6), 577–586. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2007.05.031 
Goodman, R. (1997). The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire: a research note. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 38(5), 581–586. 
Goodman, R. (2001). Psychometric Properties of the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. Journal 
of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 40(11), 1337-1345.  
Grant, C. M., Boucher, J., Riggs, K. J., & Grayson, A. (2005). Moral understanding in children with 
autism. Autism, 9(3), 317–331. doi:10.1177/1362361305055418 
Grier, J. B. (1971). Nonparametric indexes for sensitivity and bias: computing formulas. 
Psychological Bulletin, 75(6), 424. 
128 
 
Griffith, E. M., Pennington, B. F., Wehner, E. A., & Rogers, S. J. (1999). Executive functions in 
young children with autism. Child Development, 70(4), 817–832. 
Gummerum, M., Hanoch, Y., & Keller, M. (2008). When child development meets economic game 
theory: An interdisciplinary approach to investigating social development. Human 
Development, 51(4), 235–261. 
Gummerum, M., Keller, M., Takezawa, M., & Mata, J. (2008). To Give or Not to Give: Children’s 
and Adolescents’ Sharing and Moral Negotiations in Economic Decision Situations. Child 
Development, 79(3), 562–576. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01143.x 
Hallmayer, J., Cleveland, S., Torres, A., Phillips, J., Cohen, B., Torigoe, T., … Reisch, N. (2011). 
Genetic heritability and shared environmental factors among twin pairs with autism. Archives 
of General Psychiatry, 68(11), 1095–1102. doi:10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.76 
Happé, F. (1994). An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story characters’ thoughts 
and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped, and normal children and adults. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24(2), 129–154. doi:10.1007/BF02172093 
Happé, F. (1997). Central coherence and theory of mind in autism: Reading homographs in context. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 15(1), 1–12. 
Happé, F., Booth, R., Charlton, R., & Hughes, C. (2006). Executive function deficits in autism 
spectrum disorders and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder: Examining profiles across 
domains and ages. Brain and Cognition, 61(1), 25–39. 
Happé, F. G. E. (1995). The Role of Age and Verbal Ability in the Theory of Mind Task Performance 
of Subjects with Autism. Child Development, 66(3), 843–855. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.1995.tb00909.x 
Happé, F. G. E., & Booth, R. D. L. (2008). The power of the positive: Revisiting weak coherence in 
autism spectrum disorders. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(1), 50–63. 
doi:10.1080/17470210701508731 
Happé, F., & Ronald, A. (2008). The ‘Fractionable Autism Triad’: A Review of Evidence from 
Behavioural, Genetic, Cognitive and Neural Research. Neuropsychology Review, 18(4), 287–
304. doi:10.1007/s11065-008-9076-8 
Happé, F., Ronald, A., & Plomin, R. (2006). Time to give up on a single explanation for autism. 
Nature Neuroscience, 9(10), 1218–1220. doi:10.1038/nn1770 
Happé, F., & Vital, P. (2009). What aspects of autism predispose to talent? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1522), 1369–1375. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0332 
Harris, P. L., Johnson, C. N., Hutton, D., Andrews, G., & Cooke, T. (1989). Young children’s theory 
of mind and emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 3(4), 379–400. 
Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies in the Nature of Character. New York: Macmillan. 
Hastings, R. P. (2003). Brief Report: Behavioral Adjustment of Siblings of Children with Autism. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 33(1), 99–104. 
doi:10.1023/A:1022290723442 
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis. Orlando: Academic Press. 
Herrera, C., & Dunn, J. (1997). Early experiences with family conflict: implications for arguments 
with a close friend. Developmental Psychology, 33(5), 869. 
Hill, E. L. (2004). Evaluating the theory of executive dysfunction in autism. Developmental Review, 
24(2), 189–233. 
129 
 
Hill, E. L., & Bird, C. M. (2006). Executive processes in Asperger syndrome: Patterns of performance 
in a multiple case series. Neuropsychologia, 44(14), 2822–2835. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.06.007 
Hill, E., Sally, D., & Frith, U. (2004). Does mentalising ability influence cooperative decision-making 
in a social dilemma? Introspective evidence from a study of adults with autism spectrum 
disorder. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(7-8), 7–8. 
Hobson, P. (2004). The cradle of thought: Exploring the origins of thinking. Pan Macmillan. 
Hobson, R. P. (1993). Autism and the Development of Mind. Psychology Press. 
Hobson, R. P. (2007). Communicative depth: Soundings from developmental psychopathology. Infant 
Behavior and Development, 30(2), 267–277. 
Hobson, R. P. (2014). The coherence of autism. Autism, 18(1), 6–16. doi:10.1177/1362361313497538 
Hobson, J. A., Hobson, R. P., Malik, S., Bargiota, K., & Caló, S. (2013). The relation between social 
engagement and pretend play in autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 31(1), 
114-127. 
Hofmann, W., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baddeley, A. D. (2012). Executive functions and self-regulation. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), 174–180. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.006 
Hook, J. G., & Cook, T. D. (1979). Equity theory and the cognitive ability of children. Psychological 
Bulletin, 86(3), 429–445. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.429 
Houben, K., & Jansen, A. (2011). Training inhibitory control. A recipe for resisting sweet 
temptations. Appetite, 56(2), 345-349. 
Howe, N., Aquan%Assee, J., Bukowski, W. M., Lehoux, P. M., & Rinaldi, C. M. (2001). Siblings as 
confidants: Emotional understanding, relationship warmth, and sibling self%disclosure. Social 
Development, 10(4), 439–454. 
Howlin, P., Savage, S., Moss, P., Tempier, A., & Rutter, M. (2014). Cognitive and language skills in 
adults with autism: a 40%year follow%up. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 55(1), 
49-58. 
Hughes, C., & Ensor, R. (2007). Executive function and theory of mind: Predictive relations from 
ages 2 to 4. Developmental Psychology, 43(6), 1447–1459. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.6.1447 
Hughes, C., & Russell, J. (1993). Autistic children’s difficulty with mental disengagement from an 
object: Its implications for theories of autism. Developmental Psychology, 29(3), 498–510. 
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.29.3.498 
Huizinga, M., Dolan, C. V., & van der Molen, M. W. (2006). Age-related change in executive 
function: Developmental trends and a latent variable analysis. Neuropsychologia, 44(11), 
2017–2036. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.01.010 
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. (2004). Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in 
research findings. Sage. 
Izuma, K., Matsumoto, K., Camerer, C. F., & Adolphs, R. (2011). Insensitivity to social reputation in 
autism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(42), 17302-17307. 
Jahr, E., Eldevik, S., & Eikeseth, S. (2000). Teaching children with autism to initiate and sustain 
cooperative play. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 21(2), 151–169. doi:10.1016/S0891-
4222(00)00031-7 
130 
 
Jahromi, L. B., Bryce, C. I., & Swanson, J. (2013). The importance of self-regulation for the school 
and peer engagement of children with high-functioning autism. Research in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 7(2), 235–246. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2012.08.012 
Jarrold, C., Butler, D. W., Cottington, E. M., & Jimenez, F. (2000). Linking theory of mind and 
central coherence bias in autism and in the general population. Developmental Psychology, 
36(1), 126–138. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.36.1.126 
Johnson, D. H. (1999). The insignificance of statistical significance testing. The Journal of Wildlife 
Management, 763–772. 
Johnson, K. A., Robertson, I. H., Kelly, S. P., Silk, T. J., Barry, E., Dáibhis, A., … Gallagher, L. 
(2007). Dissociation in performance of children with ADHD and high-functioning autism on a 
task of sustained attention. Neuropsychologia, 45(10), 2234–2245. 
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Emotion regulation in depression: relation to cognitive 
inhibition. Cognition and Emotion, 24(2), 281–298. 
Jordan, R. (2003). Social play and autistic spectrum disorders A perspective on theory, implications 
and educational approaches. Autism, 7(4), 347–360. 
Jordan, R., & Libby, S. (1997). Developing and using play in the curriculum. Autism and Learning: A 
Guide to Good Practice, 28–45. 
Joseph, R. M., McGrath, L. M., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2005). Executive Dysfunction and Its Relation 
to Language Ability in Verbal School-Age Children With Autism. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 27(3), 361–378. doi:10.1207/s15326942dn2703_4 
Joseph, R. M., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2004). The relationship of theory of mind and executive 
functions to symptom type and severity in children with autism. Development and 
Psychopathology, null(01), 137–155. doi:10.1017/S095457940404444X 
Kaminsky, L., & Dewey, D. (2001). Siblings Relationships of Children with Autism. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(4), 399–410. doi:10.1023/A:1010664603039 
Kane, M. J., & Engle, R. W. (2002). The role of prefrontal cortex in working-memory capacity, 
executive attention, and general fluid intelligence: An individual-differences perspective. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 637–671. doi:10.3758/BF03196323 
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2(3), 217–250. 
Karmiloff-Smith, A., D’Souza, D., Dekker, T. M., Van Herwegen, J., Xu, F., Rodic, M., & Ansari, D. 
(2012). Genetic and environmental vulnerabilities in children with neurodevelopmental 
disorders. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(Supplement 2), 17261–
17265. 
Kasari, C., Sigman, M., Mundy, P., & Yirmiya, N. (1990). Affective sharing in the context of joint 
attention interactions of normal, autistic, and mentally retarded children. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 20(1), 87–100. 
Kawamura, Y., Takahashi, O., & Ishii, T. (2008). Reevaluating the incidence of pervasive 
developmental disorders: impact of elevated rates of detection through implementation of an 
integrated system of screening in Toyota, Japan. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 62(2), 
152–159. doi:10.1111/j.1440-1819.2008.01748.x 
Kenworthy, L., Yerys, B. E., Anthony, L. G., & Wallace, G. L. (2008). Understanding executive 
control in autism spectrum disorders in the lab and in the real world. Neuropsychology Review, 
18(4), 320–338. 
131 
 
Kim, Y. S., Leventhal, B. L., Koh, Y.-J., Fombonne, E., Laska, E., Lim, E.-C., … Grinker, R. R. 
(2011). Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders in a Total Population Sample. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 168(9), 904–912. doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2011.10101532 
Kimhi, Y., & Bauminger-Zviely, N. (2012). Collaborative problem solving in young typical 
development and HFASD. Journal of autism and developmental disorders, 42(9), 1984-1997. 
Knott, F., Lewis, C., & Williams, T. (1995). Sibling interaction of children with learning disabilities: 
A comparison of autism and Down’s syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
36(6), 965–976. 
Kochanska, G., Murray, K., & Coy, K. C. (1997). Inhibitory Control as a Contributor to Conscience in 
Childhood: From Toddler to Early School Age. Child Development, 68(2), 263–277. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01939.x 
Kochanska, G., Murray, K., Jacques, T. Y., Koenig, A. L., & Vandegeest, K. A. (1996). Inhibitory 
control in young children and its role in emerging internalization. Child Development, 67(2), 
490–507. 
Kohler, F. W., Anthony, L. J., Steighner, S. A., & Hoyson, M. (2001). Teaching Social Interaction 
Skills in the Integrated Preschool An Examination of Naturalistic Tactics. Topics in Early 
Childhood Special Education, 21(2), 93–103. 
Konidaris, J. B. (1997). A sibling’s perspective on autism. Handbook of Autism and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorders, 2nd Ed. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1021–1031. 
Ladd, G. W., Kochenderfer, B. J., & Coleman, C. C. (1996). Friendship Quality as a Predictor of 
Young Children’s Early School Adjustment. Child Development, 67(3), 1103–1118. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01785.x 
Larkin, M., Watts, S. & Clifton, E. (2006). Giving voice and making sense in interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3, 102-120. 
Larson, M. J., South, M., Clayson, P. E., & Clawson, A. (2012). Cognitive control and conflict 
adaptation in youth with high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
53(4), 440–448. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.2011.02498.x 
Leekam, S., & Moore, C. (2001). The development of attention and joint attention in children with 
autism. The Development of Autism: Perspectives from Theory and Research, 105–129. 
Lee, P. S., Yerys, B. E., Rosa, A. D., Foss-Feig, J., Barnes, K. A., James, J. D., … Kenworthy, L. E. 
(2009). Functional Connectivity of the Inferior Frontal Cortex Changes with Age in Children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorders: A fcMRI Study of Response Inhibition. Cerebral Cortex, 
19(8), 1787–1794. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhn209 
Lemon, J. M., Gargaro, B., Enticott, P. G., & Rinehart, N. J. (2011). Brief Report: Executive 
Functioning in Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Gender Comparison of Response Inhibition. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 41(3), 352–356. doi:10.1007/s10803-010-
1039-2 
Leslie, A. M., Mallon, R., & Dicorcia, J. A. (2006). Transgressors, victims, and cry babies: Is basic 
moral judgment spared in autism? Social Neuroscience, 1(3-4), 270–283. 
doi:10.1080/17470910600992197 
Liebal, K., Colombi, C., Rogers, S. J., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Helping and 
cooperation in children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 38(2), 
224–238. 
132 
 
Liew, J., McTigue, E. M., Barrois, L., & Hughes, J. N. (2008). Adaptive and effortful control and 
academic self-efficacy beliefs on achievement: A longitudinal study of 1st through 3rd graders. 
Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 23(4), 515–526. doi:10.1016/j.ecresq.2008.07.003 
Li, J., Zhu, L., Liu, J., & Li, X. (2014). Social and non-social deficits in children with high-
functioning autism and their cooperative behaviors. Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 
8(12), 1657-1671.  
Li, J., Zhu, L., & Gummerum, M. (2014). The relationship between moral judgment and cooperation 
in children with high-functioning autism. Scientific Reports, 4. doi:10.1038/srep04314 
Liss, M., Fein, D., Allen, D., Dunn, M., Feinstein, C., Morris, R., … Rapin, I. (2001). Executive 
Functioning in High-functioning Children with Autism. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 42(2), 261–270. 
Logan, G. D., Schachar, R. J., & Tannock, R. (1997). Impulsivity and inhibitory control. 
Psychological Science, 8(1), 60–64. 
Lopez, B. R., Lincoln, A. J., Ozonoff, S., & Lai, Z. (2005). Examining the Relationship between 
Executive Functions and Restricted, Repetitive Symptoms of Autistic Disorder. Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35(4), 445–460. doi:10.1007/s10803-005-5035-x 
Loth, E., Carlos Gómez, J., & Happé, F. (2008). Detecting changes in naturalistic scenes: contextual 
inconsistency does not influence spontaneous attention in high-functioning people with autism 
spectrum disorder. Autism Research, 1(3), 179–188. doi:10.1002/aur.19 
Loth, E., Happé, F., & Gómez, J. C. (2010). Variety is Not the Spice of Life for People with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders: Frequency Ratings of Central, Variable and Inappropriate Aspects of 
Common Real-life Events. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(6), 730–742. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-009-0929-7 
Luna, B., Doll, S. K., Hegedus, S. J., Minshew, N. J., & Sweeney, J. A. (2007). Maturation of 
executive function in autism. Biological Psychiatry, 61(4), 474–481. 
Macks, R. J., & Reeve, R. E. (2007). The adjustment of non-disabled siblings of children with autism. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(6), 1060–1067. 
Marotta, A., Pasini, A., Ruggiero, S., Maccari, L., Rosa, C., Lupiáñez, J., & Casagrande, M. (2013). 
Inhibition of Return in Response to Eye Gaze and Peripheral Cues in Young People with 
Asperger’s Syndrome. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43(4), 917–923. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-012-1636-3 
Mascha, K., & Boucher, J. (2006). Preliminary investigation of a qualitative method of examining 
siblings’ experiences of living with a child with ASD. The British Journal of Development 
Disabilities, 52(102), 19–28. 
Mazefsky, C. A., Herrington, J., Siegel, M., Scarpa, A., Maddox, B. B., Scahill, L., & White, S. W. 
(2013). The Role of Emotion Regulation in Autism Spectrum Disorder. Journal of the 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 52(7), 679–688. 
doi:10.1016/j.jaac.2013.05.006 
McEvoy, R. E., Rogers, S. J., & Pennington, B. F. (1993). Executive function and social 
communication deficits in young autistic children. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 34(4), 563–578. 
McHale, S. M., Sloan, J., & Simeonsson, R. J. (1986). Sibling relationships or children with autistic, 
mentally retarded, and nonhandicapped brothers and sisters. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 16(4), 399–413. doi:10.1007/BF01531707 
133 
 
Miller-Kuhaneck, H., & Britner, P. A. (2013). A Preliminary Investigation of the Relationship 
Between Sensory Processing and Social Play in Autism Spectrum Disorder. OTJR: 
Occupation, Participation, Health, 33(3), 159–167. doi:10.3928/15394492-20130614-04 
Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., & Altman, D. G. (2009). Preferred reporting items for systematic 
reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. Annals of Internal Medicine, 151(4), 264-
269. 
Moran, J. M., Young, L. L., Saxe, R., Lee, S. M., O’Young, D., Mavros, P. L., & Gabrieli, J. D. 
(2011). Impaired theory of mind for moral judgment in high-functioning autism. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(7), 2688–2692. doi:10.1073/pnas.1011734108 
Mosconi, M. W., Kay, M., D’Cruz, A.-M., Seidenfeld, A., Guter, S., Stanford, L. D., & Sweeney, J. 
A. (2009). Impaired inhibitory control is associated with higher-order repetitive behaviors in 
autism spectrum disorders. Psychological Medicine, 39(09), 1559–1566. 
doi:10.1017/S0033291708004984 
Mulrow, C. D. (1994). Rationale for systematic reviews. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 309(6954), 
597–599. 
Mundy, P., & Sigman, M. (1989). Specifying the nature of the social impairment in autism. In Autism: 
Nature, diagnosis, and treatment (pp. 3–21). New York: Guilford Press. 
Mundy, P., Sigman, M., & Kasari, C. (1994). The theory of mind and joint-attention deficits in 
autism. Retrieved from http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1993-98373-008 
Nederkoorn, C., Houben, K., Hofmann, W., Roefs, A., & Jansen, A. (2010). Control yourself or just 
eat what you like? Weight gain over a year is predicted by an interactive effect of response 
inhibition and implicit preference for snack foods. Health Psychology, 29(4), 389. 
Newton, E., & Jenvey, V. (2011). Play and theory of mind: associations with social competence in 
young children. Early Child Development and Care, 181(6), 761–773. 
Ng, R., Heyman, G. D., & Barner, D. (2011). Collaboration promotes proportional reasoning about 
resource distribution in young children. Developmental Psychology, 47(5), 1230. 
Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinhibition in developmental psychopathology: views from 
cognitive and personality psychology and a working inhibition taxonomy. Psychological 
Bulletin, 126(2), 220. 
Oakes, M. W. (1986). Statistical inference: A commentary for the social and behavioural sciences. 
New York: Wiley. 
Ogilvie, J. M., Stewart, A. L., Chan, R. C. K., & Shum, D. H. K. (2011). Neuropsychological 
Measures of Executive Function and Antisocial Behavior: A Meta-Analysis*. Criminology, 
49(4), 1063–1107. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2011.00252.x 
O’Hearn, K., Asato, M., Ordaz, S., & Luna, B. (2010). Neurodevelopment and executive function in 
autism. Development and Psychopathology, 20(4), 1103. 
Olson, K. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2008). Foundations of cooperation in young children. Cognition, 
108(1), 222–231. 
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., & Kuilen, G. van de. (2004). Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game 
Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis. Experimental Economics, 7(2), 171–188. 
doi:10.1023/B:EXEC.0000026978.14316.74 
Ornitz, E. M., & Ritvo, E. R. (1968). Perceptual inconstancy in early infantile autism: The syndrome 
of early infant autism and its variants including certain cases of childhood schizophrenia. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 18(1), 76–98. doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1968.01740010078010 
134 
 
Orsmond, G. I., & Seltzer, M. M. (2007). Siblings of individuals with autism spectrum disorders 
across the life course. Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Research Reviews, 
13(4), 313–320. doi:10.1002/mrdd.20171 
Overgaauw, S., Gürolu, B., & Crone, E. A. (2012). Fairness considerations when I know more than 
you do: developmental comparisons. Frontiers in psychology, 3.  
Ozonoff, S., & Jensen, J. (1999). Brief Report: Specific Executive Function Profiles in Three 
Neurodevelopmental Disorders. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29(2), 171–
177. doi:10.1023/A:1023052913110 
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991). Executive Function Deficits in High-
Functioning Autistic Individuals: Relationship to Theory of Mind. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 32(7), 1081–1105. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.1991.tb00351.x 
Ozonoff, S., & Strayer, D. L. (1997). Inhibitory function in nonretarded children with autism. Journal 
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 27(1), 59–77. 
Ozonoff, S., Strayer, D. L., McMahon, W. M., & Filloux, F. (1994). Executive Function Abilities in 
Autism and Tourette Syndrome: An Information Processing Approach. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 35(6), 1015–1032. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.1994.tb01807.x 
Parker, J. G., & Gottman, J. M. (1989). Social and emotional development in a relational context: 
Friendship interaction from early childhood to adolescence. 
Passolunghi, M. C., & Siegel, L. S. (2001). Short-Term Memory, Working Memory, and Inhibitory 
Control in Children with Difficulties in Arithmetic Problem Solving. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 80(1), 44–57. doi:10.1006/jecp.2000.2626 
Patterson, G. R. (1986). Performance models for antisocial boys. American Psychologist, 41(4), 432. 
Pellicano, E. (2007). Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with 
autism: Clues to developmental primacy. Developmental Psychology, 43(4), 974–990. 
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.4.974 
Pellicano, E. (2010a). Individual differences in executive function and central coherence predict 
developmental changes in theory of mind in autism. Developmental Psychology, 46(2), 530. 
Pellicano, E. (2010b). The Development of Core Cognitive Skills in Autism: A 3%Year Prospective 
Study. Child Development, 81(5), 1400–1416. 
Pellicano, E. (2011). Psychological models of autism: An overview. In I. Roth & P. Rezaie (Eds.), 
Researching the Autism Spectrum: Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 219–265). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pellicano, E., Maybery, M., Durkin, K., & Maley, A. (2006a). Multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits 
in children with an autism spectrum disorder:‘ weak’ central coherence and its relationship to 
theory of mind and executive control. Development and Psychopathology, 18(1), 77. 
Pellicano, E., Maybery, M., Durkin, K., & Maley, A. (2006b). Multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits 
in children with an autism spectrum disorder:‘ weak’ central coherence and its relationship to 
theory of mind and executive control. Development and Psychopathology, 18(1), 77. 
Pennington, B. F., & Ozonoff, S. (1996). Executive functions and developmental psychopathology. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 37(1), 51–87. 
Pennington, B. F., Rogers, S. J., Bennetto, L., Griffith, E. M., Reed, D. T., & Shyu, V. (1997). 
Validity tests of the executive dysfunction hypothesis of autism. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1998-07445-004 
135 
 
Peterson, C., Peterson, J., & McDonald, N. (1975). Factors affecting reward allocation by preschool 
children. Child Development, 942–947. 
Piggot, J., Kwon, H., Mobbs, D., Blasey, C., Lotspeich, L., Menon, V., … Reiss, A. L. (2004). 
Emotional Attribution in High-Functioning Individuals With Autistic Spectrum Disorder: A 
Functional Imaging Study. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent 
Psychiatry, 43(4), 473–480. doi:10.1097/00004583-200404000-00014 
Pollack, I., & Norman, D. A. (1964). A non-parametric analysis of recognition experiments. 
Psychonomic Science, 1(1-12), 125–126. doi:10.3758/BF03342823 
Pooragha, F., Kafi, S.-M., & Sotodeh, S.-O. (2013). Comparing Response Inhibition and Flexibility 
for Two Components of Executive Functioning in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
and Normal Children. Iranian Journal of Pediatrics, 23(3), 309–314. 
Powell, T. H., & Gallagher, P. A. (1993). Brothers & sisters--a special part of exceptional families. 
Paul H. Brookes Publishing Company. 
Pronk, T. M., Karremans, J. C., & Wigboldus, D. H. (2011). How can you resist? Executive control 
helps romantically involved individuals to stay faithful. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 100(5), 827. 
Rao, P. A., & Beidel, D. C. (2009). The Impact of Children with High-Functioning Autism on 
Parental Stress, Sibling Adjustment, and Family Functioning. Behavior Modification, 33(4), 
437–451. doi:10.1177/0145445509336427 
Razza, R. A., & Blair, C. (2009). Associations among false-belief understanding, executive function, 
and social competence: A longitudinal analysis. Journal of Applied Developmental 
Psychology, 30(3), 332–343. 
Reed, M. A., Pien, D. L., & Rothbart, M. K. (1984). Inhibitory self-control in preschool children. 
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly (1982-), 131–147. 
Reiersen, A. M., & Todd, R. D. (2008). Co-occurrence of ADHD and autism spectrum disorders: 
phenomenology and treatment. Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics, 8(4), 657–669. 
doi:10.1586/14737175.8.4.657 
Restall, G., & Magill-Evans, J. (1994). Play and preschool children with autism. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 48(2), 113–120. 
Rinehart, N. J., Bradshaw, J. L., Moss, S. A., Brereton, A. V., & Tonge, B. J. (2008). Brief report: 
Inhibition of return in young people with autism and Asperger’s disorder. Autism, 12(3), 249–
260. doi:10.1177/1362361307088754 
Robbins, E., & Rochat, P. (2011). Emerging signs of strong reciprocity in human ontogeny. Frontiers 
in psychology, 2. 
Robinson, E. B., Koenen, K. C., McCormick, M. C., Munir, K., Hallett, V., Happé, F., … Ronald, A. 
(2012). A Multivariate Twin Study of Autistic Traits in 12-Year-Olds: Testing the Fractionable 
Autism Triad Hypothesis. Behavior Genetics, 42(2), 245–255. doi:10.1007/s10519-011-9500-3 
Robinson, S., Goddard, L., Dritschel, B., Wisley, M., & Howlin, P. (2009). Executive functions in 
children with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Brain and Cognition, 71(3), 362–368. 
doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2009.06.007 
Rochat, P., Dias, M. D., Liping, G., Broesch, T., Passos-Ferreira, C., Winning, A., & Berg, B. (2009). 
Fairness in distributive justice by 3-and 5-year-olds across seven cultures. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 40(3), 416–442. 
136 
 
Ronald, A., Happé, F., Bolton, P., Butcher, L. M., Price, T. S., Wheelwright, S., … Plomin, R. (2006). 
Genetic Heterogeneity Between the Three Components of the Autism Spectrum: A Twin 
Study. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 45(6), 691–699. 
doi:10.1097/01.chi.0000215325.13058.9d 
Ronald, A., Happé, F., Price, T. S., Baron-Cohen, S., & Plomin, R. (2006). Phenotypic and Genetic 
Overlap Between Autistic Traits at the Extremes of the General Population. Journal of the 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 45(10), 1206–1214. 
doi:10.1097/01.chi.0000230165.54117.41 
Ross, P., & Cuskelly, M. (2006). Adjustment, sibling problems and coping strategies of brothers and 
sisters of children with autistic spectrum disorder. Journal of Intellectual and Developmental 
Disability, 31(2), 77–86. 
Rumsey, J. M. (1985). Conceptual problem-solving in highly verbal, nonretarded autistic men. 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 15(1), 23–36. 
Russell, A. J., Jassi, A., Fullana, M. A., Mack, H., Johnston, K., Heyman, I., … Mataix-Cols, D. 
(2013). Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Comorbid Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder in High-
Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Randomised Controlled Trial. Depression and 
Anxiety, 30(8), 697–708. doi:10.1002/da.22053 
Russell, J. E. (1997). Autism as an executive disorder. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1998-07445-000 
Russell, J., Hala, S., & Hill, E. (2003). The automated Windows task: the performance of preschool 
children, children with autism, and children with moderate learning difficulties. Cognitive 
Development, 18(1), 111–137. 
Russell, J., Jarrold, C., & Hood, B. (1999). Two Intact Executive Capacities in Children with Autism: 
Implications for the Core Executive Dysfunctions in the Disorder. Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders, 29(2), 103–112. doi:10.1023/A:1023084425406 
Russell, J., Mauthner, N., Sharpe, S., & Tidswell, T. (1991a). The ‘Windows task’as a measure of 
strategic deception in preschoolers and autistic subjects. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 9(2), 331–349. 
Russell, J., Mauthner, N., Sharpe, S., & Tidswell, T. (1991b). The ‘Windows task’ as a measure of 
strategic deception in preschoolers and autistic subjects. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 9(2), 331–349. doi:10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00881.x 
Russell, J., Saltmarsh, R., & Hill, E. (1999). What do executive factors contribute to the failure on 
false belief tasks by children with autism? Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 40(06), 
859–868. 
Russo, N., Flanagan, T., Iarocci, G., Berringer, D., Zelazo, P. D., & Burack, J. A. (2007). 
Deconstructing executive deficits among persons with autism: Implications for cognitive 
neuroscience. Brain and Cognition, 65(1), 77–86. 
Rutter, M. (1968). Concepts of autism: A review of research. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 9(1), 1–25. 
Rutter, M. (2000). Genetic Studies of Autism: From the 1970s into the Millennium. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 28(1), 3–14. doi:10.1023/A:1005113900068 
Rutter, M. (2014). Addressing the issue of fractionation in autism spectrum disorder: A commentary 
on Brunsdon and Happé, Frazier et al., Hobson and Mandy et al. Autism, 18(1), 55–57. 
doi:10.1177/1362361313513522 
137 
 
Sally, D., & Hill, E. (2006). The development of interpersonal strategy: Autism, theory-of-mind, 
cooperation and fairness. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(1), 73–97. 
Schachar, R., & Logan, G. D. (1990). Impulsivity and inhibitory control in normal development and 
childhood psychopathology. Developmental Psychology, 26(5), 710–720. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1037/0012-1649.26.5.710 
Schachar, R., Mota, V. L., Logan, G. D., Tannock, R., & Klim, P. (2000). Confirmation of an 
Inhibitory Control Deficit in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Journal of Abnormal 
Child Psychology, 28(3), 227–235. doi:10.1023/A:1005140103162 
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (2003). History, development, evolution, and impact of validity 
generalization and meta-analysis methods, 1975–2001. Validity Generalization: A Critical 
Review, 31–66. 
Schuh, J. M. (2011). Pragmatic language abilities: Working memory influences on mutual 
information. University of Connecticut. 
Schuppert, M. H., Timmerman, M. E., Bloo, J., van Gemert, T. G., Wiersema, H. M., Minderaa, R. B., 
… Nauta, M. H. (2012). Emotion Regulation Training for Adolescents With Borderline 
Personality Disorder Traits: A Randomised Controlled Trial. Journal of the American Academy 
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 51(12), 1314–1323.e2. doi:10.1016/j.jaac.2012.09.002 
Sedlmeier, P., & Gigerenzer, G. (1989). Do studies of statistical power have an effect on the power of 
studies? Psychological Bulletin, 105(2), 309. 
Seibert, J. M., Hogan, A. E., & Mundy, P. C. (1982). Assessing interactional competencies: The early 
social-communication scales. Infant Mental Health Journal, 3(4), 244–258. 
Seltzer, M. M., Greenberg, J. S., Orsmond, G. I., & Lounds, J. (2005). Life course studies of siblings 
of individuals with developmental disabilities. Mental Retardation, 43(5), 354–359. 
Seltzer, M. M., Shattuck, P., Abbeduto, L., & Greenberg, J. S. (2004). Trajectory of development in 
adolescents and adults with autism. Mental retardation and developmental disabilities research 
reviews, 10(4), 234-247. 
Semrud-Clikeman, M., Walkowiak, J., Wilkinson, A., & Butcher, B. (2010). Executive Functioning in 
Children with Asperger Syndrome, ADHD-Combined Type, ADHD-Predominately Inattentive 
Type, and Controls. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 40(8), 1017–1027. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-010-0951-9 
Senju, A., Southgate, V., White, S., & Frith, U. (2009). Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous 
Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome. Science, 325(5942), 883–885. 
doi:10.1126/science.1176170 
Shah, A., & Frith, U. (1983). An Islet of Ability in Autistic Children: A Research Note. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 24(4), 613–620. doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.1983.tb00137.x 
Sherratt, D. (1999). The importance of play. Good Autism Practice, 1(2), 23–31. 
Sherratt, D., & Peter, M. (2002). Developing Play and Drama in Children with Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders. Routledge. 
Shu, B.-C., Tien, A. Y., & Chen, B.-C. (2001). Executive function deficits in non-retarded autistic 
children. Autism, 5(2), 165–174. 
Sigman, M., & Ruskin, E. (1999). Social competence in children with autism, Down syndrome, and 
other developmental delays: A longitudinal study. Monographs of the Society for Research in 
Child Development, 64(1), 1–114. 
Silberman, S. (2001). The Geek Syndrome. Wired, 9(12). 
138 
 
Sinzig, J., Morsch, D., Bruning, N., Schmidt, M. H., & Lehmkuhl, G. (2008). Inhibition, flexibility, 
working memory and planning in autism spectrum disorders with and without comorbid 
ADHD-symptoms. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health, 2(1), 4. 
Smith, C. E., Blake, P. R., & Harris, P. L. (2013). I Should but I Won’t: Why Young Children 
Endorse Norms of Fair Sharing but Do Not Follow Them. PLoS ONE, 8(3), e59510. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059510 
Smith, J. A. (1996). Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: Using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis in health psychology. Psychology and Health, 11(2), 261–271. 
Smith, J. A. (2004). Reflecting on the development of interpretative phenomenological analysis and 
its contribution to qualitative research in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 
1(1), 39–54. 
Smith, J. A., Flowers, P. & Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretative phenomenological analysis: Theory, 
method and research. London: Sage. 
Solomon, M., Ozonoff, S. J., Cummings, N., & Carter, C. S. (2008). Cognitive control in autism 
spectrum disorders. International Journal of Developmental Neuroscience, 26(2), 239–247. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijdevneu.2007.11.001 
Solomon, M., Ozonoff, S. J., Ursu, S., Ravizza, S., Cummings, N., Ly, S., & Carter, C. S. (2009). The 
neural substrates of cognitive control deficits in autism spectrum disorders. Neuropsychologia, 
47(12), 2515–2526. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.04.019 
Sterne, J. A., & Egger, M. (2005). Regression methods to detect publication and other bias in meta-
analysis. Publication Bias in Meta-Analysis: Prevention, Assessment and Adjustments, 99–110. 
Stocker, C. M., Burwell, R. A., & Briggs, M. L. (2002). Sibling conflict in middle childhood predicts 
children’s adjustment in early adolescence. Journal of Family Psychology, 16(1), 50. 
Strain, P. S., & Schwartz, I. (2001). ABA and the development of meaningful social relations for 
young children with autism. Focus on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities, 16(2), 
120–128. 
Stuss, D. T., & Knight, R. T. (2013). Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. Oxford University Press. 
Sullivan, K., Zaitchik, D., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (1994). Preschoolers can attribute second-order 
beliefs. Developmental Psychology, 30(3), 395. 
Szatmari, P., Tuff, L., Finlayson, M. A. J., & Bartolucci, G. (1990). Asperger’s syndrome and autism: 
Neurocognitive aspects. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 
29(1), 130–136. 
Tager-Flusberg, H. (2003). Exploring the relationship between theory of mind and social-
communicative functioning in children with autism. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (Eds.), 
Individual differences in theory of mind:  Implications for typical and atypical development 
(pp. 197–212). New York,  NY,  US: Psychology Press. 
Tager-Flusberg, H. (2007). Evaluating the Theory-of-Mind Hypothesis of Autism. Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 16(6), 311–315. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00527.x 
Takagishi, H., Kameshima, S., Schug, J., Koizumi, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2010). Theory of mind 
enhances preference for fairness. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 105(1), 130–137. 
Takeda, T., Kasai, K., & Kato, N. (2007). Moral judgment in high-functioning pervasive 
developmental disorders. Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 61(4), 407–414. 
doi:10.1111/j.1440-1819.2007.01678.x 
139 
 
Takezawa, M., Gummerum, M., & Keller, M. (2006). A stage for the rational tail of the emotional 
dog: Roles of moral reasoning in group decision making. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
27(1), 117–139. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.06.012 
Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing 
intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 675–690. 
Travis, L., Sigman, M., & Ruskin, E. (2001). Links between social understanding and social behavior 
in verbally able children with autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31(2), 
119–130. 
Tsai, C.-L., Pan, C.-Y., Wang, C.-H., Tseng, Y.-T., & Hsieh, K.-W. (2011). An event-related potential 
and behavioral study of impaired inhibitory control in children with autism spectrum disorder. 
Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders, 5(3), 1092–1102. doi:10.1016/j.rasd.2010.12.004 
Turner, M. (1997). Towards an executive dysfunction account of repetitive behaviour in autism. In 
Autism as an executive disorder (pp. 57–100). New York,  NY,  US: Oxford University Press. 
Unwin, L. M., Maybery, M. T., Wray, J. A., & Whitehouse, A. J. O. (2013). A ‘Bottom-Up’ 
Approach to Aetiological Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 7. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00606 
Vaidya, C. J., Foss-Feig, J., Shook, D., Kaplan, L., Kenworthy, L., & Gaillard, W. D. (2011). 
Controlling attention to gaze and arrows in childhood: an fMRI study of typical development 
and Autism Spectrum Disorders. Developmental Science, 14(4), 911–924. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2011.01041.x 
Valiente, C., Lemery-Chalfant, K., Swanson, J., & Reiser, M. (2008). Prediction of children’s 
academic competence from their effortful control, relationships, and classroom participation. 
Journal of Educational Psychology, 100(1), 67–77. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.100.1.67 
Van Ommeren, T. B., Begeer, S., Scheeren, A. M., & Koot, H. M. (2012). Measuring reciprocity in 
high functioning children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Autism 
and Developmental Disorders, 42(6), 1001–1010. 
Verté, S., Geurts, H. M., Roeyers, H., Oosterlaan, J., & Sergeant, J. A. (2005). Executive functioning 
in children with autism and Tourette syndrome. Development and Psychopathology, 17(02), 
415–445. 
Verté, S., Geurts, H. M., Roeyers, H., Oosterlaan, J., & Sergeant, J. A. (2006). The relationship of 
working memory, inhibition, and response variability in child psychopathology. Journal of 
Neuroscience Methods, 151(1), 5–14. 
Verté, S., Roeyers, H., & Buysse, A. (2003). Behavioural problems, social competence and self-
concept in siblings of children with autism. Child: Care, Health and Development, 29(3), 193–
205. doi:10.1046/j.1365-2214.2003.00331.x 
Von Hippel, W., & Gonsalkorale, K. (2005). ‘That is bloody revolting!’ Inhibitory control of thoughts 
better left unsaid. Psychological Science, 16(7), 497–500. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind and society: The development of higher mental processes. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Wakefield, A., Murch, S., Anthony, A., Linnell, J., Casson, D., Malik, M., … Walker-Smith, J. 
(1998). RETRACTED: Ileal-lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive 
developmental disorder in children. The Lancet, 351(9103), 637–641. doi:10.1016/S0140-
6736(97)11096-0 
140 
 
Walsh, P., Elsabbagh, M., Bolton, P., & Singh, I. (2011). In search of biomarkers for autism: 
scientific, social and ethical challenges. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 12(10), 603–612. 
doi:10.1038/nrn3113 
Wechsler, D. (2003). WISC-IV technical and interpretive manual. San Antonio, TX: Psychological 
Corporation. 
Weiss, L. A., Shen, Y., Korn, J. M., Arking, D. E., Miller, D. T., Fossdal, R., … Daly, M. J. (2008). 
Association between Microdeletion and Microduplication at 16p11.2 and Autism. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 358(7), 667–675. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa075974 
Werling, D. M., & Geschwind, D. H. (2013). Sex differences in autism spectrum disorders. Current 
Opinion in Neurology, 26(2), 146–153. 
White, S. J. (2013). The Triple I Hypothesis: Taking Another(’s) Perspective on Executive 
Dysfunction in Autism. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43(1), 114–121. 
doi:10.1007/s10803-012-1550-8 
Williams, B. R., Ponesse, J. S., Schachar, R. J., Logan, G. D., & Tannock, R. (1999). Development of 
inhibitory control across the life span. Developmental Psychology, 35(1), 205–213. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/10.1037/0012-1649.35.1.205 
Williams, D. M., & Bowler, D. M. (2014). Autism spectrum disorder: Fractionable or coherent? 
Autism, 18(1), 2–5. doi:10.1177/1362361313513523 
Williams, J. G., Higgins, J. P. T., & Brayne, C. E. G. (2006). Systematic review of prevalence studies 
of autism spectrum disorders. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 91(1), 8–15. 
doi:10.1136/adc.2004.062083 
Wing, L. (1996). The Autistic Spectrum: A guide for Parents and Professionals. London: Constable. 
Wing, L., & Gould, J. (1979). Severe impairments of social interaction and associated abnormalities 
in children: Epidemiology and classification. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 
9(1), 11–29. doi:10.1007/BF01531288 
Wing, L., & Wing, J. K. (1971). Multiple impairments in early childhood autism. Journal of Autism 
and Childhood Schizophrenia, 1(3), 256–266. doi:10.1007/BF01557347 
Wolfberg, P. J. (2009). Play and imagination in children with autism. AAPC Publishing. 
Yerys, B. E., Wallace, G. L., Harrison, B., Celano, M. J., Giedd, J. N., & Kenworthy, L. E. (2009). 
Set-shifting in children with autism spectrum disorders Reversal shifting deficits on the 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional Shift Test correlate with repetitive behaviors. Autism, 
13(5), 523–538. doi:10.1177/1362361309335716 
Yoran-Hegesh, R., Kertzman, S., Vishne, T., Weizman, A., & Kotler, M. (2009). Neuropsychological 
mechanisms of Digit Symbol Substitution Test impairment in Asperger Disorder. Psychiatry 
Research, 166(1), 35–45. doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2007.11.015 
Yoshida, W., Dziobek, I., Kliemann, D., Heekeren, H.R., Friston, K.J., & Dolan, R.J. (2010). 
Cooperation and Heterogeneity of the Autistic Mind. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(26), 
8815-8818.  
Zalla, T., Barlassina, L., Buon, M., & Leboyer, M. (2011). Moral judgment in adults with autism 
spectrum disorders. Cognition, 121(1), 115–126. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.06.004 
Zelazo, D., Jacques, P., Burack, J., & Frye, D. (2002). The relation between theory of mind and rule 
use: Evidence from persons with autism spectrum disorders. Infant and Child Development, 
11(2), 171–195. 
141 
 
Zhang, J., & Mueller, S. T. (2005). A note on ROC analysis and non-parametric estimate of 
sensitivity. Psychometrika, 70(1), 203–212. doi:10.1007/s11336-003-1119-8 
 
  
142 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1.  The Early Positive Justice Levels Interview 
 
Adapted from Damon (1977).  
 
Section 1 
All of these boys and girls [show pictures] are in the same class together. One day 
their teacher lets them spend the whole afternoon making paintings and crayon 
drawings. The teacher thought that these pictures were so good that the class could 
sell them at the fayre. The children sold the pictures to their parents, and together the 
class made a whole lot of money. Now, all the children gathered the next day and 
tried to decide how to split up the money.  
1. What do you think they should do with it? Why?  
2. Kathy says that the kids in the class who made the most pictures should get 
most of the money. What do you think?  
3. Andy says the kids who made the best ones should get the most. What do you 
think? 
4. There was a lazy kid in the class, Rebecca, who didn’t draw as much as the 
others. What about her? Should she get the same amount of money as the 
others? Should she get less? Why?  
5. Jim says that the best-behaved children should get more than the rest.  
6. Lisa says that the poor children should get the money because they don’t have 
much.  
7. Billy, here, comes from a very poor family and doesn’t get any pocket money. 
What should the class do about him?  
8. Someone said the teacher should get the money because it was her idea to sell 
the pictures. What do you think?  
9. Should the boys or the girls get more?  
10. Should the teacher decide? What if she decides to give it all to Melissa because 
Melissa is her favourite? Does she have the right to decide that?  
11. What should the kids do?  
12. Should anyone get more than anyone else?  
 
Section 2 
Remember there was a lazy kid in class – Rebecca. Now, Rebecca is very smart. She 
never studies, or does her homework, because she is so lazy. But she always gets all 
the answers right on tests. Peter, here, is just the opposite. He works really hard, but 
he’s not so smart and usually makes lots of mistakes.  
13. Miss Townsend has to decide who she would give the best mark to for 
schoolwork: Rebecca or Peter. What should she do?  
14. Why does a teacher give marks? Is that a good reason?  
143 
 
15. What should Miss Townsend do? What’s fairest to Rebecca and Peter? How 
should she decide?  
 
Section 3  
16. Here are some toys [seven poker chips]. Let’s pretend your best friend, 
[name], is sitting right here. Now I’m going to give you all these toys to play 
with. Would you give [name] any of them? Which ones would you give him? 
Which ones would you keep yourself? What if s/he wanted all these – what 
would you say to her/him?  
17. Would it make any difference if [name] was poor and never got to play with 
toys?  Should s/he get some more?  
18. What if [name] did you a favour or did a good deed? Does that matter? Does 
it matter if your friend is a boy or a girl?  
19. Why do you share with people?  How many of your things should you share? 
Are there some things you share and not others? Are there some people who 
you share more with than others? What are these people like?  
20. What would happen if you said “No, [name], you can’t play with my toys”? 
Is that fair? How come?  
21. What would you do if [name] said to you: “You can’t play with my toys”? 
Would that be fair? How come? What if you didn’t let her/him play with your 
toys first? Then would it be fair? What if you did let him play first?  
 
Section 4 
22. If you get a cake for dessert in your family, who should get the biggest piece? 
If there’s an extra piece, who should get it?  
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Appendix 2.  Sibling interview about the experience of cooperative play with 
HFA sibling 
 
Note to interviewer: This interview is intended to gauge to what extent poor 
executive function (i.e. inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility, and planning) 
contributes to difficulties in social play in HFA children. If necessary, adapt / clarify 
questions to ascertain to what extent the HFA child is capable / willing to adapt and 
accept the play partner’s (i.e. the interviewee’s) input during play sessions, After 
building rapport, the interview should last around 20 minutes.  
 
• What sort of things do you and [HFA sibling] do together?  
• Can you think back to a time when you really enjoyed playing with [HFA 
child]? Tell me about it. [solicit details with follow-up questions] 
• Can you think back to a time when playing with [HFA child] wasn’t much 
fun because of something? Tell me about it. [solicit details with follow-up 
questions] 
• Is there anything you think that [HFA child] finds more difficult than other 
children?  
• Is there anything you think he is better at than other children?  
• What kinds of games do you play with [HFA child]? Are they different from 
the kind of games you play with your other friends? How? 
• Who chooses what you are going to play? Is it you or [HFA child]? When 
you are playing, who comes up with the ideas? Does [HFA child] like it when 
you come up with ideas?  
• Is there anything you find difficult when you are playing with [HFA child]?  
• What is the best thing about playing with [HFA child]?  
 
